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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I examine the inter-temporal variation (course) and the 
composition (character) of late-Victorian British exports. 
The first substantive chapter focuses specifically on Anglo-American trade, 
which was the largest bilateral flow of trade during the first era of globalization, and 
finds that tariffs were the sole inter-temporal determinant of Anglo-American trade 
costs. The determinacy of tariffs for Anglo-American trade costs only becomes 
apparent when the tariff variable incorporates a measure of the bilateral American 
tariff toward Britain, which I purposely reconstruct. I conclude that Anglo-American 
trade represents a major qualification to any emerging consensus that foreign tariffs 
were of minor significance to the trade of late nineteenth-century Britain. 
The next chapter reassesses the empirical validity of the Ford thesis, which 
argued that a short-term causal relationship between British ex ante lending and 
British merchandise exports operated in the late nineteenth century. Using more 
recent data on bilateral British lending, I find evidence of a ‘lending-export loop’, 
with British ex ante lending preceding merchandise exports by a period of two years. 
A case study of New Zealand, which had an extraordinarily high share of Britain in 
its imports, reveals that the relationship was conditional upon the lending being 
allocated to social overhead capital. 
In the final substantive chapter, I construct indicators of revealed comparative 
advantage for British manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900. In 
contrast with previous research, I argue that the manufacturing comparative 
advantages of late-Victorian Britain rested in the relatively labour non-intensive 
industries, and this finding remains robust even after controlling for human capital 
intensity. Furthermore, the manufacturing comparative advantages were neutral with 
respect to material intensity. While the share of inter-industry (Heckscher-Ohlin) 
trade in Britain’s total manufacturing trade declined throughout the late-Victorian 
era, it still accounted for the majority of Britain’s manufacturing trade in the 1890s.   
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I: Introduction 
 
Aims and scope 
Late-Victorian Britain was the ‘workshop of the world’. Sayers observed that 
‘around 1880 the British economy was geared to the ability to sell to the outside 
world the output of one worker in every five’.1 Indeed, the export sector was of 
fundamental importance to the economy of late-Victorian Britain. For this reason 
alone, it is imperative that economic historians arrive at an accurate understanding of 
late-Victorian British exports. Yet, the significance of this subject matter extends 
well beyond the economic history of just Britain. British exports were perhaps the 
closest nexus between the first industrial nation and the newly industrializing 
countries across the Channel and across the Atlantic. In these industrial countries, 
British exports competed against domestic manufactures. And in the periphery, they 
were the engines, figuratively and literally, of economic integration. To no small 
extent, the essence of the world economy is reflected in late-Victorian British 
exports, in both their ‘course and character’. Still, despite a voluminous literature on 
the subject, there are several inadequately answered questions about late-Victorian 
British exports, questions which this dissertation addresses. 
Chapters II and III of this dissertation concern the ‘course’, or the inter-
temporal variation in the volume of British exports, which is plotted in Figure 1.1. 
These chapters examine, respectively, foreign tariffs and British overseas lending as 
possible determinants of the demand for British exports. Recent literature has 
suggested against the determinacy of foreign tariffs for the volume of British exports, 
but this literature relies upon an empirically incorrect measure of the tariff levels that 
British exports encountered in foreign markets. Similarly, it has been argued that 
British overseas lending was not a short-term determinant of the volume of British 
exports, but this argument is based upon data that has been superseded in recent 
times. Both chapters remedy major shortcomings in the existing literature. It should 
be emphasized that the implications of these chapters reach farther than just the 
volume of British exports. Notably, these chapters stand to inform the climacteric 
debate, which concerned the existence and timing of a structural break in the British  
 
                                                     
1 Sayers, The vicissitudes, p. 4. 
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economy during the late-Victorian or Edwardian eras.2 Insofar as British economic 
growth depended upon export growth, the proximate determinants of export growth 
were ultimate determinants of Britain’s rather lacklustre economic growth during this 
period. 
Chapter IV concerns the ‘character’, or the industrial composition of British 
exports. In particular, it reassesses the claim by Crafts and Thomas that the 
manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain rested in industries 
that were relatively intensive in capital and labour, but not in human capital.3 It also 
considers the association between comparative advantage and the factor proportion 
of material inputs. Unlike Crafts and Thomas, however, this chapter makes use of 
indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), which are purposely 
constructed for this analysis. The RCA indicators represent a great improvement over 
the proxy for comparative advantage that Crafts and Thomas used in their study. 
                                                     
2 The climacteric debate concerned structural breaks in the growth rates of, alternately, 
GDP and industrial output. 
3 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 637. 
Figure 1.1.   Volume of British exports, 1870-1900 
 
 
Source: Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-7. 
Note: The volumes are expressed in 1880 values. 
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Economically, late-Victorian Britain was, in many ways, different from mid-
Victorian Britain. The economic historian Ashworth wrote that ‘nothing contributed 
more to the air of prosperity in mid-Victorian Britain than the expansive condition of 
so many export markets’.4 Surely, no such characterization could be made of late-
Victorian Britain, however. In the 1870s, British economic growth decelerated, and 
so too did British export growth. Britain’s export volume growth rate halved from 
4.1 per cent per annum (1853-72) to 2.0 per cent per annum (1872-96).5 The mid-
Victorian ‘air of prosperity’ had succumbed to an air of depression, and 
contemporaries came to regard exports as a leading cause. 
The relative stagnation of British exports after 1872 contrasts significantly with 
the impressive growth during the years immediately preceding. From 1868-72, the 
volume of British exports increased by more than a third. 6  Contributing to this 
increase was a spate of railway construction in the United States, which engendered a 
tremendous demand for British iron and steel exports. 7  These propitious 
circumstances were not to last indefinitely. Export growth was checked by the 
Financial Crisis of 1873, the effects of which were most acute in Britain’s largest 
export market, the United States.8 
The year 1873 marks the beginning of Britain’s so-called Great Depression, 
which was to last until the mid-1890s.9 The Great Depression was a depression in 
neither production nor exports, but rather in prices. Throughout the period, British 
export prices steadily declined, punctuated by only two brief intervals of rising prices 
in the early and late 1880s.10 Yet, the volume of British exports continued to grow, 
albeit slowly and subject to cyclical variation. Nevertheless, the rise in volumes was 
outpaced by the fall in prices, resulting in a declining total value of exports. The peak 
value of British exports in 1872 was not surpassed until 1890, and not consistently 
surpassed until 1899. In an era when export volume indices were unavailable, the 
                                                     
4 Ashworth, Economic history, p. 138. 
5 Calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-7. 
6 Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-7. 
7 Saul, British overseas trade, p. 95. During the interval from 1868-72, iron and steel 
constituted 27% of British exports to the United States.  
8 Lewis, Growth and fluctuations, p. 36. 
9  For a general account of the Great Depression, including an evaluation of the 
appropriateness of this phrase for the period from 1873-96, readers are referred to Saul, The 
myth. Beales, ‘Great Depression’, offered some of the earliest criticisms against applying this 
phrase to the economy of late-Victorian Britain.  
10 Imlah, Pax Britannica, p. 97. 
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declining value of exports occasioned real concern and, indeed, an air of depression 
amongst the industrial interests of Britain.  
This concern culminated, in 1885, in the Royal Commission on the Depression 
of Trade and Industry. The Commission undertook an exhaustive inquiry into the 
state of British manufacturing industries, particularly as they compared to the 
manufacturing industries of foreign countries. 11  Questionnaires were sent to 
chambers of commerce and trade unions. Representatives of the Board of Trade, the 
Foreign Office, the Board of Inland Revenue, and the Board of Customs spoke 
before the Commission. Witnesses from the iron and textile industries provided oral 
testimony, as well. The final report of the Commission, delivered in 1886, put 
forward several causes of the ‘depression’ in trade and industry, such as diminishing 
returns to capital and the monopoly power of the railways. However, of all the causes 
referenced in the report, the most resounding was the emergence of foreign 
competition, and Germany was explicitly identified as its greatest embodiment.12 The 
final report concluded ‘that our position as the chief manufacturing nation of the 
world is not so undisputed as formerly, and that foreign nations are beginning to 
compete with us in many markets of which we formerly had a monopoly’.13  
The emergence of foreign competition was nowhere more evident than in the 
performance of British exports, which confronted increasing protection in many 
markets. The reports of the Royal Commission abound with references to the 
curtailment of British exports to protected markets. When the Commission concluded 
in 1886, Britain still had yet to encounter the barrage of foreign tariffs that would 
come in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The McKinley Tariff of 1890 raised the ad 
valorem equivalent bilateral American tariff toward Britain from (an already high) 35 
to 43 per cent, according to the bilateral tariff series that I reconstruct in the next 
chapter. France’s Méline Tariff of 1892 raised the duties on many manufactured 
imports, including textiles, and therefore was particularly punishing toward Britain.14 
Even within the Empire, there was a ratcheting-up of protection, the Canadian Tariff 
                                                     
11  It should be observed that the purview of the Commission also extended to 
agriculture and shipping.  
12 Final report of the Royal Commission on the depression of trade and industry, p. 
xx, noted, ‘A reference to the reports from abroad will show that in every quarter of the 
world the perseverance and enterprise of the Germans are making themselves felt’. 
13 Final report of the Royal Commission on the depression of trade and industry, p. 
xxiii. 
14 Ashley, Modern tariff history, p. 333. 
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Amendment Act of 1887 being one of the most outstanding examples.15 Yet, despite 
the testimony recorded in the reports of the Royal Commission, and despite the 
protectionist legislation that followed, economic historians have suggested against 
the determinacy of foreign tariffs for the aggregate volume of British exports during 
the period from 1870-1913, often called, somewhat paradoxically in this regard, the 
first era of globalization. Saul observed that ‘it seems unlikely that in the period 
before 1914 tariffs seriously hindered the development of [British] trade, taken as a 
whole’. 16  More recent scholarship by Jacks et al. found that tariffs were not a 
statistically significant determinant of Britain’s ‘trade costs’, a concept which I 
address in due course.17 Given the inconsistency between the historical record and 
the scholarly literature, I examine the effect of foreign tariffs on the volume of 
British exports in chapter II. 
Any analysis, especially econometric analysis, of the effect of foreign tariffs on 
the aggregate volume of British exports is necessarily complicated, owing to the 
immense number of tariff-imposing markets to which Britain exported its wares. 
Precisely for this reason, Hatton was unable to include a variable for foreign tariffs in 
his demand function for British exports during the period from 1870-1913. 18 
Confronting the same problem, I have decided to consider the determinacy of tariffs 
for the volume of British exports to just one market, the United States. The United 
States is a singularly deserving case to consider because it was one of Britain’s 
largest export markets—in some years, it was the largest export market—and 
because it offers substantial inter-temporal variation in the tariff level. By focusing 
upon just one bilateral flow of British exports, I can pursue an econometric analysis 
that relies upon an empirically correct measure of the tariff level that British exports 
encountered, that is, the bilateral tariff toward Britain. Indeed, a major contribution 
of this chapter is a reconstructed annual series of the ad valorem equivalent bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain. In this chapter, the econometric analysis takes the 
form of a time-series adaptation of the trade-costs framework of Jacks et al.  
                                                     
15 Beaulieu and Cherniwchan, ‘Canadian protectionism’, p. 157. 
16 Saul, British overseas trade, p. 165. 
17 Jack, Meissner, and Novy, ‘Trade costs’, p. 135. 
18 Hatton, ‘British exports’, p. 583. In recognition of the heightening of protection in 
several of Britain’s largest export markets in the late 1880s and early 1890s, Hatton tested 
for a structural break between 1890 and 1891, but found no statistically significant break; see 
p. 585. 
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The Royal Commission directly preceded a crescendo of British overseas 
lending in the late 1880s, with annual foreign portfolio investment rising from £69.8 
million in 1886 to £122.9 million in 1889.19 In that year, British foreign portfolio 
investment amounted to no less than 9 per cent of GNP.20 Most of this investment 
was allocated to social overhead projects, such as the construction of railways and 
bridges. Throughout the late nineteenth century, Britain was the world’s foremost 
creditor, but it is worth observing that the volume of its overseas lending exhibited 
long swings that alternated with domestic investment.21 In the decade following the 
Baring Crisis of 1890, capital otherwise invested abroad was instead invested 
domestically, creating what has been referred to as the ‘home boom’ of the 1890s.22 
In short, the volume of British overseas lending was hardly constant, or even linear.      
While the effect of overseas lending on the volume of British exports went 
entirely unaddressed by the Commission, economic historians have devoted 
considerable attention to the relationship between British capital exports and British 
merchandise exports during the late nineteenth century. A positive effect of British 
overseas lending on the demand for its merchandise exports was articulated at least 
as early as 1904 in Hobson’s International Trade, but it was not until the 1950s and 
60s that such a relationship was given an empirical foundation by Ford.23 Ford, who 
was primarily concerned with explaining the working of the classical gold standard, 
argued for a short-term causal relationship between British ex ante lending and 
British merchandise exports, operating with a one-year or two-year lag.24  Social 
overhead projects overseas raised demand for British capital goods exports, while 
higher incomes arising from these projects raised demand for British consumption 
goods exports. 25  The Ford thesis offered an elegant and not unreasonable 
equilibrating mechanism that could accommodate, at least partially, Britain’s 
overseas lending in its balance of payments. However, Ford’s proposed relationship 
                                                     
19 Simon, ‘Portfolio foreign investment’, p. 38.  
20 Calculated from Simon, ‘Portfolio foreign investment’, p. 38; Feinstein, National 
income, p. T5. 
21 Cairncross, Home and foreign investment, especially ch. 7. 
22 The origins and nature of this boom are detailed in Blackman and Sigsworth, ‘Home 
boom’. 
23 Hobson, International trade, pp. 106-7. 
24 Ford’s argument was explicated over the course of several articles: Ford, ‘British 
foreign lending’; Ford, ‘Gold standard’; Ford, ‘British economic fluctuations’. 
25 Ford, ‘British foreign lending’, p. 305. 
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between British capital and merchandise exports was discredited by, separately, 
Hatton and Eichengreen.26  
Did overseas lending determine the course of late-Victorian British exports? In 
chapter III, I endeavour to answer this question using Stone’s annual series of 
bilateral British lending, which had been unavailable to Hatton and Eichengreen.27 
Stone’s series permit me to exploit the large cross-sectional variation in British 
overseas lending that is evident in any given year. In contrast, Hatton and 
Eichengreen were reliant upon an aggregate series of British lending (to all 
countries) and, therefore, were confined to time-series analysis. 
In this chapter, I complement my empirical test of the Ford thesis with a case 
study of bilateral British capital and merchandise exports to New Zealand. The 
extremely high share of Britain in the country-composition of New Zealand’s 
imports renders this case ideal for identifying the precise channel through which the 
causal relationship operated. Was the ‘lending-export loop’, as I shall refer to it, 
conditional upon the lending being allocated to a particular purpose, such as a social 
overhead project? Did lending raise demand for both British capital goods exports 
and British consumption goods exports? These are the more refined questions which, 
I maintain, are best answered by means of a carefully formulated case study. 
Ultimately, the bilateral case study of New Zealand leads to a more qualified 
judgment on the validity of the Ford thesis than would have been concluded 
otherwise. 
Turning now to the character of late-Victorian British exports, the aim of 
chapter IV is to identify the factor determinants of Britain’s within-sector 
manufacturing comparative advantages. In order to measure the presence and extent 
of comparative advantage, I estimate indicators of revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) using a modified version of the method proposed by Balassa.28 I estimate 
RCA indicators for 17 manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900. 
These indicators represent the earliest systematic measurements of the relative 
performance of individual British manufacturing industries.29 Indeed, it is my hope 
                                                     
26 Hatton, ‘British exports’, pp. 584-5; Eichengreen, ‘Alec Ford’, p. 66. 
27 Stone, Global export. 
28 Balassa, ‘Trade liberalisation’, pp. 105-6. 
29 These RCA indicators predate Crafts’s 1899 RCA indicators for British 
manufacturing industries; see Crafts, ‘Revealed comparative advantage’, p. 130. They also 
predate Broadberry’s 1907 estimates of US-UK and Germany-UK comparative 
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that historians of British industries will find these indicators eminently useful. Here, 
however, I employ the RCA indicators for the more concerted purpose of identifying 
the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages, and I do 
so using the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of trade.  
In examining the pattern of specialization within the British manufacturing 
sector, this chapter finds little historical context in the final report of the 
Commission, which merely identified the causes of the Great Depression, and even 
then, largely irrespective of individual industries.30 Yet, the earlier reports of the 
Commission, particularly the testimony from industry witnesses, offer some 
indication of the relative scarcity of factors in the British manufacturing sector. One 
of the most common points raised by the industry witnesses was the higher wages 
that prevailed in British manufacturing, compared to Continental European (though 
not American) manufacturing. As one of the witnesses from the silk industry of 
Macclesfield stated, ‘It would cost about 8s. for labour to make 20s. of goods in 
Lyons. Whereas, for every 20s. worth I make, it costs 12s. to produce them’.31 It 
would follow that late-Victorian Britain’s relative scarcity of labour, vis-à-vis 
Continental Europe, was most injurious to those industries with a high factor 
proportion of labour, such as the silk industry.32 
However, Crafts and Thomas argued that late-Victorian Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages rested in the relatively labour-intensive 
industries. 33  This argument is difficult to reconcile with the lower wages in 
Continental Europe, which supplied 52 per cent of world manufactured exports in 
1899.34 It is therefore an argument worth reassessing, and I do so using superior data. 
Whereas Crafts and Thomas relied upon gross exports in just the year 1880 as a 
proxy for comparative advantage, I rely upon actual measurements of comparative 
                                                                                                                                                      
manufacturing labour productivity, disaggregated by industry; see Broadberry, Productivity 
race, pp. 28-32.  
30 One exception was the iron and steel industry. In enumerating the causes of the 
depression, the Commission cited the decline in global railway construction in the mid-1880s 
as uniquely injurious to this industry. Final report of the Royal Commission on the 
depression of trade and industry, p. xxiii. 
31 Second report of the Royal Commission on the depression of trade and industry, p. 
285. 
32 My RCA indicators for the silk industry do, in fact, reveal that Britain was at a 
consistent and marked comparative disadvantage in the silk industry; see table 4.1. 
33 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 637. 
34 Calculated from Tyszynski, ‘Manufactured commodities’, p. 277. 
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advantage for three decennial years in the late-Victorian era.35 My measurements 
normalize for the composition of world exports, including the exports of relatively 
labour-abundant Continental Europe. 
In chapter IV, I also consider the extent to which Britain’s manufacturing trade 
was factor-determined at all. I decompose the manufacturing trade of late-Victorian 
Britain into inter-industry trade, as explained by the H-O model, and intra-industry 
trade, as explained by new trade theory (NTT). I stress that the analysis in this 
section of the chapter is of a more preliminary nature. Nevertheless, it is one of the 
first applications of NTT to the nineteenth century, and it lays a foundation for much 
future research.  
This dissertation answers three questions. First, were tariffs an inter-temporal 
determinant of bilateral Anglo-American trade costs? Second, was there a short-term 
causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports? Third, what 
were the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages? I 
have settled upon these particular questions, largely because they address apparent 
inconsistencies between the historical record and the scholarly literature or, in the 
case of the Ford thesis, a debate within the literature itself. In all three analyses, I 
utilize new data: my reconstructed annual series of the bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain, Stone’s annual series of bilateral British overseas lending, and my 
estimated decennial RCA indicators for British manufacturing industries. 
In this dissertation, I do not purport to offer a comprehensive historical 
overview of late-Victorian British exports. For such a text, I refer readers to Saul’s 
Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914. In this classic text, Saul discusses 
each of the main commodities in each of the sub-intervals of the late-Victorian era. 
He also gives thorough treatment to the shifts in the geographical markets for British 
exports. While I hardly seek to emulate Saul’s work, I do make frequent use of it 
throughout this dissertation, especially when I believe that readers would benefit 
from historical context. Saul’s text remains, in my estimation, the single best 
narrative account of British exports (and imports) during this period, and its value is 
uncompromised in this respect. Nevertheless, I do dispute Saul’s assessment of the 
overall effect of foreign tariffs on the volume of British exports. 
                                                     
35 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 636. 
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Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914 is now more than a half-century 
old, and, in this regard, it is not untypical of much of the literature on the subject 
matter. Some of the most pertinent sources are from the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. The 
vintage of this literature should hardly come as a surprise. A long tradition of 
economic history within Britain, a tendency toward the study of domestic economic 
history, and the cohesion of the late nineteenth century—conveniently, there were no 
major wars—all conspired to bring the economy of late-Victorian Britain to the early 
attention of economic historians.36 And the centrality of trade to the British economy 
meant that the subject of late-Victorian British exports was high on their agendas. 
The early attention to this subject is, I have found, more of an opportunity than an 
impediment. Older arguments about late-Victorian British exports stand to benefit 
greatly from more recent literature, particularly in the area of tariffs. Additionally, 
older arguments can be reassessed using econometric methods, which were mostly 
unavailable to the first generation of post-war economic historians. Altogether, there 
is the scope for a revival of interest in the economy of late-Victorian Britain! While it 
would be audacious and, more than likely, incorrect for me to suggest that this 
dissertation marks the beginning of such a revival, I nevertheless maintain that this 
dissertation does offer significant ‘value-added’ to a not recent (but not irrelevant) 
subject matter. 
Regrettably, the imports of late-Victorian Britain fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation. Of course, imports cannot be avoided entirely. In chapter II, British 
imports from the United States figure into my econometric analysis, as bidirectional 
bilateral trade costs are the unit of analysis in the framework of Jacks et al. And in 
chapter IV, the quality of Britain’s intra-industry exports can only be ascertained 
relative to the quality of Britain’s intra-industry imports. Still, imports are peripheral 
to my work here. To be sure, the course and character of late-Victorian British 
imports would make for a fascinating dissertation, but one perhaps better written by 
another PhD student.    
This introductory chapter to the dissertation includes both historical 
background and a survey of the literature. As for the historical background, the next 
two sections of this chapter cover, respectively, late-Victorian Britain’s terms of 
                                                     
36 It was in the early 1930s when academic interest in the economy of late-Victorian 
Britain began in earnest; see Silverman, ‘Monthly index numbers’; Silverman, ‘International 
trade factors’; Beales, ‘Great Depression’. 
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trade and the geographical markets for its exports. These two topics are not directly 
addressed in any of the substantive chapters, but I believe they are of sufficient 
importance to warrant discussion here. Knowledge of these topics will assist the 
reader in evaluating the contributions of the substantive chapters. For example, 
knowledge of the share of the United States in the country-composition of British 
exports will help the reader to contextualize the significance of American tariffs for 
the British export sector as a whole. In these two sections, I mostly draw upon the 
standard descriptive texts, notably Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914, but 
I do intersperse some original insights throughout the discussion.  
The next two sections of the introduction offer a survey of the literature, which 
I have opted to divide along broadly chronological lines. First, I address the older 
literature, specifically that literature which forms the British climacteric debate, or, 
as I shall later suggest, climacteric debates. Here, I limit my discussion to only that 
literature which examines the contribution of exports to the (debated) British 
climacteric. Second, I address the newer literature. Altogether, the literature which I 
cover in these two sections of the introduction is supplemented by more topic-
specific literature which I have reserved for the appropriate substantive chapters. 
This dissertation concerns the late-Victorian era, which I define as the period 
from 1870-1900. It encompasses the Great Depression of 1873-96, plus some more 
prosperous years on both ends. 37  I have mostly refrained from considering 
Edwardian British exports. Although the interval from 1870-1913 is now an almost 
conventional periodization, there was once a tendency amongst economic historians 
to treat the Edwardian era as a period apart.38 Especially with respect to the course 
and character of British exports, the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras were distinct, 
and I have decided to direct my focus to the former. I devote the final section of this 
introductory chapter to explaining my choice of periodization. In this section, I 
enumerate those elements of Edwardian British exports which contrast with late-
Victorian British exports. The differences are many.  
                                                     
37 Though the period from 1896-1900 was far more prosperous for the domestic sector 
than for the export sector. In 1900, real GDP was 11% higher than in 1896; calculated from 
Feinstein, National income, p. T14. Meanwhile, in 1900, the export volume was only 2% 
higher than in 1896; calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, p. 97. 
38  Some notable examples include Ford, ‘British export performance’; Harley, 
‘Edwardian industry’. Still, studies of the Edwardian British economy have not vanished 
altogether; see Dilley, ‘London finance’. 
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It should not, however, be assumed that the year 1900 marks some strict 
dividing line. It does not. The years 1896 and 1899 are also good candidates for the 
terminal year of this study, for reasons I shall explain. In short, there is no ideal 
ending point. Rather, it should simply be emphasized that the course and character of 
British exports were more fundamentally altered between 1895 and 1905 than, say, 
between 1885 and 1895. That is not to deny the existence of change within the late-
Victorian era. Indeed, by focusing on the late-Victorian era exclusively, I can 
examine these changes against a backdrop of constants. 
In chapters II and III, which address the course of British exports, it is 
necessary that I defer, to a degree, to the conventional periodization of 1870-1913. In 
chapter II, this decision is motivated by the desire to situate my findings alongside 
those of Jacks et al., whose period is the first era of globalization, i.e. 1870-1913. In 
chapter III, this decision is motivated by the need to obtain a sufficient number of 
annual observations for export markets that only joined the gold standard in the late 
1870s.39 Yet, even in these two chapters, the emphasis is on the late-Victorian era. In 
chapter II, most of the discussion of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain 
necessarily focuses on the 1890s, when the tariff exhibited its greatest variation. In 
chapter III, the bilateral case study of New Zealand is limited to the period before 
1901, when there was an abrupt decline in the foreign share of New Zealand’s public 
capital formation. 
Before proceeding any further, it is appropriate that I briefly note my principal 
source for data on British exports: the Annual Statements of the Trade of the United 
Kingdom. Unless otherwise noted, it should be assumed that all trade figures 
referenced in the text were obtained from this source. The main exception is chapter 
II, in which the Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States is relied 
upon for data on American imports from Britain. In those instances where the source 
of data might be ambiguous to the reader, I cite the source explicitly in a footnote.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
39 Importantly, the United States did not de facto adopt a gold standard until 1879. 
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Terms of trade 
The net barter terms of trade, or more commonly just ‘terms of trade’, is arrived at by 
dividing a country’s export price index by its import price index.40 Changes in a 
country’s terms of trade can be interpreted as changes in the quantity of imports that 
can be obtained per unit of exports. One early terms of trade series for late-Victorian 
Britain was produced by Silverman in 1930. 41  However, the Silverman series 
presents a couple of disadvantages. First, it only commences in 1880. Second, in 
constructing the underlying import price index, Silverman excludes finished 
manufactured commodities, which accounted for a substantial (and increasing) share 
of Britain’s imports during this period.42 Still, in spite of these disadvantages, the 
Silverman series remains the only available monthly terms of trade series for late-
Victorian Britain, as the two subsequently produced series are of an annual 
periodicity. 
In 1938, Schlote produced the first long-run terms of trade series for Britain, 
spanning the period from 1814-1933 and, therefore, the entirety of the late-Victorian 
era. 43  Schlote’s method requires some explanation, as it departs from the more 
traditional method of constructing Laspeyres export and import price indices. 
Instead, Schlote constructs Laspeyres export and import quantity indices, in which 
there are fixed commodity prices taken from base years. The export and import 
quantity indices are first constructed for shorter intervals; the two relevant intervals 
for the late-Victorian era happen to be 1869-81 and 1881-1902, and the 
corresponding base years are 1880 and 1902.44 The quantity indices for the shorter 
intervals are then spliced together in the overlapping years (e.g. 1881) to form 
continuous, long-run export and import quantity, or volume, indices. The volume 
indices are then simply calibrated to the values of trade (exports and imports) in 
                                                     
40 In some early studies, the terms of trade were calculated by dividing the import 
price index by the export price index; see Taussig, International trade, pp. 252-3; Silverman, 
‘International trade factors’, p. 115. 
41 Silverman, ‘Monthly index numbers’. 
42 Ibid., pp. 140-1. The exclusion of manufactured commodities from the import price 
index is not altogether trivial. According to Schlote, Overseas trade, p. 68, the share of 
finished manufactured commodities in British imports rose from 14% in the 1880s to 17% in 
the 1890s. 
43  I have relied upon the 1952 English translation of this text by Henderson and 
Chaloner. 
44 Schlote, Overseas trade, p. 27. 
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1913, resulting in a series of ‘volumes based upon value’ [emphasis in original].45 
Export and import price indices are obtained from the division of trade values by 
trade volumes. Finally, the terms of trade is calculated as the ratio of the export price 
index to the import price index.46 
It is worth emphasizing that Schlote does not rely upon a single base year for 
the construction of his export and import quantity indices. Rather, he constructs 
chained Laspeyres quantity indices with multiple base years, in order to 
accommodate longer-term shifts in the relative economic significance of individual 
commodities within the composition of British trade. 47  Consider cotton 
manufactures. Assigning a constant price to cotton manufactures for the whole 
period from 1814-1933 would fail to account for the fact that, by the twentieth 
century, cotton manufactures had become a fundamentally cheaper commodity 
relative to other commodities in Britain’s export basket.48         
Imlah produced an improved terms of trade series for nineteenth-century 
Britain. His method was essentially identical to Schlote’s: constructing chained 
Laspeyres quantity indices for exports and imports, obtaining the price indices 
through the division of values by volumes, and then, of course, taking the ratio of the 
export price index to the import price index. Nevertheless, there are two main 
distinguishing features of the Imlah series. First, the Imlah series is superior on 
account of its coverage of commodities, which is around 90 per cent for the late-
Victorian intervals (1865-88 and 1887-1901).49 In contrast, Schlote does not state his 
coverage rate, causing Imlah to question the representativeness of the Schlote series. 
Second, Imlah objects to the base years which Schlote chooses for deriving the 
commodity price weightings. In particular, Imlah points to the atypically low prices  
                                                     
45 Ibid., pp. 28-9. It should be stressed that these series are fundamentally volumetric. 
46 Schlote does not present the terms of trade series itself in tabular form, although it 
can easily be calculated from the export and import price indices on pp. 175-8. A diagram 
depicting the terms of trade does appear on p. 47. 
47 Schlote, Overseas trade, p. 14. 
48  In fact, Imlah published an export price index for, specifically, British cotton 
manufactures. In 1880, the export price index for cotton manufactures was at 16% of its 
1814 level; calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 208-10. In 1880, the export price 
index for total exports was at 30% of its 1814 level; calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, 
pp. 94-7. Thus, a constant price weighting for cotton manufactures would be distorting.    
49  Imlah, Pax Britannica, p. 90. It should also be observed that, whereas Schlote 
splices the quantity indices using a single overlapping year, Imlah splices the quantity 
indices using two overlapping years, to reduce the error propagated in the splicing process. 
The base years for Imlah’s intervals are 1880 (1865-88) and 1892 (1887-1901). 
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in 1902, which render it unsuitable to function as the base year for the 1881-1902 
interval in the Schlote series.50 All in all, it is reasonable to conclude that the Imlah 
series represents a modest improvement over the Schlote series. Both series, 
recalibrated to a reference year of 1870, are depicted in Figure 1.2. For ease of 
reference throughout this dissertation, Imlah’s export volume and price indices are 
reproduced, along with the current values of British exports, in Appendix 1.1. 
The main turning points are similar in both the Schlote and Imlah terms of 
trade series: a peak in 1873 and a trough in 1881. The terms of trade follow a 
noticeably pro-cyclical course in the 1870s, and this pattern can be explained by the 
concentration of (relatively income-elastic) manufactured commodities in Britain’s 
exports. The global upswing of the early 1870s and global depression beginning in 
1873 are borne out in Britain’s terms of trade. Between 1870 and 1873, the export 
price of pig iron increased by 111 per cent, railway iron by 56 per cent, and coal by 
116 per cent. By comparison, the import price of wheat, assumed to be less elastic to 
income, only increased by 24 per cent. Beginning in 1873, the global depression and 
                                                     
50 Ibid., pp. 200-1. 
Figure 1.2.   Britain’s terms of trade, 1870-1900 
 
 
Sources: Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-7; calculated from Schlote, Overseas trade, pp. 176-7. 
Notes: Both terms of trade series have been recalibrated to a reference year of 1870. 
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slowdown in railway construction—New Zealand bucked the trend—set off a decline 
in Britain’s terms of trade that persisted until 1881.51  
After 1881, Britain realized a mostly consistent improvement in its terms of 
trade until 1900, which is, coincidentally, the ending point of this study. From 1881-
1900, the Schlote series increases by 29 per cent, the Imlah series by 24 per cent. 
This two-decade improvement in Britain’s net barter terms of trade was a signature 
feature of the late-Victorian economy. Meier put forward what might be considered 
the generally accepted explanation for this occurrence, which was later subscribed to 
by such scholars as O’Rourke and Williamson.52 He argued that, beginning in the 
1880s, the development of a transport infrastructure in the periphery, largely the 
outcome of Britain’s immense export of capital, contributed to a sharper decline in 
the import price index than in the export price index.53 It should be remembered that 
the prices of almost all commodities, imports and exports, were declining during the 
Great Depression.54 Additionally, Meier identified the fall in ocean freight rates as 
another factor contributing to Britain’s improving terms of trade. With respect to the 
fall in ocean freight rates, Meier’s argument speaks to the distinction between the 
f.o.b. (free on board) valuation of exports and the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) 
valuation of imports used in the construction of both the Schlote and Imlah terms of 
trade series.55 Simply on account of falling ocean freight rates, Britain could have 
realized an improvement in its terms of trade, as measured.  
The economic historian should be cautious not to attach too great a significance 
to the effect of falling ocean freight rates on the terms of trade of late-Victorian 
Britain. Certainly, nominal and real ocean freight rates were generally declining from 
1881-1900, but they were also declining before and after these decades, during 
periods of deterioration in Britain’s terms of trade.56 Moreover, Shah Mohammed 
and Williamson’s nominal freight index for the important trans-Atlantic grain trade, 
which accounted for 9 per cent of Britain’s imports by value in 1881, is stationary 
                                                     
51 The history of railway construction in New Zealand will be covered in ch. III. Here, 
it might be speculated, in passing, how much New Zealand gained from expanding its 
railway network in the mid and late 1870s, when capital goods were cheap.  
52 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and history, pp. 88-9. 
53 Meier, ‘Long period determinants’, p. 121. 
54 After the Great Depression, from 1896-1900, British export prices increased faster 
than imports prices; see Imlah, Pax Britannica, p. 97. 
55 Meier, ‘Long period determinants’, p. 115. 
56 Shah Mohammed and Williamson, ‘Freight rates’, p. 188. 
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during the period from 1881-1900.57 This finding is consistent with Harley’s data on 
wheat prices, which reveal no convergence between the Chicago and British prices of 
grain between 1880/4 and 1895/9.58 In short, the 1880s and 1890s were two decades 
on a continuum of generally, though not universally, declining ocean freight rates, 
and a more compelling explanation for Britain’s improving terms of trade must be 
sought elsewhere. 
Meier did offer another explanation. He claimed that labour deepening in the 
periphery, i.e. migration to there, raised the supply of primary-sector commodities, 
which were subject to inelastic demand.59  In contrast, Britain’s secondary-sector 
exports enjoyed a more elastic demand. Historical price data does not contradict this 
explanation. In 1900, the British export price index was at 96 per cent of its 1881 
level.60 In that same year, the Chicago price of wheat, which is net of trans-Atlantic 
shipping costs, had declined all the way to 69 per cent of its 1881 level.61 Similarly, 
the American export price of cotton, also net of trans-Atlantic shipping costs, was at 
68 per cent of its 1881 level.62  
Musson mostly reiterated Meier’s explanations for the improvement in late-
Victorian Britain’s terms of trade, though he did name one additional contributing 
factor, and that was the buoyant price of Britain’s only notable (domestically 
produced) primary-sector export: coal. 63  Coal was basically immune from the 
declining prices of the late nineteenth century. During the 1880s and 1890s, there 
was a growing demand for coal in industrial Europe. Italian industry became 
extremely dependent upon coal imported from Britain; and for this reason, there was 
a great improvement in Britain’s bilateral terms of trade with Italy during the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century.64 It can be argued that coal was one of the few 
British industries that benefitted directly from overseas industrialization, the other 
being the machinery industry. In the 1880s and 1890s, increased demand for coal 
                                                     
57 Ibid., pp. 182-3. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 5% level. The 
figure of 9% includes imports from Canada and the United States of wheat, maize, wheat 
meal, and flour. 
58 Harley, ‘World wheat trade’, p. 221 
59 Meier, ‘Long period determinants’, p. 122. 
60 Calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, p. 97. 
61 Calculated from Harley, ‘World wheat trade’, pp. 246-7. 
62 Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States (1900), p. 
178. 
63 Musson, ‘Great Depression’, p. 218. 
64 Glazier, Bandera, and Berner, ‘Terms of trade’, p. 18. 
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acted to prevent a fall in its price. Another trend that helped to maintain the price of 
coal was the declining productivity of Britain’s collieries. 65  A number of 
explanations have been advanced for this trend, which began in the 1880s. One of the 
more plausible explanations is that the most accessible coal faces had already been 
worked by this period, with the consequence that both the miners and their output 
had to travel a greater distance underground. 66  It should be observed that, in 
relatively labour-scarce late-Victorian Britain, the higher costs of coal production 
were not met with a reduction in wages. Even the nominal wages of coal miners rose 
in the late nineteenth century.67 To an extent, the higher costs of production were 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
  
Export markets 
Scarcely a corner of the world was untouched by British exports during the first era 
of globalization. The vast number of Britain’s export markets makes difficult the task 
of abstracting the essential changes in the geographical distribution of British 
exports. Nevertheless, I have endeavoured to do so, and the results of this effort are 
presented in Table 1.1. This table presents the decennial shares of categories of 
countries (colonies) in the composition of Britain’s domestically produced exports, 
i.e. excluding Britain’s entrepôt trade.68 Britain’s larger export markets, defined as 
those countries which took at least 1 per cent of exports in at least one of the 
decennial years, are enumerated individually. All other countries are included in the 
classification of ‘other’ within the appropriate category. 
While there is no inherently correct way to categorize Britain’s exports 
markets, I have done so in a manner that is broadly consistent with the literature on 
international trade in the late nineteenth century. Following the division in the British 
trade statistics, I have categorized the markets as either non-Empire or Empire. I  
                                                     
65 Taylor ‘Coal industry’, p. 46, reported that output per man-year of miners employed 
below and above ground declined from 319 tonnes in 1879-83 to 289 tonnes in 1899-1903. 
Church, British coal industry, p. 480, estimated that the inter-cycle growth in TFP for the 
British coal industry was 0.2% (in total) from 1874/80-1881/90 and -16.4% (in total) from 
1881/90-1891/1900. Broadly, these figures accord with Feinstein, Matthews, and Odling-
Smee, ‘Timing of the climacteric’, p. 178, who reported low and sometimes negative intra-
cycle TFP growth rates for the mining and quarrying sector in the late-Victorian era. 
66 Mitchell, Economic development, p. 322. 
67 Church, British coal industry, p. 561. 
68 The share of re-exports in the combined total of re-exports and domestic exports 
was as follows: 18% (1870), 22% (1880), 20% (1890), and 18% (1900). 
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Table 1.1.   Britain’s export markets, 1870-1900 
 1870 1880 1890 1900 
Non-Empire     
Industrial Europe     
Belgium 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.7 
France 5.8 7.0 6.3 6.9 
Germany 10.2 7.6 7.3 9.6 
Holland 5.6 4.1 3.8 3.8 
Industrial Europe total 23.9 21.3 20.3 23.9 
European periphery     
Denmark 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.5 
Italy 2.6 2.4 2.9 3.0 
Norway 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.1 
Russia 3.5 3.6 2.2 3.8 
Spain 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.9 
Sweden 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.9 
Turkey (European) 2.8 1.8 1.3 0.8 
Other 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 
European periphery total 14.5 13.6 13.4 16.1 
Industrializing non-Europe     
Japan 0.8 1.5 1.5 3.4 
United States 14.2 13.8 12.2 6.8 
Industrializing non-Europe total 15.0 15.3 13.7 10.2 
Non-European periphery     
Argentine Republic 1.2 1.1 3.2 2.5 
Brazil 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.0 
Chile 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.1 
China 3.1 2.3 2.5 1.9 
Egypt 4.4 1.4 1.3 2.1 
Spanish West Indies 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 
Turkey (Asiatic) 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.0 
United States of Colombia 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 
Other 4.6 5.0 5.9 6.3 
Non-European periphery total 20.6 16.0 19.3 17.3 
Non-Empire total 74.0 66.2 66.8 67.6 
Empire     
Dominions     
Australia 4.2 6.3 7.5 7.4 
Canada and Newfoundland 3.4 3.5 2.7 2.8 
Cape Colony and Natal 0.9 3.0 3.5 4.4 
New Zealand 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Dominions total 9.3 14.0 14.9 16.5 
Low-income Empire     
India and Ceylon 10.1 14.1 13.1 11.0 
Hong Kong 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.9 
British West Indies 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 
Straits Settlements 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Other 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.3 
Low-income Empire total 16.7 19.7 18.2 15.9 
Empire total 26.0 33.7 33.2 32.4 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. 
Notes: All values are expressed in %. In 1870 only, Egypt includes exports to India routed through the 
Suez Canal. 
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have further divided the non-Empire markets into four categories: industrial Europe, 
European periphery, industrializing non-Europe, and non-European periphery. I have 
divided the Empire markets into two categories: Dominions and low-income 
Empire. 69  In the process of categorizing countries, ambiguities often arose. For 
example, should Italy be assigned to industrial Europe or to the European periphery? 
In view of these ambiguities, not too great an emphasis should be placed upon the 
export shares of each category, and only the most pronounced trends should be taken 
as indicative. 
There are three additional reasons why Table 1.1 should be approached with 
caution. First, at any point in time, Britain’s export markets were in differing phases 
of the business cycle.70 For this reason, a cross-country comparison of export shares 
in any single year is somewhat distorted. Second, the territorial changes of the late 
nineteenth century are internalized in the export shares. One major territorial change 
was the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine between 1870 and 1880. Third, 
before 1904, the British trade statistics reported export values according to the 
‘country of destination’, or the country to which the merchandise was shipped, not 
the ‘country of consignment’, or the country in which the merchandise was 
ultimately consumed.71 Hence, landlocked countries, such as Switzerland, are absent 
from the late nineteenth-century British trade statistics. Another important 
implication of this statistical convention is that the export shares of those countries 
with large entrepôt trades are overstated. This issue is very apparent in the export 
shares of the Cape Colony and Natal, through which British exports to the Orange 
Free State and the Transvaal were routed. In 1904, the Annual Statement of the Trade 
of the United Kingdom reported export values according to both country of 
destination and country of consignment. In this year, destination exports to the Cape 
Colony and Natal exceeded consignment exports to there by £2.5 million. A smaller 
discrepancy of £1.2 million between destination and consignment exports to Belgium 
                                                     
69 In the late-Victorian context, the use of the term Dominion is anachronistic for all 
but Canada, which adopted the title of Dominion upon Confederation in 1867. Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Africa did not acquire Dominion status until the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Still, these colonies were uniformly marked by higher incomes and, 
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, responsible self-government. 
70 This point is especially relevant for the late nineteenth century, when international 
business cycles were highly desynchronized; see Bordo and Helbling, ‘International business 
cycle’, p. 212. 
71 Schlote, Overseas trade, pp. 6-7.  
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reveals that some of Britain’s exports to Central Europe, mainly Switzerland, were 
routed through this country. 
Despite these caveats, some observations about the geographical distribution of 
British exports can be made. Foremost, there was a remarkable degree of constancy 
in the share of exports going to industrial Europe.72 The region of the world that 
posed the greatest competition to the British manufacturing sector also remained the 
core of its export markets.  That there was no diminution of the export share of 
industrial Europe, even despite further industrialization there, is suggestive of the 
emergence of intra-industry trade in differentiated manufactures. Assuming 
increasing returns to scale, a single firm situated in Britain would satisfy total 
demand (British and Continental) for one variety of a manufactured commodity, 
whilst another firm situated on the Continent would satisfy total demand for another 
variety of that same commodity. The matter of intra-industry trade is taken up more 
fully in chapter IV. Suffice it now to state that Continental industrialization did not 
spell the demise of this regional market—far from it. 
Nevertheless, the constant export share of industrial Europe did conceal an 
important shift in the commodity composition of Britain’s exports across the 
Channel, and that was the falling share of manufactures and the rising share of coal. 
France, much more so than Germany, came to rely upon imported British coal.73 
Between 1870 and 1900, the share of coal in the value of bilateral British exports to 
France increased from less than one-twelfth to more than one-third. 74  France’s 
endowment of coal was poor relative to the needs of its industries and railways, but it 
was not entirely alone in this respect. Nascent industrializers in the European 
periphery were also constrained by deposits of coal that were either insufficient or 
simply unprofitable to extract. Italy represents the proverbial case of a country 
wholly dependent upon imported coal. The share of coal in the value of bilateral 
British exports to Italy was at 49 per cent in 1900. Still, other countries in the 
                                                     
72 To be sure, I am not the first economic historian to make such an observation; see 
Saul, ‘Export economy’, p. 6. 
73 Clapham, France and Germany, p. 234. 
74 The rising share of coal in bilateral British exports to France far exceeded what 
would have been explained by the appreciation in the price of coal relative to the price of 
British manufactured exports. Assuming that the export price of coal was the same in 1900 
as in 1870, the share of coal in bilateral British exports to France would still have risen 
greatly: from 8% to 21%.   
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European periphery, especially the Scandinavian countries, were also quite 
dependent upon imported British coal. 
The export shares of most of the countries of the European periphery increased 
during the late nineteenth century, and not always on account of the coal trade. 
Between 1870 and 1900, the export share of the Scandinavian countries increased 
from 2.0 to 4.5 per cent. The share of British non-coal exports going to the 
Scandinavian countries still increased, though from 1.8 to 3.1 per cent. Indeed, 
Scandinavia is a fascinating case to consider, and one which offers some insights 
about British exports to the European periphery more generally. 
The rising share of British exports going to the Scandinavian countries should 
not be misinterpreted as a strengthening of Britain’s competitive position in this 
region. After 1880, Scandinavia consistently imported more from Germany than 
from Britain, and Germany’s lead began to widen in the late 1890s.75 Scandinavia 
was falling ever more under the commercial influence of Germany. Some traditional 
explanations for the rising competitiveness of Germany, in Scandinavia and 
elsewhere, were the greater adaptiveness of German manufacturing firms to 
consumer demand and the greater effort applied toward developing channels of 
distribution.76 Hoffman noted that, in Norway, there was ‘a swarm of persevering 
German commercial travellers, speaking a fluent Norwegian and not infrequently 
offering more skilful imitations of the more salable English wares’.77 Nevertheless, 
the within-sector specializations of British and German manufacturing were borne 
out in the Norwegian market, even if Germany was making inroads in some 
traditionally British industries. In 1890, Norway imported three times as many cotton 
manufactures, by value, from Britain as from Germany.78 Yet, with respect to silk 
manufactures, imports from Germany exceeded imports from Britain by a factor of 
ten.79 The reasons behind this difference are addressed in chapter IV. 
The rising share of British exports going to Scandinavia is attributable, quite 
simply, to the economic growth of this region. As in other parts of the European 
                                                     
75 Hoffman, German trade rivalry, p. 128. 
76 The classic articulation of this argument is in Aldcroft, ‘The entrepreneur’, pp. 123-
7. Although, this argument did not go unchallenged; see Nicholas, ‘Overseas marketing 
performance’. The adaptiveness of German cotton textile industry to foreign consumer 
demand is discussed in Brown, ‘Cotton textiles’, pp. 512-13. 
77 Hoffman, German trade rivalry, p. 127. 
78 Tabeller Norges handel i aaret 1890, p. 63. 
79 Ibid. 
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periphery, real wages in Scandinavia were converging upon those of industrial 
Europe. 80  Scandinavia was becoming wealthier indeed. As Williamson has 
estimated, the Norwegian real wage rose from 41 to 65 per cent of the British real 
wage between 1870 and 1900.81 An even more impressive rate of convergence was 
realized by Denmark and Sweden, where unskilled real wages were not much less 
than those in Britain by the end of the century.82 The development of manufacturing, 
particularly forward industrial linkages from the primary sector, raised incomes and, 
consequently, the demand for British consumption goods exports. One such forward 
industrial linkage was the Norwegian fish-canning industry, which really only came 
into existence in the 1880s, but quickly tapped into the large foreign demand for this 
commodity. 83  In Denmark, mechanization in the production of butter had a 
measurable effect on national income in the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century.84 
Of all export markets, the share of British exports going to the United States 
underwent the greatest change throughout the late-Victorian era, declining from 14 to 
7 per cent. Figure 1.3 depicts the annual American share of British exports. It should 
be emphasized that the export share of the United States was quite variable.85 In the 
United States, the Depression of 1873-9 was bracketed by railway booms, during 
which the American share of British exports swelled, owing to demand for British 
iron and, in the boom of the early 1880s, steel. In the quarter century from the Civil 
War until the 1890s, the United States imported substantial quantities of iron and 
steel from Britain during periods of peak demand, when domestic capacity was 
strained to its utmost, and when the British price plus the cost of shipment plus the 
duty imposed was still beneath the domestic American price.86  
By 1898, the American share of British exports fell to the very low level of 6 
per cent, and not because of the American business cycle. Two forces in the 1890s 
conspired to reduce, on a more permanent basis, the share of British exports going to 
the United States. First, American protection of manufacturing intensified, and the 
bilateral American tariff toward Britain peaked in 1893/4. The tariff revisions of the  
                                                     
80 Spain was a notable exception; see Williamson, ‘Global labor markets’, pp. 154-5. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Hodne, Economic history of Norway, pp. 89-90. 
84 Henriksen, Lampe, and Sharp, ‘Danish creameries’, p. 490. 
85 Saul, ‘Export economy’, p. 6. 
86 Saul, British overseas trade, pp. 141-2. 
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1890s hit the British alkali, woollen, and tinplate industries particularly hard. 
Discussion of these matters is reserved for chapter II. The second force that reduced 
the American share of British exports was the Anglo-American relative price of iron 
ore shifting further in favour of the United States.87 Not only did this shift strengthen 
the competitive position of the American iron and steel industries in the domestic 
market, it was also responsible for the emergence of the United States as a major 
exporter of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, as Irwin has argued.88 Thus, the 
United States came to compete more strenuously against Britain in third markets, 
notably Canada.89 
The decline in the American export share was almost exactly offset by the 
growth in the Dominion share. In effect, the market share was transferred from one 
high-income area of recent settlement to a collection of other high-income areas of 
recent settlement. The Dominions were characterized by much extensive growth in 
                                                     
87 Allen, ‘Iron and steel’, p. 928-9; Irwin, ‘America’s surge’, p. 369. 
88 Irwin, ‘America’s surge’, p. 372.   
89 In 1896, the last year before Canada extended preference to imports from Britain, 
the value of Canadian imports of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof from the United States 
was more than double the value of these imports from Britain; see Statistical year-book of 
Canada for 1896, p. 174.  
Figure 1.3.   American share of British exports, 1870-1900 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. 
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the late-Victorian era. An increasing and wealthy population of consumers loyal, 
though not unfalteringly loyal, to British manufactures was a boon to the British 
export sector. In 1900, the value of British exports to Australia, on the eve of its 
Federation, had already surpassed the value of British exports to the United States. 
Yet, the population of Australia was less than one-twentieth in size. 90  The 
contribution of consumption patterns to the high demand for British exports in the 
Dominions is a point that is revisited throughout this dissertation. 
Canada, however, was the exception. Here, distance worked to the 
disadvantage of the British manufacturer and to the advantage of the American 
manufacturer. Moreover, with respect to trade policy, Canada was moving 
ideologically closer to the United States. Canadian protection was increased in 1879 
and 1887, and these reforms were effective in stimulating domestic production. 
Inwood and Keay estimated that Canadian production of pig iron in the 1890s would 
have been 70 per cent lower if the tariff was removed.91 On the whole, Canada was 
more protectionist than the other Dominions. In 1890, the Canadian average ad 
valorem equivalent tariff was 22 per cent.92 Lloyd estimated that, in the same year, 
the trade-weighted average ad valorem equivalent tariff of pre-Federation Australia 
was 8 per cent.93 Although the average ad valorem equivalent tariffs of Canada and 
Australia should not be regarded as the level of protection that the British export 
sector encountered in each of these markets, the large disparity is nevertheless 
suggestive that British exports were excluded more from the Canadian market than 
from the Australian.94  
                                                     
90 Calculated from Maddison, World economy, p. 82. 
91 Inwood and Keay, ‘Industrial development’, p. 1289. 
92 Beaulieu and Cherniwchan, ‘Canadian protectionism’, p. 157. The actual level of 
protection was higher, as the trade restrictiveness index was 30% in 1890, according to their 
estimate. 
93  Lloyd, ‘Tariffs in Australia’. Curiously, the relative positions of Canada and 
Australia, with respect to tariff policy, would reverse in the interwar era, with Australia 
emerging as the more protectionist country; see Pomfret, ‘Trade policy’, pp. 115-20. 
94 There is evidence that the bilateral Canadian tariff toward Britain greatly exceeded 
the bilateral Australian tariff toward Britain. In 1903, the Board of Trade estimated the 
bilateral tariffs of 11 countries toward Britain for the year 1902. In 1905, the Board of Trade 
expanded these estimates to include the bilateral tariffs of 15 additional countries (colonies), 
including Canada and Australia, again for the year 1902. The estimated bilateral Canadian 
tariff toward Britain was 17%, while the estimated bilateral Australian tariff toward Britain 
was only 6%. British and foreign trade and industry (second series), p. 292. The Board of 
Trade’s method for estimating the bilateral tariffs is described at length in the next chapter.  
As Canada introduced preferences for imports from Britain in 1897, these preferences 
are reflected in the estimated bilateral Canadian tariff toward Britain for 1902. In 1902, 
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Finally, no overview of the geographic destinations of late-Victorian British 
exports would be complete without reference to India, which was the largest market 
for British exports at the close of the nineteenth century. In certain respects, the 
Indian market was a microcosm of the world market for British exports. The Indian 
market posed a large demand for British cotton textiles, albeit the cheaper grades.95 
As Saul observed, the share of cotton textiles in the value of bilateral British exports 
to India was rarely less than half in the late-Victorian era.96 And during episodes of 
railway construction, India purchased its capital goods mainly from the ‘workshop of 
the world’.97 In the late nineteenth century, India was a slowly expanding economy, 
but its extreme and continued reliance upon imported manufactured commodities 
meant that its share in the country-composition of British exports remained stable. 
 
Exports and the climacteric debate 
The climacteric debate was never well defined. The climacteric debate centred upon 
the vague proposition that, at some point in the late nineteenth century, for some 
reason, there was perhaps a structural break in the trend rate of growth of some 
macroeconomic series for Britain. Was the break in income or industrial output? Did 
it occur in the 1870s, 1880s, or 1890s?98 Why did it occur? Was there a climacteric at 
all?99 Given the many possible combinations, it may be more accurate to refer to the 
climacteric debates, but that too is problematic, as it still implies a directionality that 
was noticeably absent from the literature. Summarizing the climacteric debate (or 
debates) is an exercise in making order out of chaos. In the decades since Phelps 
Brown and Handfield-Jones proposed the notion of a British climacteric, countless 
scholars have weighed in on the debate to some extent or another. Here, only those 
contributions to the climacteric debate that pertain to exports are considered. In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Australia had yet to introduce preferences for imports from Britain. Thus, prior to 1897, the 
disparity between the Canadian and Australian bilateral tariffs toward Britain was likely 
even greater.   
95 Although, as Broadberry and Gupta, ‘Shifting competitive advantage’, p. 300, have 
noted, the British share of the Indian market for cotton textiles began to decline in the 1870s, 
as the falling factor price of labour-saving machinery finally made mechanized production 
competitive in India.  
96 Saul, British overseas trade, p. 198. 
97 Ibid. Although, Belgium was making an incursion into the Indian market for iron 
and steel manufactures. 
98 Greasley, ‘Paradox of the 1880s’, offered the sole argument implicating the 1880s 
as the decade of the British climacteric. 
99 See Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills, ‘The climacteric’. 
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in their foundational article published in 1952, Phelps-Brown and Handfield Jones 
were silent on the matter of exports; they mainly ascribed the British (income) 
climacteric of the 1890s to the declining rate of productivity growth that followed the 
full adoption of steam and steel in the British economy.100 However, it would not be 
long before economic historians would associate the deceleration of the late-
Victorian economy with the lethargic growth of British exports.101   
Meyer, writing just three years after Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones, 
argued that the growth in British industrial output was retarded by the slow growth in 
the volume of exports after 1872. For each of the major British industries, Meyer 
calculated hypothetical export volumes in the year 1907 by extrapolating forward the 
1854-72 per-industry export volume growth rates. Substituting hypothetical for 
actual export volumes in a Leontief input-output table for the British economy in 
1907, Meyer estimated a hypothetical level of industrial output in that year. The 
result of Meyer’s counterfactual exercise is striking. If the mid-Victorian per-
industry export volume growth rates were maintained until 1907, then the imputed 
hypothetical growth rate of British industrial output would have been 4.10 per cent 
per annum from 1872-1907, or well in excess of the realized 1.75 per cent per 
annum.102 
There are a number of problems with Meyer’s fanciful counterfactual. Even 
assuming perfectly elastic foreign demand, it remains uncertain how Britain could 
have sustained such a growth in output—through factor accumulation, total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth, or some combination thereof? Could gross output really 
have exceeded £1 billion in the British textile industry in 1907?103 McCloskey would 
challenge Meyer on the basis of Britain’s factor constraints, and this critique is 
addressed shortly. Still, despite its several outlandish assumptions, Meyer’s article is 
nonetheless meaningful. Leaving the numbers aside, even a slightly faster-than- 
                                                     
100 Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones, ‘Expanding economy’, pp. 282-3. 
101 There were some earlier articles that examined the relationship between exports 
and output during the late-Victorian era. For example, Pesmazoglu, ‘British cyclical 
fluctuations’, p. 128, observed that the quarterly turning point in the export cycle tended to 
precede the quarterly turning point in the business cycle. 
102 Meyer, ‘Input-output approach’, p. 17. 
103 Meyer’s hypothetical gross output of £1.1 billion in the British textile industry is 
not, individually, wholly unreasonable. In 1907, the share of net output in the gross output of 
the textile industries was 30%; calculated from Final report of the first census of production 
of the United Kingdom, 1907, p. 285. Thus, assuming a constant ratio of net output to gross 
output, the net output of the hypothetically large textile industry would have amounted to 
only 15% of actual GDP; calculated from Feinstein, National income, p. T10. 
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actual growth in the volume of late-Victorian exports could still have resulted in a 
faster-than-actual growth in industrial output. The question of whether industrial 
output could have increased by 4.10 per cent per annum is unimportant (the answer is 
almost certainly no). The more important question is whether industrial output could 
have increased at a rate greater than 1.75 per cent per annum, or at least sufficiently 
greater to dispel the claim of a climacteric in late-Victorian industry. 
In fact, Coppock pointed to a climacteric in British industrial output occurring 
in the 1870s, and he implicated slow export volume growth as the main cause. It is 
undisputable that, after 1872, the export volume growth rate was substantially less 
than it had been. Table 1.2 lays out the average annual intra-cycle export volume 
growth rates, as well as the growth rates for the broader mid-Victorian and late-
Victorian intervals. According to Coppock, slow export growth retarded industrial 
output growth via the channel of capital accumulation. He argued that there was an 
exogenous deceleration in the growth of Britain’s export markets and that this 
deceleration was attended by a lower rate of capital accumulation in 
manufacturing.104 As each addition to the manufacturing capital stock embodied the 
newest technology, the slow growth of Britain’s manufacturing capital stock caused 
its average technological vintage to fall behind those of other industrial countries, 
                                                     
104 Coppock, ‘Climacteric of the 1890’s’, pp. 27-8. It is worth calling attention to the 
subtle difference between industrial output and manufacturing output. Coppock 
distinguished industrial output from manufacturing output, noting that the production of coal 
was included in the former but not the latter. He claimed that his argument applied to both 
industry and manufacturing; see pp. 12-13. It should also be commented that Coppock’s 
article provoked a lively debate with Musson in the Manchester School and Economic 
History Review: Musson, ‘Great Depression’; Coppock, ‘The causes’; Musson, ‘Some 
comments’; Coppock, ‘A pessimist’s view’; Musson, ‘A balanced view’.      
Table 1.2.   Britain’s export volume growth rates, 1853-96 
Mid-Victorian trade 
cycles  
(peak-to-peak) 
Growth rate  
(per cent per annum) 
Late-Victorian trade 
cycles  
(peak-to-peak) 
Growth rate  
(per cent per annum) 
1853-7 4.5 1872-84 2.2 
1857-60 4.0 1884-90 2.6 
1860-72 4.0 1890-6 0.8 
1853-72 4.1 1872-96 2.0 
Source: Calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-7. 
Notes: The trade cycles in this table are inferred from Imlah’s annual export volume series. These 
trade cycles differ from the trade cycles reported in Rostow, British economy, p. 33, which were 
determined on the basis of quarterly export value data. 
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where the rate of capital accumulation in manufacturing was higher.105 Thus, the 
climacteric in industrial output came as a consequence of the slow growth of capital, 
which functioned as both a factor input and a vehicle for TFP growth. The growth of 
industrial output was reduced on both accounts beginning in the 1870s, or so it has 
been traditionally thought.106 
Coppock acknowledged that the slow export volume growth rate in the late-
Victorian era was not wholly exogenous: ‘Exports react on productivity and 
productivity reacts on exports to explain a generalised climacteric of the 1870’s’.107 
Still, at least in part, the export volume was determined exogenously. As evidence 
for the exogeneity of the slow export volume growth rate, Coppock cited the high 
levels of foreign protection that Britain confronted in the late nineteenth century.108 
Indeed, one of the opportunities of this dissertation is to establish whether the British 
export volume was determined exogenously by foreign tariffs. 
Coppock’s theory that an export-induced break in TFP growth contributed to a 
climacteric in industrial output in the 1870s is not corroborated by the more recent 
estimates of TFP growth in British manufacturing put forward by Matthews et al. 
TFP in British manufacturing increased at an average rate of 0.9 per cent per annum 
during both the mid-Victorian (1856-73) and late-Victorian (1873-99) intervals.109 
TFP growth in British manufacturing had been slow since the 1850s; it was not a 
new phenomenon in the 1870s. After 1899, however, TFP growth in British 
manufacturing fell to an average rate of 0.3 per cent per annum, or essentially nil, 
                                                     
105 Ibid., p. 30. A comparison of manufacturing capital accumulation in Britain and the 
United States is revealing. In Britain, the manufacturing capital input increased at an average 
rate of 3.4% p.a. from 1873-82, as noted in Feinstein et al., ‘Timing of the climacteric’, p. 
178. In the United States, the manufacturing capital input increased at an average rate of 
5.6% p.a. from 1869-79, as calculated from Kendrick, Productivity trends, p. 464. 
Furthermore, in the 1880s, the rate of manufacturing capital accumulation slowed in Britain, 
but accelerated in the United States. 
106 The dual functions of capital accumulation were eloquently restated, with respect to 
late-Victorian Britain, by Lewis, Growth and fluctuations, p. 116:  
 
For our purposes it suffices to note that in so far as each generation of machines is more 
productive than its predecessor, a country with a high investment ratio will, other things 
being equal, have higher productivity than a country with a low investment ratio, 
because a greater proportion of its machines will be of the latest designs. So what we 
are saying is that British productivity was diminished not merely by the small amount of 
capital, but also by the extent to which its capital was out of date; and both these 
resulted from the low investment ratio. 
 
107 Coppock, ‘Climacteric of the 1890’s’, p. 31. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British economic growth, p. 607. 
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from 1899-1913.110 It would be tempting, then, to apply Coppock’s theory—slow 
export growth, retarding capital accumulation, retarding TFP growth, retarding 
industrial output—to the Edwardian era. However, Britain’s export volume growth 
rate actually increased during this period. The collapse of TFP growth in British 
manufacturing, alongside an acceleration of export volume growth, was a sort of 
paradox of the Edwardian British economy. It represents an important reason why 
the course of Edwardian exports should be considered separately from the course of 
late-Victorian exports. 
McCloskey’s landmark article, ‘Did [late] Victorian Britain fail?’, was 
primarily a response to Meyer. McCloskey claimed that the slow growth of late-
Victorian industrial output was not the consequence of sluggish growth in foreign 
demand for British exports, but rather an inevitable outcome of highly inelastic 
domestic supplies of capital and labour. 111  Moreover, McCloskey claimed that 
(economy-wide) TFP growth in Britain was essentially the same as TFP growth in 
the United States.112 Hence, relative productivity was blameless.113  Quite simply, 
supply constraints were the explanation for Britain’s slow growth. Precisely how 
inelastic was the domestic supply of capital was the subject of a later debate.114 All in 
all, on whether Britain suffered from export-retarded growth, McCloskey’s 
conclusion was clear: ‘It is implausible, then, to draw the lines of causation in late 
Victorian England from export demand to the output of the economy’.115    
Feinstein rendered the final words on the existence of export-retarded growth 
in late-Victorian Britain, and they were very much in opposition to McCloskey. 
Feinstein deconstructed the export-retarded growth hypothesis into four main 
propositions: 
 
1) that the changes which initiated this deceleration in export growth rates had 
their origin in the process of foreign industrialization, and were essentially 
                                                     
110 Ibid. 
111 McCloskey, ‘Victorian Britain’, p. 455. 
112 Ibid., p. 458. 
113  Aldcroft, ‘Victorian growth’, challenged McCloskey’s exoneration of a 
productivity-based explanation for the slow growth of late-Victorian Britain. See also 
McCloskey, ‘Victorian growth’. 
114 See Crafts, ‘Victorian Britain’; McCloskey, ‘Reply to Crafts’. 
115 McCloskey, ‘Victorian Britain’, p. 459.  
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independent of developments within Britain (or, to use an economists’ term, the 
causes of deceleration were exogenous); 
2) that the dominant effect of this extension of industrialization to other 
countries was increased competition for Britain, and a resultant loss of markets; 
3) that, if this had not occurred, it would have been possible to expand output to 
meet a hypothetically higher level of overseas demand without a corresponding 
reduction in production for the home market; 
4) that a consequence of the slower growth of exports was a deterioration in 
Britain’s performance in relation not only to output but also to productivity.116 
 
Feinstein affirmed the first proposition and, like Coppock, pointed to the myriad 
instances of foreign protective tariffs as evidence of exogeneity.117 Feinstein also 
affirmed the second proposition that the dominant effect of foreign industrialization 
was increased competition. This proposition invoked the framework of 
complementary and competitive effects of foreign industrialization that was 
originally articulated by Sayers.118 The complementary effect was that, as foreign 
countries industrialized, rising income raised demand for British exports. The 
competitive effect was that these countries began to produce commodities that had 
been supplied by Britain previously. Feinstein argued that the competitive effect was 
dominant, and he took the declining share of British exports going to industrial 
countries as prima facie evidence in support of the second proposition.119 However, 
as already discussed, but worth reiterating here, the declining share of British exports 
going to industrial countries is almost wholly explained by the American market, 
before 1900. 
In affirming the third proposition, Feinstein was rebutting McCloskey. While 
McCloskey argued that the labour stock or the capital stock or TFP would have 
needed to grow at an unattainably fast rate in order to sustain the mid-Victorian 
growth of industrial output through 1907, Feinstein argued that moderately higher-
than-actual growth rates of the labour stock and the capital stock and TFP, 
collectively, would have produced a late-Victorian industrial output growth rate not 
                                                     
116 Feinstein, ‘Exports and economic growth’, pp. 80-1. 
117 Ibid., pp. 87-8. 
118 Sayers, The vicissitudes.  
119 Feinstein, ‘Exports and economic growth’, pp. 88-90.  
40 
 
much less than the 3.7 per cent per annum achieved during the mid-Victorian era.120 
Feinstein was not too specific on how the growth rates of factor inputs would have 
been higher; he stated that there was some additional scope for reduction in 
unemployment and in consumption.121 
Was Feinstein right to affirm the proposition that output could have been 
expanded to meet foreign demand, had foreign demand been greater? This 
proposition is the crux of the export-retarded growth hypothesis. Here, there is a 
lingering uncertainty which this dissertation can work toward resolving. Chapter II 
reveals that the ad valorem equivalent bilateral American tariff toward Britain fell 
from 45 per cent in 1893/4 to 31 per cent in 1894/5, following the enactment of the 
Wilson-Gorman Tariff. This was a tremendous decline in the bilateral tariff that 
Britain encountered in one of its largest export markets. If British exports responded 
elastically to this reduction in the bilateral tariff, then it is reasonable to infer that the 
supply constraints of labour and capital were not so binding, or that manufacturing 
capacity was substantially underutilized. American imports from Britain did increase 
between these years, from $107.4 million in 1893/4 to $159.1 in 1894/5. The 
difference, $51.7 million or £10.6 million, amounted to nearly 5 per cent of British 
exports to all markets in 1895.122 If Britain was, as McCloskey wrote, ‘growing as 
rapidly as permitted by the growth of its resources’, then how were exports so 
responsive to a sudden increase in demand?123      
Three years later, when the Dingley Tariff raised the bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain from 23 per cent in 1896/7 to 36 per cent in 1897/8, the value of 
American imports from Britain declined from $167.9 million to $108.9 million. As 
McCloskey claimed that Britain was supply constrained, should it then be assumed 
that Britain simply redirected the lost exports to different markets? The answer is 
probably not. Even moving beyond the partial equilibrium of bilateral trade would 
likely not vindicate McCloskey’s rejection of the export-retarded growth hypothesis. 
Here, an illustrative example would be the Dingley Tariff of 1897, which raised the 
duty on soda ash, the principal variety of alkali, from 0.25¢ to 0.375¢ per pound. 
Between 1897 and 1898, British exports of alkali to the United States declined by 
                                                     
120 Ibid., pp. 86-7. 
121 Ibid., p. 86. 
122 Calculated using the exchange rate reported in Mitchell, British historical statistics, 
p. 702.  
123 McCloskey, ‘Victorian Britain’, p. 459. 
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108 million pounds (from 193 million to 85 million). British exports of alkali to all 
markets declined by a similar amount: 120 million pounds (from 497 million to 377 
million).  
Altogether, there was not a surfeit of foreign demand for British exports. As 
export markets were closed off by protective tariffs, aggregate demand for British 
exports was reduced, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the volume of British exports was 
determined exogenously by foreign tariffs. Chapter II finds that tariffs were the sole 
inter-temporal determinant of Anglo-American bilateral ‘trade costs’. While this 
finding represents a major contribution to another strand of literature, its implications 
certainly extend to the export-retarded growth hypothesis and to the climacteric 
debate more generally. This dissertation helps to rehabilitate demand-side 
interpretations of late-Victorian growth. 
Feinstein was hesitant to affirm the fourth proposition that the slower growth of 
exports engendered slower growth of output and productivity. His main concern was 
productivity. Feinstein pointed to the purely domestic reasons for the slow 
productivity growth in certain export industries, such as the textile industry, which 
was early to mechanize, and thus presented little scope for further TFP growth after 
the 1860s. 124  Feinstein concluded his analysis of the export-retarded growth 
hypothesis by calling for further research into the relationship between exports and 
productivity growth in individual industries. 
Before concluding my discussion of the climacteric debate, it is important that 
I stress that this dissertation does not hazard any formal argument about the 
relationship between exports and growth, either of industrial output or of income, in 
late-Victorian Britain. The connection between exports and growth is a tenuous one. 
Any research into this connection would require consultation of a large and separate 
literature. Still, it should be recognized that the proximate determinants of the 
volume of British exports were, more than likely, ultimate determinants of British 
economic growth. The effects of foreign tariffs, covered in chapter II, and British 
overseas lending, covered in chapter III, were farther reaching than just British 
exports alone.  
Without delving into the effect of exports on growth, it may briefly be noted 
that the income of nineteenth-century Britain was very dependent upon trade. Clark 
                                                     
124 Feinstein, ‘Exports and economic growth’, p. 93. 
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et al. recently claimed that, if Britain became autarkic in 1850, welfare would have 
been 25 to 30 per cent lower.125 The increasing cost of autarky throughout the early 
nineteenth century was mostly due to the changing relative factor endowments of 
Britain; it became increasingly capital-abundant relative to the rest of the world.126 
There is no reason to believe that Britain would have been less dependent upon trade 
in the late nineteenth century than in 1850. Insofar as foreign tariffs and overseas 
lending determined the volume of British trade, so too did they determine the income 
level. 
 
The newer literature 
The beginning of the ‘newer literature’ on British exports can be dated to Hatton’s 
article, ‘The demand for British exports, 1870-1913’, published in 1990. This article 
was the first thoroughgoing econometric analysis of late nineteenth-century British 
exports. Hatton estimated a demand function for the annual volume of British 
exports. In the main specification of the export demand function, the coefficient of 
the explanatory variable for British overseas lending was statistically insignificant.127 
This finding, which undermined the Ford thesis, is the main motivation of the third 
chapter of this dissertation, and a more comprehensive discussion is deferred to then. 
Nevertheless, Hatton drew several other conclusions from his demand function, 
based upon the other explanatory variables. He found that the greatest contribution to 
the growth in the volume of British exports was the growth in world trade.128 The 
long-run elasticity of British exports to world trade was 0.83, or less than unit-
elastic. 129  Another statistically significant determinant of the volume of British 
exports was the relative price of British exports, which Hatton calculated as the 
British export price index divided by a trade-weighted index of the export price 
indices of other industrial countries, specifically France, Germany, and the United 
States.130 Yet, compared to the growth in world trade, the contribution of relative 
                                                     
125 Clark, O’Rourke, and Taylor, ‘Growing dependence’, p. 111. 
126 Ibid., p. 126. 
127 Hatton, ‘British exports’, pp. 584-5. 
128 Ibid., p. 591. 
129 Ibid., p. 586. 
130 Ibid., p. 584. 
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prices—not to be confused with the terms of trade—to British export volume growth 
was minor, and virtually nil during the sub-interval from 1891/3-1911/3.131 
Hatton’s export demand function presents several shortcomings. First, as 
previously noted, there was no explanatory variable for foreign tariffs. Second, there 
was likely a lack of stationarity in a number of variables. Even after taking the 
natural logarithm of the volume of British exports, which Hatton did, the null 
hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at any conventional level for this 
variable. The R2 values of 0.99 in every specification of the demand function are 
symptomatic of econometrical problems.132 Third, the central finding of the article 
that the growth of world trade was the principal determinant of the growth of British 
exports dodges a more meaningful identification of the determinants of British export 
volume growth. If British exports were less than unit-elastic to world exports, was 
this difference due to slower income growth in Britain’s principal export markets, 
foreign tariffs that disproportionately discriminated against British exports, or 
perhaps the more limited scope for Britain to further integrate into world commodity 
markets after 1870?   
Atlantic commodity market integration was the focus of O’Rourke and 
Williamson. They argued that declining transport costs produced an Anglo-American 
commodity-price convergence, with British manufacturing prices and American 
agricultural prices rising, and with British agricultural prices and American 
manufacturing prices falling, ceteris paribus, between 1870 and 1913. 133  Rising 
manufacturing prices in Britain prompted a shift of labour out of agriculture and into 
manufacturing, the sector in which labour was used more intensively. In short, 
O’Rourke and Williamson depicted an Atlantic economy specializing along H-O 
lines—the Old World in the manufacturing sector, the New World in the agricultural 
sector. Although, it should be observed that agricultural tariffs in the Old World and 
manufacturing tariffs in the New World militated against this process of 
specialization.134 
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O’Rourke and Williamson documented Britain’s specialization at the sectoral 
level, i.e. in manufacturing. The H-O model can explain Britain’s specialization in 
manufacturing, but can the H-O model explain Britain’s specializations within 
manufacturing, or among industries? A crude attempt at answering this question was 
made by Crafts and Thomas. Chapter IV improves upon the work of Crafts and 
Thomas through the construction and use of superior data, specifically RCA 
indicators for individual British manufacturing industries. 
These RCA indicators complement Broadberry’s analysis of comparative 
labour productivity in British manufacturing industries, vis-à-vis the United States 
and Germany, prior to the First World War. The earliest year for which Broadberry 
was able to estimate the comparative labour productivity levels of individual 
industries was 1907, when output data first became available. 135  For the late 
nineteenth century, Broadberry’s examination of individual industries was 
necessarily reliant upon an array of industry-specific secondary literature. 
Nevertheless, several patterns emerge, including that Britain tended to realize its 
highest levels of comparative labour productivity in those industries with a high 
factor utilization of human capital. 136  Chapter IV of this dissertation offers a 
systematic quantification of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages. In this 
respect, the chapter can inform, albeit imperfectly, Broadberry’s account of 
comparative labour productivity in late-Victorian British industries.  
In the first decade of the twentieth century, there were several applications of 
the gravity model to nineteenth-century trade. The fundamental proposition of the 
gravity model is that the volume of (bidirectional) bilateral trade is positively 
associated with the economic size of the trading partners and inversely associated 
with the distance between them. Alongside the all-important variables for the 
economic size of the trading partners and the distance between them, gravity models 
can include additional explanatory variables for other potential determinants of 
bilateral trade. The gravity models of nineteenth-century trade offer rather limited 
insights about the determinants of the volume of bilateral British exports, for a 
couple of reasons. First, in all but one of these gravity models, the samples include 
mostly non-British country pairs. Second, because the unit of analysis in gravity 
models is bidirectional bilateral trade (or trade costs), it is not possible to identify the 
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determinants of Britain’s bilateral exports as separate from the determinants of 
bilateral imports; one of the assumptions of gravity models is a bilateral balance of 
trade. 
Still, these gravity models provide a loose set of expectations about what 
economic factors might have determined the volume of bilateral British exports. As 
several of these models will be addressed later in the dissertation, the discussion here 
is limited to the most novel findings from each model. In their foundational article, 
Estevadeordal et al. found that distance, gold standard adherence, and tariffs were all 
statistically significant determinants of bilateral trade during the first era of 
globalization and the interwar era.137 Focusing exclusively on the period from 1870-
1910, López-Córdova and Meissner provided additional quantification of the effect 
on bilateral trade when both trading partners adhered to the gold standard or had 
entered into a monetary union. In the baseline specification of their model, gold 
standard adherence raised bilateral trade by 62 per cent, and entering into a monetary 
union more than doubled bilateral trade, even after controlling for empire.138 These 
findings can offer some explanation for the trade-orientation of Britain, which had 
functioned as the centrepiece of the classical gold standard, and which had entered 
into a monetary union with many of its imperial possessions. Relying on a very large 
sample of annual observations, Mitchener and Weidenmier found that an imperial 
connection between trading partners roughly doubled bilateral trade.139  
Using a trade-costs framework, Jacks et al. estimated gravity models for the 
first era of globalization. In one of their gravity models, the sample consisted of only 
those country pairs that included Britain. In some respects, the determinants of 
Britain’s bilateral trade costs differed from the determinants of world bilateral trade 
costs.140  Railway density and tariffs were statistically significant determinants of 
world bilateral trade costs, but not specifically Britain’s bilateral trade costs.141 The 
gravity model of Jacks et al. is explored in greater depth in the next chapter.  
                                                     
137  Estevadoerdal, Frantz, and Taylor, ‘Rise and fall’, p. 374. Though, the actual 
contribution of tariff changes to the growth in the volume of world trade between 1870 and 
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138 López-Córdova and Meissner, ‘Exchange-rate regimes’, p. 348. 
139 Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Trade and empire’, p. 1812. 
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141 Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’, p. 135. 
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Britain’s export of goods to the Dominions has received substantial attention 
from Magee and Thompson. They argued that the high levels of British exports to the 
Dominions were sustained by common consumption patterns and well-developed 
commercial and personal networks within the Empire.142 Their analysis is laden with 
many commodity-specific examples, such as the penchant of Dominion consumers 
for specifically British-made decorative tiles. 143  The analysis by Magee and 
Thompson represents the microeconomic complement to the gravity literature. 
However, it falls short of providing any quantitative measure of the relative 
importance of consumption patterns and networks in explaining the high levels of 
British exports to the Dominions.  
 
Periodization 
The year 1870 offers a somewhat conventional starting point for this dissertation. If 
the periodization was determined along strictly monarchical lines, the dissertation 
might begin in 1869, the mid-point of Queen Victoria’s reign. In that same year, the 
Suez Canal was opened, greatly facilitating trade between Britain and India.144 The 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 and the Financial Crisis of 1873 helped to render the 
early 1870s as a sort of watershed in the development of the world economy. Thus, 
the year 1870 is taken as the starting point for this dissertation. 
In a departure from the textbook periodization of 1870-1913, the year 1900 is 
taken as the endpoint point for this dissertation. With respect to British exports, the 
late-Victorian and Edwardian eras were dissimilar. Whether these eras should be 
divided in precisely the year 1900 is of little importance. Rather, what is important is 
to acknowledge that the course and character of British exports entered a 
fundamentally different phase during the years surrounding the beginning of the 
twentieth century. What follows is an enumeration of the eight distinctive features—
many are interrelated—of Edwardian British exports. 
1. Britain’s export volume growth rate registered an improvement during the 
Edwardian era. From 1896-1913, the export volume growth rate was 3.3 per cent per 
annum, compared to 2.0 per cent per annum from 1872-96.145 While the Edwardian 
                                                     
142 Magee and Thompson, Empire and globalisation, ch. 4. 
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144 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and history, pp. 33-4. 
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export sector did not quite contribute to an ‘air of prosperity’ in the British economy, 
it was during this era that an air of depression began to lift, and the higher export 
volume growth rate was one of the causes.146     
2. As already mentioned in the context of the climacteric debate, there was a 
collapse of TFP growth in Edwardian manufacturing. The collapse was starkest 
between the 1889-99 and 1899-1907 business cycles, when the manufacturing TFP 
growth rate declined from 1.1 to 0.1 per cent per annum.147  There was a slight 
improvement in the later Edwardian era, when the growth rate increased to 0.3 per 
cent per annum during 1907-13 business cycle.148 Phelps Brown and Handfield-Jones 
interpreted the near cessation of TFP growth during the Edwardian era as arising 
from a lull between general purpose technologies, with the widespread adoption of 
electricity not being realized until the interwar era, at least in Britain.149 The collapse 
of TFP growth in Edwardian manufacturing should have acted to retard Britain’s 
export volume growth rate (and vice versa), just as Coppock claimed it did beginning 
in the 1870s.150 Thus, the increase in the export volume growth rate was entirely in 
spite of productivity trends in the British manufacturing sector. Other economic 
factors must have more than compensated for the TFP collapse to cause an 
acceleration of the export volume growth rate. 
3. One of the most evident changes in the geographical composition of late-
Victorian British exports was the rising share going to the Dominions. During the 
Edwardian era, the large share of British exports going to the Dominions was 
maintained partly on account of policies of imperial preference, which were adopted 
in all four of the Dominions during the decade between 1897 and 1907. Canada was 
at the vanguard of this movement. In 1897, Canada enacted a preference for imports 
from Britain (only), taking the form of a one-eighth reduction of the customs duties 
collected on imports from the mother country.151 This reduction was subsequently 
increased to one-quarter in 1898 and to one-third in 1900.152 Policies of imperial 
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should be noted that their argument concerned the effect of general purpose technologies on 
total output, not just on manufacturing output. 
150 Coppock, ‘Climacteric of the 1890’s’, p. 31. 
151 Knowles, Overseas empire, p. 382. 
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preference were adopted in the South African Customs Union in 1903, New Zealand 
in 1903, and Australia in 1907.153 Among the Dominions, the policies of imperial 
preference differed considerably, and such differences included whether the 
preference was extended to the entire Empire or just Britain, and whether preference 
involved reducing the duties on preferred imports or raising the duties on non-
preferred imports. Regardless of these differences, by the close of the Edwardian era, 
the British export sector enjoyed some degree of preference in all four of the 
Dominion markets. Late-Victorian British exports, before 1897, were not accorded 
preferential treatment in any Dominion market. 
Yet, Magee and Thompson have argued that Edwardian policies of imperial 
preference per se did not raise the volume of British exports to Dominion markets.154 
Instead, they emphasized that common consumption patterns and commercial 
networks within the Empire sustained the high demand for British exports into the 
Edwardian era. Their dismissiveness of the efficacy of Edwardian imperial 
preference was too hasty and probably incorrect. In this matter, the unique case of 
New Zealand is illuminative. New Zealand’s policy of imperial preference, codified 
in the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903, extended preference to just a 
subset of three dozen mainly manufactured commodities.155 For these commodities, 
preference took the form of increased duties on imports originating from outside the 
Empire. The act went into effect on 24 November 1903, but certain exemptions were 
granted until 31 March 1904. For a number of commodities subject to imperial 
preference, the shares imported from Britain increased markedly between 1902 and 
1905, the full years immediately preceding and following the act. The share of 
bicycles imported from Britain increased from 49 to 92 per cent, boots and shoes 
from 50 to 68 per cent, iron and steel rails from 58 to 77 per cent, and pianos from 38 
to 52 per cent.156  
The preliminary evidence is that some British export industries did benefit 
from policies of imperial preference. In Dominion markets, imperial preference 
would have, for certain commodities, rendered British exports marginally more 
competitive than American or Continental manufactured exports. Edwardian imperial 
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preference prefigured the much more decisive (and researched) system of imperial 
preferences that emerged during the interwar era. Without any substantial research 
indicating otherwise, it would be premature to deny that policies of imperial 
preference, even as early as the Edwardian era, raised the volume of British exports, 
ceteris paribus. Edwardian imperial preference is an underexplored topic and, hence, 
one ripe for future research.157 
4. The world tariff toward Britain, not that it has ever been quantified, likely 
crested as the late-Victorian era gave way to the Edwardian era. Irwin has observed 
that the American, French, and German tariff levels remained mostly constant 
throughout the Edwardian era. 158  The bilateral American tariff toward Britain, 
reconstructed in the next chapter, reached a peak immediately following the passage 
of the Dingley Tariff in 1897, but declined rather persistently thereafter. An 
important force acting to depress tariff levels during the Edwardian era was the 
worldwide trend of rising prices, which diminished the ad valorem equivalent of 
specific duties. Irwin has documented this relationship for the American case. Based 
upon his estimates, the rising price of American imports reduced the ad valorem 
equivalent average American tariff by fully 10 per cent between the Dingley Tariff of 
1897 and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff of 1913.159 Altogether, the falling prices of 
the late-Victorian era served to raise tariffs, while the rising prices of the Edwardian 
era served to reduce them.  
5. In 1897, the British export price index reached its lowest point for the entire 
nineteenth century.160 Throughout the Edwardian era, the British export price index 
increased, as did world prices in general. The reversal in the directional movement of 
the British export price index is an important reason for distinguishing between late-
Victorian and Edwardian British exports, even apart from the effect of this reversal 
on the world tariff toward Britain. For example, a trend of rising prices carried 
implications for the investment decisions undertaken by firms. The reasons for the 
late 1890s reversal in the directional movement of world prices are the subject of an 
old debate, which has been nicely summarized by Rostow.161 The debate falls well 
outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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6. The period from the late 1890s through 1913 was marked by vigorous 
economic growth in the world economy and, in many parts of the world economy, 
the beginnings of sustained economic growth. By some accounts, Italian economic 
growth did not even begin until this period. 162  During the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the European and non-European periphery was growing wealthier, 
and at a fast pace. The improving terms of trade in much of the periphery raised its 
capacity to purchase British exports. 163  In short, there was considerably greater 
demand for British exports in the Edwardian era.   
7. The Edwardian era was when the Second Industrial Revolution first became 
apparent in world trade. These were the years when automobiles, electrical goods, 
and synthetic chemicals entered the scene. While automobiles and electrical goods 
accounted for only 1 per cent of world manufactured exports in 1899, they accounted 
for 6 per cent of world manufactured exports in 1913.164 Although, the rise of these 
industries in the composition of British manufactured exports was somewhat less 
impressive, as automobiles and electrical goods were 4 per cent of British 
manufactured exports in 1913. 165  To be sure, there were shifts in the industrial 
composition of British exports during the late-Victorian era; the relative decline of 
textiles in British exports was one of the most prominent.166 However, during the 
Edwardian era, the compositional shifts were prompted by the emergence of wholly 
new industries. These new industries altered the character of British exports not 
inconsiderably, even if Britain was lagging behind certain other countries in the 
Second Industrial Revolution. 
8. Lastly, the United States emerged as a major world exporter of manufactured 
commodities, especially metal-intensive commodities, beginning in the final few 
years of the nineteenth century. This occurrence has been discussed already, and it is 
revisited in chapter IV. For now, it should simply be observed that the Edwardian era 
was marked by an intensified competition between Britain and the United States in 
third markets. It was during the Edwardian era, rather than the late-Victorian era, 
when Britain’s claim to the title of ‘workshop of the world’ was most credibly 
challenged. 
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II: Anglo-American trade costs during the first era of globalization: the 
contribution of a bilateral tariff series 
 
Introduction 
In the first era of globalization, the largest bilateral flow of trade was between Britain 
and the United States. This chapter examines Anglo-American trade during the 
period from 1870-1913, the so-called first era of globalization. Specifically, the aim 
of this chapter is to identify the determinants of Anglo-American bilateral trade 
costs, paying special attention to tariffs. Bilateral trade costs are a standardized 
measure of the difference between the actual and frictionless volumes of bilateral 
trade. In a recent study, Jacks et al. calculated annual series of bilateral trade costs 
for a large number of country pairs and then proceeded to estimate the determinants 
thereof using a gravity model. They found that tariffs were not a statistically 
significant determinant of the bilateral trade costs of those country pairs that included 
Britain.167 This finding is consistent with earlier literature claiming that British trade 
was generally unaffected by foreign tariffs.168 But were tariffs a non-determinant of 
Anglo-American bilateral trade costs in particular? There are two important reasons 
why this question warrants consideration.     
First, as already mentioned, the scale of Anglo-American trade was 
unsurpassed, comprising 7 per cent of world exports between 1870 and 1913.169 
Britain was consistently the foremost export market of the United States, owing 
primarily to the trade in cotton. Likewise, the United States was an important export 
market for Britain, though the share of the United States in the country-composition 
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of British exports was, according to Saul, ‘volatile’.170 Especially during the early 
years of the first era of globalization, periods of expansion in the American economy 
closely corresponded to increases in British exports to the United States, oftentimes 
resulting in the United States assuming the largest share in the country-composition 
of British exports.171 Indeed, Anglo-American trade was of an immense scale. For 
this reason, if the determinants of Anglo-American trade (or trade costs) were 
exceptional, then the general conclusions drawn from gravity models for the first era 
of globalization are compromised, as these models do not weight the various country 
pairs. 
Second, Anglo-American trade was unique in that it was characterized by quite 
divergent commercial policies, with Britain notoriously pursuing (practically) free 
trade and the United States espousing one of the most highly protectionist tariff 
regimes in the world.172 Still, American commercial policy, though protectionist by 
almost any standard, was hardly unchanging throughout the course of the late 
nineteenth century, most notably during the 1890s when the McKinley Tariff (1890), 
Wilson-Gorman Tariff (1894), and Dingley Tariff (1897) followed in rapid 
succession. A substantial literature, addressed shortly, has examined the effect of 
American tariffs on British exports of certain commodities. Yet, no study has 
explicitly and econometrically considered the aggregate role of American tariffs in 
the context of Anglo-American trade. 
One deficiency of gravity models is the tariff measurement assigned to each 
country pair.173 The tariff measurement is usually some combination (product or 
sum) of the average tariffs of the two countries, rather than a combination of the 
bilateral tariffs of the countries toward each other. Taking an average tariff as an 
approximation of a bilateral tariff is a precarious practice, especially when the 
composition of bilateral imports differs substantially from the composition of total 
imports, as in the case of bilateral American imports from Britain. Thus, in order to 
                                                     
170 Saul, ‘Export economy’, p. 6. 
171 Williamson, ‘Long swing’, pp. 34-40. The United States accounted for the largest 
share in the country-composition of British exports in the years 1870-4, 1880, 1882, 1888, 
and 1895. 
172 For a comparison of the average tariff levels of industrial countries for the period 
from 1875-1914, see table 1 in O’Rourke, ‘Tariffs and growth’, p. 461. If Russia were 
included in this comparison, its average tariff may well have exceeded the average tariff of 
the United States (25%); see Knowles, Nineteenth century, pp. 283-5. 
173 For example, see Estevadeordal et al., ‘Rise and fall’, p. 373. 
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properly ascertain whether tariffs determined Anglo-American trade costs, this 
chapter reconstructs an annual series of the (unidirectional) bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain for 1870/1-1912/3. The product of the bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain and the average British tariff—so low that British commercial policy 
was considered free trade—represents a greatly improved tariff measure for Anglo-
American trade.174 This improved tariff measure is then considered alongside other 
potential determinants of Anglo-American trade costs.       
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section situates this study within 
three recent scholarly debates: trade (and trade costs) during the first era of 
globalization, the effect of American tariffs on selected British commodity exports, 
and lastly the measurement and application of bilateral tariffs. The next section 
reconstructs an annual series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain, relying 
on a method best described as a current-year weighted average of per-industry ad 
valorem equivalent tariffs. This section also reconstructs an alternative, substitution-
adjusted series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain, relying on a method 
suggested by Federico and Tena. The next section comments on the course of the 
bilateral American tariff toward Britain, explaining why it differed from the average 
American tariff. The penultimate section estimates the determinants of Anglo-
American trade costs in a manner broadly consistent with Jacks et al.  The final 
section offers brief concluding remarks. 
        
Literature 
Gravity models 
Estevadeordal et al. put forward a gravity model of trade for the period from 1870-
1939, spanning the first era of globalization and the interwar globalization backlash. 
They estimated the direct effect of trade barriers on bilateral trade, using data taken 
from the years 1913, 1928, and 1938. In the most advanced specification of their 
gravity model, which included country fixed effects, the variables for payments 
frictions (gold standard adherence), policy frictions (tariffs), and transport frictions 
(distance) were all statistically significant determinants of the volume of bilateral 
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trade.175 Statistical significance aside, the actual contributions of these frictions to 
prewar globalization varied greatly. The pervasion of the gold standard and the 
decline in transport costs were major drivers of the volume of world trade and, 
therefore, globalization.176 However, as Estevadoerdal et al. argued, tariffs exerted 
little effect on the volume of world trade between 1870 and 1913, since the trade-
weighted world tariff level remained practically unchanged throughout this period, at 
least judging by the benchmark years of 1870, 1900, and 1913.177 
Jacks et al. focused on the first era of globalization specifically. Their approach 
departed from the approach undertaken by Estevadeordal et al. in one crucial respect. 
While Estevadeordal et al. estimated the direct effect of individual barriers on 
bilateral trade, Jacks et al. estimated the indirect effect of individual barriers on 
bilateral trade, via trade costs. Trade costs are a standardized measure of the 
difference between the actual volume of bilateral trade and the volume of bilateral 
trade in the absence of any trade barriers. Although a theoretical discussion of trade 
costs is beyond the scope of this present chapter, it should be noted that the 
calculation—not estimation—of bilateral trade costs for a given country pair is based 
upon the countries’ export volumes (bilateral and total) and real GDPs.178 Trade costs 
encompass all barriers to trade, including measurable barriers, such as transport 
costs, as well as not so readily measurable barriers, such as the reach of distribution 
channels. In this way, bilateral trade costs capture the aggregate barriers to bilateral 
trade. This chapter follows the example of Jacks et al. in estimating the determinants 
of bilateral trade costs, rather than of the bilateral trade volume, for the Anglo-
American country pair. This strategy permits a better identification of the individual 
barriers to Anglo-American trade, as separate from the effects of income and relative 
prices on bilateral trade. 
Jacks et al. examined the determinants of bilateral trade costs in both a large 
and small sample. For the large sample, which contained 48 country pairs, they 
found that distance, tariffs, adherence to the gold standard, membership in the British 
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Empire, and railway density were all statistically significant determinants.179 Based 
upon the standardized coefficients of these variables, distance emerged as the 
primary determinant of bilateral trade costs, while the other variables were of 
secondary importance.180 In recognition of the well-documented decline in ocean 
freight rates that occurred during the first era of globalization, Jacks et al. sought to 
estimate the effect of freight rates, rather than (time-invariant) distance per se, on 
bilateral trade costs. They therefore reduced the sample to only those country pairs 
that included Britain, which were the country pairs for which bilateral ocean freight 
indices were available. The results were quite different. The most noteworthy 
difference was that tariffs were not a statistically significant determinant of bilateral 
British trade costs, of which Anglo-American trade costs were a subset.181 Ocean 
freight rates, the variable of interest in the reduced sample, took on a statistically 
significant coefficient, though it should be observed that the standardized coefficient 
of this variable was especially small.182  
 
Iron, steel, and tinplate 
Whereas the general literature on the first era of globalization suggests a diminished 
role for tariffs, the commodity-specific literature on Anglo-American trade during 
this same period suggests that British exports to the United States were elastic to 
American tariffs. It should be observed that this literature was primarily intended to 
assess whether American tariffs fostered certain domestic manufacturing industries. 
Still, the conclusions reached in this literature can rightly be extended to Anglo-
American trade, since the manufactured commodities were previously supplied by 
Britain, and often to a great extent. While for the antebellum period, the debate was 
focused on the American cotton textile industry, for the late nineteenth century, the 
pig iron and tinplate industries have received the most attention.183 
Sundararajan was the first to examine econometrically the relationship between 
American tariffs and domestic pig iron production for the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries. What distinguished his approach was the calculation of an 
annual series of the effective tariff for pig iron, that is, the protection extended to the 
domestic value added in the pig iron industry, after accounting for the share of 
imported material inputs and the duties imposed upon these inputs.184 He found that 
the effective tariff, though not the nominal tariff, was a statistically significant 
determinant of pig iron production in the seaboard states of New York and New 
Jersey, where production was not insulated from international competition by the 
cost of inland transport. 185  Irwin, proceeding on a better econometric footing, 
revisited the American pig iron industry and the extent to which it depended upon 
protection. He found that domestic production and imports were responsive to the 
(nominal) tariff. In the most extreme of his three counterfactual scenarios, the 
complete elimination of the duty on pig iron in 1869, the volume of pig iron imports 
would have risen by 172 per cent in the short run and 489 per cent in the long run, 
though it should be emphasized that the share of imports in domestic consumption 
would have remained small.186 A very recent study by Inwood and Keay explored 
several potential determinants of British pig iron exports to the United States and 
Canada during the period from 1870-1913. They found consistent evidence for a 
negative association between tariffs and pig iron. 187  Based on their estimated 
coefficient, a 10 per cent decrease in the duty on pig iron, such as occurred under the 
Tariff Act of 1872, would have corresponded to a 7 per cent increase in British pig 
iron exports to the United States, ceteris paribus.188 
In contrast to pig iron, American consumption of tinplate was satisfied wholly 
through imports from Britain, prior to the McKinley Tariff.189 Using a probit model, 
Irwin found that the McKinley Tariff initiated the domestic production of tinplate, 
which displaced the majority of imports by the close of the century. 190  Had the 
McKinley Tariff not raised the duty on tinplate, domestic production would probably 
                                                     
184 In his calculations, Sunadararajan had to assume that the factor shares of material 
inputs remained constant over specified intervals. 
185 Sundararajan, ‘Iron and steel industry’, pp. 602-3. 
186 Irwin, ‘Iron industry’, p. 292. 
187 Inwood and Keay, ‘Iron trade’, p. 112. 
188 For a record of changes in the American duty on pig iron, refer to Taussig, Tariff 
question, p. 139. 
189 A small amount of tinplate was produced in the United States in the mid-1870s, 
when the relative price of iron and steel declined in favour of domestic production; see 
Irwin, ‘Tinplate industry’, pp. 338-9. 
190 Between 1889/90 and 1899/1900, the annual value of tinplate imports fell from 
$20.1 million to $4.8 million. 
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not have commenced until sometime between 1898 and 1903, by which time the 
relative price of material inputs—the main material inputs were iron and steel—
would have declined enough to permit domestic production.191  
 
Bilateral tariffs 
The literature on historical bilateral tariffs includes one outstanding and recent 
example. Dedinger reconstructed the late nineteenth-century bilateral French tariff 
toward Germany for the period from 1857-1913. In this endeavour, she benefitted 
from the unique arrangement of the French trade statistics, which enabled her to 
identify, for each product class, the value of French imports from Germany and the 
customs revenue collected thereon. Dedinger then used this bilateral tariff series to 
argue that French protection did not systematically discriminate against imports from 
Germany and that French protection had little bearing upon the German share of 
French imports.192 
The British Board of Trade actually estimated the bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain, along with the bilateral tariffs of ten other countries, but for just the 
year 1902.193 The Board of Trade’s estimate of 73 per cent for the bilateral American 
tariff toward Britain greatly exceeds this chapter’s main estimate of 33 per cent. The 
discrepancy arises from the dissimilar methods used to estimate the tariff. In this 
chapter, the main method entails a weighted average of per-industry ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs, with the weights derived from the composition of bilateral trade. 
However, the method employed by the Board of Trade used weights derived from 
the composition of British exports to all countries. The Board of Trade summarized 
this distinguishing feature of its method as follows: ‘the basis of the calculation is not 
the classes of British goods which we actually sell to each particular country, but 
those which we sell to the world in general’ [emphasis in original].194 
The Board of Trade settled on this method for calculating bilateral tariffs 
because the resulting estimates are not diminished by the imposition of prohibitive 
                                                     
191 Irwin, ‘Tinplate industry’, pp. 351-2. 
192 Dedinger, ‘Franco-German’, pp. 1044-5. 
193  British and foreign trade and industry, p. 171. The ten other countries and 
corresponding bilateral tariffs are as follows: Russia (131%), Austria-Hungary (35%), 
France (34%), Italy (27%), Germany (25%), Canada (16%), Belgium (13%), New Zealand 
(9%), Australian Commonwealth (6%), and South African Customs Union (6%). 
194 Ibid., p. 169. 
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tariffs on classes of British exports.195 Prohibitive tariffs, which are high enough to 
block imports entirely, are the most extreme case of the substitution effect, whereby 
an increase in the tariff on a given class of exports causes the value and share of that 
class of exports to decline. By fixing the shares according to the composition of 
British exports to all countries, the Board of Trade attempted to ensure that the 
substitution effect did not erode its estimates of bilateral protection. The main series 
of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain, reconstructed in the next section of 
this chapter, does not adjust for the substitution effect. Not adjusting for the 
substitution effect preserves the comparability between the bilateral tariff series and 
the average tariff of the United States, thereby allowing for the calculation of the 
relative bilateral American tariff toward Britain.  
Nevertheless, the substitution effect cannot be wholly ignored, at least insofar 
as this chapter aims to examine closely the relationship between tariffs and Anglo-
American trade costs. Hence, the next section of this chapter also reconstructs an 
alternative series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain that adjusts, however 
imperfectly, for the substitution effect. The method for estimating the alternative 
series is an unweighted average of per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs. This 
method, suggested by Federico and Tena as one possible option for handling the 
substitution effect, has the advantage of being easily implemented given the data 
available. 196  Of course, the equal weights implicit in an ‘unweighted’ average 
underweight (overweight) what would be the relatively large (small) industries in the 
hypothetical free-trade composition of bilateral imports.  
Estimates of bilateral tariffs, rare in their existence, are practically absent from 
gravity models of trade. This very topic was recently addressed by Hayakawa in an 
article titled ‘How serious is the omission of bilateral tariff rates in gravity?’. Using 
the World Integrated Trade Solution database, he calculated annual bilateral tariff 
series for a large number of country pairs for the years 1996-2007. These bilateral 
tariffs pertained only to trade in manufactures. In the gravity model, the coefficient 
of the bilateral tariff variable was statistically significant.197 However, the inclusion 
of this variable had hardly any effect on the magnitudes of the other coefficients and 
                                                     
195 Ibid. 
196 Federico and Tena, ‘Protectionist country’, pp. 75-6. 
197 Hayakawa, ‘Bilateral tariff rates’, p. 89. 
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had no effect on the explanatory power of the model.198 Hayakawa’s finding deserves 
mention, but should not be taken as indicative of what the econometric analysis in 
this chapter may reveal. Tariffs during the first era of globalization were quite 
different from (manufactured) tariffs at the turn of the millennium, which were much 
lower and generally declining.     
 
Reconstructing the bilateral American tariff toward Britain 
The source used in reconstructing the bilateral American tariff toward Britain is the 
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, a series of reports issued 
annually by the United States Treasury Department. The only other potential source, 
the Annual Statements of the Trade of the United Kingdom, enumerates British 
exports to the United States, but does so in a manner inconsistent with the 
classification of articles in the American tariff schedule. Accordingly, this study 
relies on the American trade statistics. Each annual report of the Foreign Commerce 
covers the fiscal year ending 30 June, rather than the calendar year. For the purposes 
of this chapter, 1870/1 means the year beginning 1 July 1870 and ending 30 June 
1871. The bilateral tariff series reconstructed here spans the 43 years from 1870/1-
1912/3 and is therefore in keeping with the conventional periodization of the first era 
of globalization.  
The Foreign Commerce treats dutiable and non-dutiable imports entirely 
separately. With regard to the dutiable imports, the two relevant sections of the 
Foreign Commerce for reconstructing the bilateral American tariff toward Britain are 
the article-country disaggregation and industry-tariff disaggregation sections. The 
article-country disaggregation section records, for example, the value of pig iron 
imported from Britain. The industry-tariff disaggregation section records, for 
example, the total value of all iron, steel, and manufactures thereof imported from all 
countries and the customs revenue collected thereon, which thus enables the 
calculation of the per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States 
imposed upon imports from all countries. 
In order to calculate the main series of the bilateral American tariff toward 
Britain (MAINb,t), it is first necessary to calculate the industry-composite bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain (COMPOSITEb,t):  
                                                     
198 Ibid. 
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𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑏,𝑡 =  ∑ (
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑏,𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑏,𝑖,𝑡
16
𝑖=1
)(
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑎,𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑎,𝑖,𝑡
)16𝑖=1   (2.1)  
Here, IMPORTS represents the value of dutiable imports, while REVENUE 
represents the customs revenue accruing to the United States from those dutiable 
imports. The subscripts denote American imports from Britain (b), American imports 
from all countries (a), the particular industry (i), and the year (t). 199  Taking 
COMPOSITEb,t from equation 2.1, it is next possible to calculate the bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain (MAINb,t): 
𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑏,𝑡 =
(𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑏,𝑡)(𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑏,𝑡)
𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑏,𝑡+𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑏,𝑡
     (2.2) 
In equation 2.2, DUTIABLE represents the total value of dutiable imports and FREE 
the total value of non-dutiable imports. The meanings of the subscripts are retained 
from equation 2.1. 
The industry-composite bilateral American tariff toward Britain, represented in 
equation 2.1, is a weighted average of the per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs 
that the United States imposed upon dutiable imports from all countries, taken from 
the industry-tariff disaggregation section of the Foreign Commerce. The weights, 
calculated from the article-country disaggregation section, are the per-industry shares 
of dutiable imports from Britain within a composite basket of dutiable imports from 
Britain spanning 16 industries: alkali; books; cement; clocks and watches; 
(bituminous) coal; cotton manufactures; earthenware and chinaware; flax and 
manufactures thereof; fur and manufactures thereof; iron, steel, and manufactures 
thereof; leather and manufactures thereof; salt; silk manufactures; tinplate; wool; and 
wool manufactures. Table 2.1 presents the weights and per-industry ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs for four benchmark years: 1870/1, the initial year of the series; 
1889/90, the last full year preceding the McKinley Tariff; 1898/9, the first full year 
following the Dingley Tariff; and 1912/3, the final year of the series. The weights 
and per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are reported for all years in Appendix 
2.1. Because the article-country disaggregation section does not explicitly record the 
total value of dutiable imports from Britain for each industry, it is necessary to sum  
                                                     
199 Prior to 1890/1, the Foreign Commerce does not record imports from Britain as a 
whole, but instead from England (including Wales), Scotland, and Ireland. Between 1890/1 
and 1908/9, the Foreign Commerce records imports from Britain as a single country, after 
which it reverts to the earlier convention of recording imports from three separate countries. 
Accordingly, for the years 1870/1-1889/90 and 1909/10-1912/3, the total value of dutiable 
imports per industry for each of England, Scotland, and Ireland are calculated separately and 
then added together so as to obtain IMPORTSb,i,t. 
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the values of the dutiable articles imported from Britain for each of the 16 industries, 
in order to obtain IMPORTSb,i,t. In other words, it is necessary to sum the values of 
(dutiable) pig iron, (dutiable) bar iron, and so forth, imported from Britain, in order 
to obtain the total value of (dutiable) iron, steel, and manufactures thereof imported 
from Britain.   
The assumption implicit in equation 2.1 is that, within each industry, the intra-
industry composition of dutiable articles that the United States imports from Britain 
mirrors the intra-industry composition of dutiable articles that the United States 
Table 2.1.   Industry weights and tariffs, 1870/1-1912/3 
Industry 1870/1 1889/90 1898/9 1912/3 
Alkali 
2.0 
(35.1) 
3.9 
(32.9) 
1.0 
(52.3) 
-- 
Books 
0.7 
(25.0) 
1.2 
(25.0) 
1.7 
(25.0) 
3.0 
(29.7) 
Cement -- 
0.9 
(20.0) 
0.7 
(24.0) 
0.0 
(21.9) 
Clocks and watches 
1.8 
(23.3) 
0.1 
(26.0) 
0.2 
(35.8) 
0.1 
(35.8) 
Coal 
0.2 
(47.5) 
0.1 
(22.2) 
0.5 
(22.0) 
0.0 
(14.8) 
Cotton manufactures 
14.4 
(40.5) 
9.5 
(39.9) 
22.1 
(56.0) 
20.5 
(55.0) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.2 
(41.3) 
3.2 
(57.1) 
5.1 
(58.8) 
2.5 
(58.2) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
10.4 
(33.7) 
14.7 
(33.9) 
28.3 
(42.0) 
29.7 
(33.2) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
0.8 
(19.8) 
2.0 
(20.2) 
2.4 
(20.9) 
1.0 
(26.2) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
22.0 
(43.1) 
9.9 
(38.0) 
8.1 
(38.1) 
12.9 
(26.1) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
3.5 
(35.4) 
1.9 
(31.7) 
4.3 
(35.7) 
5.4 
(27.9) 
Salt 
0.5 
(101.6) 
0.6 
(41.3) 
0.7 
(46.7) 
0.3 
(40.7) 
Silk manufactures 
12.0 
(57.8) 
5.4 
(49.5) 
4.0 
(54.0) 
3.0 
(51.4) 
Tinplate 
6.2 
(22.7) 
16.7 
(32.5) 
4.5 
(62.4) 
1.0 
(29.9) 
Wool 
1.9 
(45.6) 
6.7 
(33.8) 
5.6 
(47.3) 
13.9 
(44.7) 
Wool manufactures 
21.4 
(67.7) 
23.2 
(69.1) 
10.9 
(94.9) 
6.8 
(81.8) 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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imports from all countries. Indeed, the danger of this assumption is best conveyed by 
a simple example. Suppose there is an industry that includes only two articles, X and 
Y, which the United States imports in equal values. The ad valorem equivalent tariff 
is 20 per cent for article X, 40 per cent for article Y, and 30 per cent for the industry 
as a whole. However, the United States imports article X exclusively from country A 
and article Y exclusively from country B. In this example, the true bilateral tariff 
toward country A is 40 per cent for this industry, but the calculation of 
COMPOSITEb,t inappropriately relies on an ad valorem equivalent tariff of 30 per 
cent. 
The delicate nature of this assumption factors heavily into the selection of the 
16 industries listed earlier. For each of these 16 industries, the intra-industry 
composition of dutiable articles imported from Britain broadly approximates the 
intra-industry composition of dutiable articles imported from all countries. Since 
some industries encompass many individual articles of importation, especially the 
industry of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, and since the intra-industry 
compositions of dutiable articles approximate each other to varying extents, the 
decision to settle on the 16 aforementioned industries is inevitably a discretionary 
one. The glass industry offers an example of an industry excluded from the 
calculations for this reason. In 1889/90, the article-country disaggregation section 
classifies 21 per cent of dutiable glass imports from all countries as ‘cylinder and 
crown glass, polished and silvered’, whereas less than 1 per cent of dutiable glass 
imports from Britain fall under this classification.200 Because certain industries, such 
as the glass industry, are excluded from equation 2.1, it is essential to observe that 
ΣIMPORTSb,i,t from equation 2.1 is always less than DUTIABLEb,t from equation 2.2, 
as the latter value includes all dutiable imports from Britain across all industries, 
including the excluded industries. 
For the industry of flax and manufactures thereof, the intra-industry 
compositions of dutiable articles imported from Britain and from all countries are 
roughly similar until 1883/4, when the Foreign Commerce merges the industries of 
flax and manufactures thereof; hemp and manufactures thereof; and jute and 
manufactures thereof. The consolidated industry of flax, hemp, jute, and 
manufactures thereof encompasses raw hemp and raw jute, the vast majority of 
                                                     
200 The United States imported almost all of its ‘cylinder and crown glass, polished 
and silvered’ from Germany. 
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which the United States imported from countries other than Britain. Consequently, 
the introduction of this consolidated industry into the American trade statistics causes 
the intra-industry composition of dutiable articles imported from Britain to differ 
considerably from the intra-industry composition of dutiable articles imported from 
all countries. For this reason, the industry of flax and manufactures thereof would 
ordinarily be excluded from equation 2.1, just as the glass industry is excluded from 
equation 2.1. However, whereas the glass industry constitutes a relatively minor 
share of American imports from Britain, the industry of flax and manufactures 
thereof constitutes a quite large share; flax and manufactures thereof accounted for 
fully 10 per cent of American imports from Britain in 1882/3. No truly representative 
series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain can neglect this important 
industry. 
A third section of the Foreign Commerce, the article-tariff disaggregation 
section, provides an acceptable solution to the problem created by the merger of flax 
and manufactures thereof; hemp and manufactures thereof; and jute and 
manufactures thereof. For the purpose of equation 2.1, the industry of flax and 
manufactures thereof is redefined to include just burlaps and linens for the years 
from 1883/4-1889/90. Burlaps and linens are two dutiable articles of importation 
listed congruently in the article-country disaggregation and article-tariff 
disaggregation sections of the Foreign Commerce. For the years 1883/4-1889/90, 
equation 2.1 weights the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States imposed 
upon burlaps and linens (combined) by the share of burlaps and linens (combined) 
within the composite basket of dutiable imports from Britain. It is noteworthy that, in 
1883/4, the value of burlaps and linens imported from Britain was $14.7 million, 
while the total value of all flax, hemp, jute, and manufactures thereof imported from 
Britain was $19.1 million. Seen in this light, redefining the industry as just burlaps 
and linens still maintains a high degree of representativeness in the calculations.      
Yet another classificatory change in the Foreign Commerce requires another 
redefinition of the industry of flax and manufactures thereof, for the purpose of 
equation 2.1. Beginning in 1890/1, the article-country disaggregation section shifts 
linens to the ubiquitous classification of ‘all other manufactures of flax, hemp, or 
jute’, a classification without any equivalent in the article-tariff disaggregation 
section. Since the article-country disaggregation and article-tariff disaggregation 
sections now differentiate between raw and manufactured flax, hemp, and jute, and 
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since the article-tariff disaggregation section lists an overall ad valorem equivalent 
tariff for all dutiable manufactures of flax, hemp, and jute, the industry is redefined 
to include all manufactures of flax, hemp, and jute from 1890/1 until the conclusion 
of the series. In summary, this industry includes flax and manufactures thereof for 
1870/1-1882/3, burlaps and linens for 1883/4-1889/90, and all manufactures of flax, 
hemp, and jute for 1890/1-1912/3. While redefining this industry at two junctures 
(1883/4 and 1890/1) introduces a small element of inconsistency to the tariff series 
being constructed here, doing so ensures that the intra-industry compositions of 
dutiable articles from Britain and from all countries broadly approximately each 
other, and that the redefined industry matches an ad valorem equivalent tariff 
ascertainable from the Foreign Commerce.     
The chemical industry, as designated in the American trade statistics, embodies 
highly discrepant intra-industry compositions of dutiable articles, with the United 
States importing dyestuffs predominantly from Germany and alkali almost 
exclusively from Britain. This problem is resolved by employing, in equation 2.1, a 
purposely crafted ‘alkali industry’ in place of the chemical industry. The alkali 
industry, as defined here, includes just three dutiable articles of importation, which 
are congruently listed in the article-country disaggregation and article-tariff 
disaggregation sections: caustic soda, sal soda, and soda ash. Therefore, equation 2.1 
weights the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States imposed upon caustic 
soda, sal soda, and soda ash (combined) by the share of these three articles 
(combined) within the composite basket of dutiable imports from Britain. 
Starting in 1883/4, the Foreign Commerce incorporates the tinplate industry, 
formerly treated as distinct, into the industry of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof. 
Yet, owing to the identical recording of tinplate in the article-country disaggregation 
and article-tariff disaggregation sections, it is possible to remove tinplate from iron, 
steel, and manufactures thereof, and continue treating tinplate as its own industry for 
the duration of the series. Obviously then, REVENUEa,i,t and IMPORTSa,i,t for the 
industry of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof are adjusted to exclude tinplate 
between 1883/4 and 1912/3. More than for the sake of consistency, the rationale for 
keeping tinplate as a distinct industry lies in the tremendous value of tinplate that the 
United States imported from Britain, as well as the atypical treatment of tinplate in 
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the American tariff legislation, specifically the provision of the McKinley Tariff of 
1890 that delayed an increase in the tariff on tinplate until 1 July 1891.201 
In a strict sense, the Foreign Commerce treats wool and manufactures thereof 
as a single industry. Yet, the article-country disaggregation section unambiguously 
notes which dutiable articles are wool and which dutiable articles are wool 
manufactures. Likewise, the industry-tariff disaggregation section decomposes the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff for wool and manufactures thereof into separate ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs for wool and wool manufactures. Altogether, it is not difficult to 
treat wool and wool manufactures as distinct industries in equation 2.1. Yet, 
simplicity itself does not justify this decision; there are important historical reasons 
calling for the segregation of these two classes of articles. First, wool and wool 
manufactures, even when treated separately, rank among the largest of the 16 
industries. Second, the United States levied much higher duties on wool 
manufactures than on wool, in keeping with the compensating system of duties, 
whereby American tariff legislation set the tariff on wool manufactures high enough 
to offer domestic wool manufacturers both an element of protection and a 
‘compensation’ for the higher price of wool that resulted from there being a tariff on 
this material input.202 
An important point germane to the (raw) wool industry is that the fleeting 
Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 removed all duties on wool imports. Recall that, in 
equation 2.1, IMPORTSb,i,t represents the value of only the dutiable imports from 
Britain per industry. Therefore, the value of IMPORTSb,i,t is nil for the wool industry 
in the years 1895/6 and 1896/7. Since the Wilson-Gorman Tariff did not become law 
until 28 August 1894, IMPORTSb,i,t takes on a small value for the wool industry in 
1894/5, representing the value of the dutiable wool imported from Britain during the 
brief interval from 1 July 1894 to 28 August 1894.  
Of the 16 industries covered in equation 2.1, several come with a few minor 
qualifications. The cement industry is introduced into the calculation of equation 2.1 
beginning in 1883/4, when the article-country disaggregation section of the Foreign 
Commerce first accords it separate treatment. In 1906/7, a classificatory change in 
the article-country disaggregation section makes impracticable the continued 
                                                     
201 Irwin, ‘Tinplate industry’, p. 340. 
202  The mechanics of the compensating system of duties, as applied to wool and 
woollens, are detailed in Taussig, Tariff question, pp. 322-4. 
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inclusion of the alkali industry in equation 2.1; in this year, the alkali industry is 
dropped from the calculation.203 Other industries are characterized by minor internal 
discontinuities. The industry of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof includes iron 
ore starting in 1883/4. From 1909/10 to 1912/3, the book industry also includes paper 
and manufactures thereof. 
Moving from equation 2.1, the industry-composite bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain (COMPOSITEb,t), to equation 2.2, the bilateral American tariff toward 
Britain (MAINb,t), entails the assumption that the dutiable imports from Britain 
falling outside of the 16 industries are subject to the industry-composite American 
tariff toward Britain. The dutiable imports accounted for in equation 2.1 represent 
anywhere between 65 and 86 per cent of total dutiable imports from Britain, 
depending upon the year.204 There are three categories of dutiable imports excluded 
from equation 2.1. The first category, already described at length, includes the 
dutiable imports of those industries exhibiting highly discrepant intra-industry 
compositions, such that the corresponding ad valorem equivalent tariff for that 
industry would grossly misrepresent the true bilateral American tariff toward Britain 
for that industry. The second category includes dutiable imports from Britain 
classified in the Foreign Commerce as ‘all other dutiable articles’.205   The third 
category includes dutiable imports that the Foreign Commerce enumerates 
separately, but that are largely inconsequential, such as artificial feathers and 
smokers’ pipes. Equation 2.2 applies the industry-composite tariff to these three 
categories of dutiable imports. Additionally, equation 2.2 incorporates the non-
dutiable imports from Britain, with the result being annual estimates of the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff that the United States levied upon the whole basket of 
imports from Britain.  
In reconstructing the main series, one final adjustment is necessary. Prior to 
1879/80, the Foreign Commerce follows the convention of recording specie, 
specifically gold and silver bullion and coin, as non-dutiable articles of importation 
in the article-country disaggregation section. In 1879/80, the American trade 
statistics cease recording specie as non-dutiable articles of importation and begin 
                                                     
203 In 1905/6, American alkali imports from Britain amounted to a paltry $0.2 million. 
204 Since the coverage rate for FREEb,t is 100%, the coverage rate is higher for MAINb,t 
than for COMPOSITEb,t. 
205 ‘All other dutiable articles’ imported from Britain usually amounted to 1% of total 
imports from Britain. 
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recording specie flows in an entirely separate section.206 The consequence of this 
change in accounting is an inconsistent tariff series, broken between 1878/9 and 
1879/80. To make the tariff series consistent, equation 2.2 is adjusted for the years 
1870/1-1878/9 by subtracting from the denominator the value of specie imported 
from Britain (SPECIEb,t): 
𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑏,𝑡 =
(𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑏,𝑡)(𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑏,𝑡)
𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑏,𝑡+𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑏,𝑡−𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑏,𝑡
     (2.3) 
The annual values of specie, dutiable, and free American imports from Britain are 
presented in Appendix 2.2. The first column of Table 2.2 reports the main series of 
the bilateral American tariff toward Britain corrected for specie flows. Since the 
average tariff of the United States, as recorded in the Foreign Commerce, embodies 
the same inconsistency as just described, it is also adjusted for specie flows prior to 
1879/80. The second column reports the average American tariff corrected for specie 
flows. Inasmuch as the British share of total American imports ranged between 16 
and 45 per cent throughout the 43 years covered in this study, the average American 
tariff is heavily influenced by imports from Britain. Thus, the third column presents 
the average American tariff excluding Britain. The fourth column presents the 
relative bilateral American tariff toward Britain, as determined by dividing the 
bilateral American tariff toward Britain (column 1) by the average American tariff 
excluding Britain (column 3).207  It should be observed that the relative bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain exceeds 1 entirely because of the composition of 
bilateral imports, not because the United States explicitly discriminated against 
imports from Britain. 
Following the suggestion of Federico and Tena, the alternative series of the 
bilateral American tariff toward Britain (ALTERNATIVEb,t) is calculated as an 
unweighted average of the per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs:208  
 
                                                     
206 A note on p. 557 of Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States (1880) 
states, ‘This table embraces only merchandise, specie having been omitted. This fact should 
be observed in comparisons made with the data in corresponding tables for previous years, 
which tables include both merchandise and specie’.  
207 This method of calculating a relative bilateral tariff differs from Dedinger’s. She 
calculated the relative bilateral French tariff toward Germany by dividing the bilateral 
French tariff toward Germany by the average French tariff toward all countries including 
Germany.   
208 Other studies that have calculated tariff levels using unweighted averages include 
Tena-Junguito, ‘Bairoch revisited’; Tena-Junguito, Lampe, and Tâmega Fernandes, 
‘Cobden-Chevalier’. 
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Table 2.2.   Bilateral American tariff toward Britain, 1870/1-1912/3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year Main series 
Average 
American 
tariff 
Average 
American 
tariff 
excluding 
Britain 
Relative 
bilateral tariff 
Alternative 
series 
1870/1 45.0 40.5 37.0 1.22 44.3 
1871/2 42.9 38.0 34.0 1.26 43.6 
1872/3 35.2 27.9 23.8 1.48 38.7 
1873/4 33.6 28.3 25.8 1.30 38.4 
1874/5 34.3 29.4 27.3 1.26 39.6 
1875/6 36.3 31.3 29.4 1.24 42.6 
1876/7 34.3 29.2 27.4 1.25 43.5 
1877/8 34.9 29.0 27.1 1.29 44.0 
1878/9 34.2 30.3 29.1 1.18 44.5 
1879/80 35.3 29.1 26.0 1.36 44.5 
1880/1 36.0 29.8 27.5 1.31 44.8 
1881/2 37.4 30.2 27.4 1.36 45.7 
1882/3 35.7 30.0 28.0 1.27 44.8 
1883/4 33.9 28.5 26.8 1.27 43.0 
1884/5 34.3 30.8 29.7 1.16 43.6 
1885/6 35.7 30.4 28.6 1.25 44.4 
1886/7 36.8 31.5 29.8 1.23 44.8 
1887/8 36.7 30.6 28.5 1.29 45.3 
1888/9 37.4 30.0 27.6 1.35 44.7 
1889/90 36.6 29.6 27.3 1.34 43.8 
1890/1 35.0 25.7 22.9 1.53 48.3 
1891/2 42.5 21.6 16.6 2.56 60.6 
1892/3 44.1 23.9 18.2 2.42 62.6 
1893/4 44.5 20.6 15.6 2.84 63.1 
1894/5 30.6 20.4 17.6 1.73 47.1 
1895/6 27.7 20.7 18.6 1.49 43.3 
1896/7 23.4 21.9 21.5 1.09 43.3 
1897/8 35.5 24.8 22.3 1.59 55.6 
1898/9 36.0 29.5 28.1 1.28 57.9 
1899/00 33.2 27.6 26.3 1.26 53.6 
1900/1 31.4 28.9 28.4 1.11 53.5 
1901/2 32.8 27.9 26.8 1.22 53.7 
1902/3 31.3 27.9 27.1 1.16 53.4 
1903/4 32.4 26.3 25.0 1.30 54.6 
1904/5 32.0 23.8 22.2 1.44 54.4 
1905/6 29.6 24.2 23.1 1.28 53.0 
1906/7 26.8 23.3 22.5 1.19 50.5 
1907/8 29.8 23.9 22.8 1.31 51.6 
1908/9 30.9 23.0 21.5 1.44 53.7 
1909/10 26.1 21.1 20.0 1.30 51.4 
1910/1 24.0 20.3 19.5 1.23 49.5 
1911/2 22.3 18.6 17.8 1.25 46.9 
1912/3 20.5 17.7 17.1 1.20 46.2 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: All figures, except those in col. 4, are in expressed in %. Col. 1 does not adjust for the 
substitution effect, whereas col. 5 does.  
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𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑏,𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑎,𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑎,𝑖,𝑡
6
𝑖=1 ) 6⁄     (2.4) 
Rather than include all 16 industries, the alternative series is calculated using the six 
largest industries, defined as those industries for which American imports from 
Britain exceeded $20 million in at least one year between 1870/1 and 1912/3. This 
approach adjusts for the substitution effect, but ensures that the ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs of relatively minor industries in the composition of American 
imports from Britain do not distort the resulting series. The six industries are cotton 
manufactures; flax and manufactures thereof; iron, steel, and manufactures thereof; 
silk manufactures; tinplate; and wool manufactures. The last column of Table 2.2 
reports the alternative series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain. Figure 
2.1 illustrates both the main and alternative series of the bilateral American tariff 
toward Britain, as well as the average tariff of the United States.  
The main and alternative series exhibit similar inter-temporal variation during 
the capricious decade in American tariff history, the 1890s. However, there is also a 
divergence between these series beginning in the 1890s and continuing through the 
early twentieth century. The divergence between the main and alternative series is 
Figure 2.1.   Bilateral American tariff toward Britain, 1870/1-1912/3 
 
 
Note: The underlying data is presented in table 2.2. 
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the consequence of a rapidly increasing non-dutiable share of bilateral imports from 
Britain. As equation 2.4 indicates, non-dutiable imports are excluded from the 
calculation of the alternative series, whereas these imports are included in the 
calculation of the main series. The growth of non-dutiable imports from Britain is 
addressed in the next section.    
 
The course of the bilateral tariff 
In the early 1870s, growth in American imports resulted in a perceived excess of 
customs revenues, and this situation elicited calls for a reduction in duties.209 The 
Tariff Act of 1872 decreased the duties on most manufactured imports by 10 per 
cent, in addition to more substantial decreases in the duties on coal and salt.210 
Between 1871/2 and 1872/3, the main series of the bilateral American tariff toward 
Britain declines from 43 to 35 per cent. However, the relative bilateral tariff remains 
fairly constant, partly because the 10 per cent reduction in the duties on 
manufactured imports was accompanied by an elimination of the duty on coffee, 
which the United States did not import from Britain.211 Neither the Tariff Act of 
1875 nor the Mongrel Tariff of 1883 caused any discernible change in the bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain. 
The McKinley Tariff of 1890 represents an abrupt departure from the status 
quo of American tariff policy during the 1870s and 1880s, having raised the duties 
on manufactured imports across a range of industries. Cotton manufactures, wool 
manufactures, and tinplate, all major British exports to the United States, suddenly 
fell subject to much higher duties. As for cotton manufactures, the United States 
imported hardly any of the cheaper grades by the late nineteenth century, but 
continued to import the more expensive grades.212 The McKinley Tariff raised the 
duties on these more expensive grades of cotton manufactures, causing the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff for this industry to increase from 40 to 51 per cent. Yet, the 
additional protection that the McKinley Tariff extended to cotton manufacturers was 
not nearly as great as the additional protection that it extended to wool 
manufacturers. When the McKinley Tariff was being crafted in Congress, moderate 
                                                     
209 Ashley, Modern tariff history, p. 188. 
210 Taussig, Tariff history, p. 185. 
211 Ibid., p. 186. 
212 Saul, British overseas trade, p. 145. 
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upward revisions in the duties on wool were proposed and eventually enacted.213 
These proposed upward revisions provided wool manufacturers an occasion to 
demand greater duties on wool manufactures, in accordance with the principle of 
compensating duties, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. However, 
so generous were the assumptions about the factor proportion of wool in wool 
manufactures, and so byzantine was the schedule of duties devised for wool 
manufactures, that the wool manufacturers ultimately obtained far more than mere 
compensation for the higher price of wool.214 By 1891/2, the ad valorem equivalent 
tariff for wool manufactures had reached 96 per cent, compared to an already high 69 
per cent in 1889/90.    
Given that the McKinley Tariff went into effect on 6 October 1890, the main 
series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain ought to register a marked 
increase between fiscal years 1889/90 and 1890/1, but no such increase is evident. 
The reason lies in the McKinley Tariff’s postponement of an increase in the tariff on 
tinplate until 1 July 1891. In expectation of the duty on tinplate rising from $0.01 to 
$0.022 per pound on 1 July 1891, American firms imported an unusually large 
amount of tinplate during 1890/1. Whereas the United States imported $20.9 million 
of British tinplate in 1889/90, it imported $35.6 million of British tinplate in 
1890/1.215 In 1890/1, the ad valorem equivalent tariff for tinplate was, at 29 per cent, 
less than the bilateral American tariff toward Britain. Thus, in the calculation of 
equation 2.1 for 1890/1, increases in the per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs 
for cotton manufactures and wool manufactures—increases that otherwise would 
yield a higher bilateral tariff for 1890/1—are counterbalanced by the much greater 
weight given to the comparatively low ad valorem equivalent tariff for tinplate. 
Because of the delayed increase in the tariff on tinplate, the main series of the 
bilateral American tariff toward Britain does not reflect the fullness of the McKinley 
Tariff until 1891/2, when it rises from 35 to 43 per cent. Interestingly, this increase in 
the bilateral tariff amounted to an exact reversal of the decrease in the bilateral tariff 
that followed the Tariff Act of 1872.    
 
                                                     
213 Taussig, Tariff history, pp. 256-9. 
214 Ibid., pp. 259-66. The schedule of duties on wool manufactures was byzantine 
because individual articles of importation were subject to both specific and ad valorem 
duties, which together often disguised the actual extent of protection. 
215 In 1890/1, tinplate accounted for 18% of American imports from Britain. 
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Between 1870/1 and 1889/90, the relative bilateral tariff, depicted in Figure 
2.2, fluctuates within the narrow range of 1.2 and 1.5. In 1891/2, the relative bilateral 
tariff swells to 2.6, and remains at a similarly elevated level through 1893/4. This 
pronounced increase in the relative bilateral tariff is partly attributable to a higher 
absolute bilateral tariff, but also attributable to a lower ‘average American tariff 
excluding Britain’. The McKinley Tariff was noteworthy for reducing the duties on 
certain primary-sector imports, few of which came from Britain. The duty on sugar, 
which regularly comprised over one-tenth of total American imports, was lifted 
altogether. 
The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 lowered the ad valorem equivalent tariffs 
for many industries well represented within the composition of imports from Britain. 
Between 1893/4 and 1894/5, the ad valorem equivalent tariff for cotton manufactures 
declined from 56 to 47 per cent; earthenware and chinaware from 58 to 35 per cent; 
iron, steel, and manufactures thereof from 50 to 39 per cent; leather and 
manufactures thereof from 33 to 26 per cent; tinplate from 82 to 57 per cent; and 
wool manufactures from 97 to 57 per cent. Moreover, the Wilson-Gorman Tariff 
removed all duties on wool. Indeed, with respect to the bilateral American tariff 
Figure 2.2.   Relative bilateral American tariff toward Britain, 1870/1-1912/3 
 
 
Note: The underlying data is presented in table 2.2. 
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toward Britain, the claim of the early tariff historian Ashley that the Wilson-Gorman 
Tariff was one of ‘relatively little change’ simply cannot apply. 216 Moving from 
1893/4 to 1894/5, the absolute bilateral American tariff toward Britain falls from 45 
to 31 per cent—a much sharper movement than occurs following the McKinley 
Tariff. The relative bilateral tariff gradually returns to its pre-McKinley level, 
assisted in this trend by the reimposition of duties on sugar. 
With the passage of the Dingley Tariff of 1897, the pendulum swung back in 
the direction of protectionism. As with the McKinley Tariff, cotton manufactures, 
silk manufactures, tinplate, and wool manufactures were subjected to higher duties. 
Furthermore, the Dingley Tariff also greatly increased the ad valorem equivalent 
tariff for the alkali industry, from 31 to 50 per cent. This increase had the effect of 
excluding British alkali exports from the American market swiftly and 
conclusively.217     
Although both the McKinley and Dingley Tariffs sharply raised the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff for wool manufactures, the substitution away from imports of 
British wool manufactures was much greater following the latter act. Whereas 
between 1889/90 and 1890/1, American imports of British wool manufactures 
decreased from $29.1 to $19.5 million, between 1896/7 and 1897/8, American 
imports of British wool manufactures decreased from $23.0 to $7.0 million. The 
post-Dingley falloff in American imports of British wool manufactures can largely 
be explained by developments within one particular branch of this industry: 
worsteds, which are manufactures of combed wool. American manufacturing of 
worsteds grew by leaps and bounds in the 1880s and 1890s, with Clapham noting 
that, during these two decades, the number of worsted combs increased by a factor of 
three, and the number of worsted spindles by a factor of six.218 Unfortunately, the 
American trade statistics do not provide a separate classification for worsted imports 
in their article-country disaggregation section. However, the British trade statistics 
do, in fact, distinguish worsted exports in their article-country disaggregation section. 
Considering the category of ‘worsted tissues, coatings, broad, all wool’, the value of 
British exports to the United States proceeded as follows: £1.1 million (1896), £1.1  
 
                                                     
216 Ashley, Modern tariff history, p. 217. 
217 Haber, Chemical industry, p. 148. 
218 Clapham, Woollen and worsted, p. 253. 
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million (1897), £0.2 million (1898), and £0.2 million (1899).219 Here, the impact of 
the Dingley Tariff is unmistakable. Due to the expanding capacity of American 
worsted factories, especially in the 1890s, the nearly complete substitution away 
from imports of British worsteds was possible.  
The Dingley Tariff was the longest-governing tariff act in American history, 
remaining in effect until the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909. During the first decade of 
the twentieth century, a time of stability within the American tariff regime, the 
bilateral American tariff toward Britain, expressed as an ad valorem equivalent, 
slowly diminishes, partly due to a trend of rising import prices. Because many duties 
were imposed on a specific basis (e.g. $0.015 per pound of tinplate), rising import 
prices reduced the ad valorem equivalent of the specific duties.  
Another reason for the sustained decline in the main series of the bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain was the growing non-dutiable share of bilateral 
imports. As evident from Table 2.3, the value of non-dutiable imports from Britain 
increased by 320 per cent from 1898/9-1912/3, while the value of dutiable imports 
increased by only 74 per cent in the same period. As has been previously noted, the 
growing non-dutiable share results in a divergence between the main and alternative 
series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain, since non-dutiable imports are 
included in the calculation of the main series only. Table 2.3 presents an illustrative 
counterfactual; if the 1898/9 non-dutiable share (31 per cent) of bilateral imports 
remained constant, then the main series would have declined by only 7 per cent from 
1898/9-1912/3, rather than by 16 per cent. The relative growth of non-dutiable 
                                                     
219 ‘All wool’ indicates that the worsted is composed solely of wool, as opposed to a 
mixture of wool and some other textile material. 
Table 2.3.   Dutiable and non-dutiable American imports from Britain, 1898/9 and 
1912/3 
 1898/9 1912/3 
Bilateral imports ($ million)   
Dutiable 82.2 143.0 
Non-dutiable 36.3 152.5 
Total 118.5 295.6 
Bilateral tariff (per cent)   
Main series (actual non-dutiable share) 36.0 20.5 
Main series (counterfactual 1898/9 non-dutiable share) -- 29.4 
Alternative series 57.9 46.2 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: The dutiable and non-dutiable bilateral imports do not sum exactly to the total in 1912/3 due to 
rounding error. The counterfactual main series assumes a constant 1898/9 non-dutiable share of 30.6% 
of bilateral imports.  
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imports accounts for the majority of the post-Dingley decline in the main series of 
the bilateral American tariff toward Britain.  
The increasing non-dutiable share was not because the Dingley Tariff 
reclassified dutiable imports as free imports; indeed, the movement was generally in 
the reverse direction. Rather, the increasing non-dutiable share was due to the 
extraordinary growth of certain bilateral imports that had traditionally been admitted 
free of duty. Many of these non-dutiable bilateral imports were primary-sector 
imports that did not originate in Britain, but formed part of Britain’s entrepôt 
trade. 220  Nevertheless, the Foreign Commerce treats these British re-exports as 
bilateral imports from Britain, not bilateral imports from the country or colony of 
origin. India-rubber and tin, two commodities prominent in Britain’s entrepôt trade, 
contributed greatly to the rising share of non-dutiable imports from Britain.221 India-
rubber enjoyed applications in the American automobile industry, and bilateral 
imports of this commodity increased from $7.0 million in 1898/9 to $33.6 million in 
1912/3. The continued expansion of the American tinplate industry in the early 
twentieth century necessitated greater imports of tin, and bilateral imports of this 
commodity increased more than tenfold during the same interval, amounting to $24.7 
million in 1912/3.         
Though obvious, it is equally appropriate to attribute the decline in the main 
series to the decreasing share of dutiable imports. Undoubtedly, the growth of 
dutiable bilateral imports was hampered by an ongoing substitution in favour of 
domestic commodities. Alkali and worsteds were subject to a sudden foreign-
domestic substitution in the wake of the Dingley Tariff. Other industries, such as the 
silk textile industry, were subject to a more gradual foreign-domestic substitution 
commensurate with the more gradual expansion of domestic production.222    
 
 
                                                     
220 For a discussion of the rapid growth in British re-exports to the United States, see 
Saul, British overseas trade, p. 59. He attributed this growth, in part, to the ‘poor condition 
of the American merchant marine’. 
221 These commodities were mostly re-exported from British colonial possessions in 
Southeast Asia. 
222  Despite the Dingley Tariff raising the ad valorem equivalent tariff on silk 
manufactures, there was no immediate decline in the value of silk manufactures imported 
from Britain. In the first decade of twentieth century, the value imported from Britain 
remained stagnant, while the gross value of silk manufactures produced domestically nearly 
doubled between the census years of 1899 and 1909. Census of manufactures, 1909, p. 151. 
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Estimating the inter-temporal determinants of Anglo-American trade costs 
To estimate the determinants of Anglo-American trade costs, the panel regression 
employed by Jacks et al. is adapted for a single bilateral trade flow, resulting in the 
following time-series regression equation (with time subscripts suppressed):  
∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑆) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹) + 𝛽2∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸) +
𝛽3∆∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇) + 𝛽4(𝐺𝑂𝐿𝐷) + 𝛽5∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑊𝐴𝑌) + 𝜖  (2.5) 
COSTS are Anglo-American trade costs, as calculated by Jacks et al. Recall that trade 
costs are a standardized measure of the difference between the actual volume of 
bilateral trade and the volume of bilateral trade in the absence of any trade barriers. 
TARIFF is a measure of the tariff level in bidirectional Anglo-American trade, and 
the calculation of this variable is discussed shortly. EXCHANGE is the exchange rate 
volatility between the dollar and sterling. FREIGHT is a semi-parametric index of 
Anglo-American ocean freight rates, as estimated by Jacks and Pendakur.223 GOLD 
is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the years 1879-1913, when both Britain 
and the United States were on the gold standard. RAILWAY is a measure of railway 
density, calculated as the product of the ratios of railway length per land surface area 
in Britain and the United States. All continuous variables are expressed in natural 
logarithms. The data source for all variables, except for certain measures of TARIFF, 
is the same as for Jacks et al.224  
Equation 2.5 resembles the panel regression of Jacks et al. in all but two 
respects. First, most of the variables are further transformed to eliminate unit roots. 
An Augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicates that COSTS, TARIFF, EXCHANGE, and 
RAILWAY are integrated of the first order, and so these variables are differenced 
once, whilst FREIGHT is integrated of the second order, and so this variable is 
differenced twice.225 As a time-series regression, equation 2.5 cannot exploit the 
variation across country pairs, as was done in Jacks et al. Thus, the second 
discrepancy between equation 2.5 and the panel regression of Jacks et al. is, 
inevitably, the exclusion of time-invariant variables. To be clear, the analysis here 
can only identify the inter-temporal determinants of Anglo-American trade costs. As 
a consequence, the effect of distance, a variable of fundamental importance to  
                                                     
223 Jacks and Pendakhur, ‘Transport revolution’. 
224  I thank David Jacks for making this data available on his website: 
http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/publications/. 
225 After this differencing, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1% level 
for all variables.  
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gravity models, cannot be estimated directly. Instead, the effect of distance is 
estimated indirectly by exploiting the inter-temporal variation in the costliness of 
distance, as measured by ocean freight rates. 
Three different calculations of TARIFF are considered in the estimation of the 
regression. TARIFF1 is the product of the average British tariff and the average 
American tariff. This variable represents the standard measure of the tariff level used 
in gravity models. TARIFF2 is the product of the average British tariff and the main 
series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain (MAINb,t). TARIFF3 is the 
product of the average British tariff and the alternative series of the bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain (ALTERNATIVEb,t), which accounts for the 
substitution effect. 
The results of the regression are reported in Table 2.4. In every specification of 
the regression, all of the coefficients take on the expected sign, which is positive for 
TARIFF, EXCHANGE, and FREIGHT, and negative for GOLD and RAILWAY. 
However, most of the coefficients are statistically insignificant at conventional 
Table 2.4.   Determinants of Anglo-American trade costs, 1872-1913 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TARIFF1 
4.66* 
(2.69) 
  
3.95 
(2.62) 
  
TARIFF2  
7.10*** 
(2.27) 
  
6.07** 
(2.26) 
 
TARIFF3   
9.87*** 
(2.89) 
  
7.96*** 
(2.82) 
EXCHANGE 
0.49 
(0.70) 
0.56 
(0.65) 
0.96 
(0.65) 
   
FREIGHT 
31.57 
(25.55) 
37.53 
(23.67) 
44.36* 
(23.54) 
   
GOLD 
-1.08 
(0.89) 
-1.20 
(0.82) 
-1.05 
(0.80) 
   
RAILWAY 
-8.13 
(11.12) 
-10.47 
(10.31) 
-5.97 
(10.13) 
   
Constant 
1.57 
(1.03) 
1.85* 
(0.95) 
1.41 
(0.92) 
0.28 
(0.31) 
0.34 
(0.30) 
0.23 
(0.29) 
R2 0.13 0.26 0.29 0.05 0.15 0.17 
DW statistic 1.92 1.83 1.75 1.98 1.84 1.91 
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Sources: The source for all variables, except TARIFF2 and TARIFF3, is the data underlying Jacks et 
al., ‘Trade costs’, located at: http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/publications/. For the sources for 
TARIFF2 and TARIFF3, see text. 
Notes:  All coefficients and standard errors have been rescaled by a factor of 100. Standard errors are 
noted in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at 
the 1% level. 
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levels. Of particular surprise is the statistical insignificance of the coefficient of 
FREIGHT in all but the third specification, in which case the coefficient is 
significant only at the 10% level. Given what has already been mentioned, the 
appropriate inference here is not that distance was meaningless in Anglo-American 
trade, but rather that it is ambiguous whether or not the declining costliness of 
distance exerted an effect on trade costs. The recent work of Inwood and Keay may 
provide one possible explanation for this finding. They emphasized the importance 
of total transport costs, including both ocean freight rates and inland transport costs, 
in determining the volume of British pig iron exports to the United States and 
Canada.226 Most pig iron exports to these countries were destined for Pittsburgh and 
Hamilton for further processing. For this single commodity, therefore, the cost of 
inland transport is measurable. However, for entire bilateral trade flows 
encompassing diverse commodities destined for diverse locations, the cost of inland 
transport is not directly measurable. 
The coefficient of TARIFF1 is barely statistically significant at the 10% level 
(p-value = 0.092). By comparison, the coefficients of TARIFF2 and TARIFF3 are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the second and third specifications 
of the regression provide twice the explanatory power of the first specification. These 
improvements in the outcome of the regression are achieved solely through 
calculations of TARIFF that include a bilateral measurement of the tariff level for 
just one of the directions of Anglo-American trade, that is, British exports to the 
United States.227 The fourth through sixth specifications, which isolate the effect of 
TARIFF on Anglo-American trade costs, are generally consistent with the first 
through third specifications, although the coefficients are slightly diminished. 
The coefficient of TARIFF3, which accounts for the substitution effect, 
expectedly exceeds that of TARIFF2, which does not. Still, the coefficients of both 
TARIFF2 and TARIFF3 are greater than the coefficient of TARIFF1. In view of these 
differences, there arises the question of how to interpret the coefficients in a 
meaningful way. Recall the log-difference expression of both COSTS and TARIFF. 
In lieu of a theoretical interpretation of the coefficient, this chapter offers an 
                                                     
226 Inwood and Keay, ‘Iron trade’, p. 118-19. 
227 In general, bilateral measurements of the tariff level for both directions of bilateral 
trade would be preferable. However, this consideration is less pressing for country pairs that 
include Britain, given its unique adherence to a policy of free trade.  
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interpretation of the coefficient grounded in historical events, specifically the 
principal American tariff acts of the late nineteenth century. Based upon the more 
conservative coefficient of TARIFF2 (0.071) and the annual changes in the main 
series of the bilateral American tariff toward Britain, the one-period effects of the 
McKinley, Wilson-Gorman, and Dingley Tariffs on bidirectional Anglo-American 
trade costs were +1.4 per cent, -2.7 per cent, and +2.9 per cent, respectively.228 The 
two-period effects were +1.6 per cent, -3.4 per cent, and +3.1 per cent. Altogether, 
changes in American commercial policy during the first era of globalization altered 
the wedge between the actual and frictionless volumes of Anglo-American trade to a 
degree that was modest, but hardly negligible. In comparison, Anglo-American trade 
costs declined by only 8.0 per cent between 1870 and 1890.229  
Did the determinants of Anglo-American trade costs conform to the 
determinants of bilateral trade costs in general? To answer this question involves 
comparing the inter-temporal determinants of Anglo-American trade costs with the 
inter-temporal and cross-sectional determinants of bilateral trade costs in general. 
Though such a comparison is admittedly imperfect, it will nonetheless be made. 
When Jacks et al. considered the bilateral trade costs of only the country pairs that 
included Britain, they found that tariffs were not a statistically significant 
determinant. In this respect, Anglo-American trade represents a departure from the 
normal pattern of British trade, which was generally unaffected by foreign 
protection. Jacks et al. found that EXCHANGE, FREIGHT, and GOLD were 
determinants of bilateral British trade costs, but the analysis here finds that these 
variables were not inter-temporal determinants of the subset Anglo-American trade 
costs. Finally, in neither case does the variable RAILWAY take on a statistically 
significant coefficient, which Jacks et al. speculated may have been attributable to 
the greater importance of ocean freight rates in determining bilateral British trade 
costs.230 
 
 
 
                                                     
228 These figures adjust for the slight annual variation in the average British tariff, so 
as to isolate fully the effects of the respective American tariff acts. The figures for the 
McKinley Tariff assume an imposition year of 1891, for reasons already described. 
229 This figure was calculated using the data underlying Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’. 
230 Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’, p. 135. 
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Conclusion 
In Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914, Saul wrote that ‘it seems unlikely 
that in the period before 1914 tariffs seriously hindered the development of [British] 
trade, taken as a whole’. 231  Similarly, the econometric analysis of Jacks et al. 
revealed that tariffs were not a statistically significant determinant of Britain’s trade 
costs. However, it is crucial that any emerging consensus that British trade was 
unaffected by tariffs be qualified to exclude Anglo-American bilateral trade. As this 
chapter has proven, tariffs were an inter-temporal determinant—the sole inter-
temporal determinant—of Anglo-American trade costs during the first era of 
globalization. 
The determinacy of tariffs for Anglo-American trade costs only became 
apparent once the variable for tariffs incorporated a measure of the bilateral 
American tariff toward Britain. The contribution of a bilateral tariff series was 
nothing less than an altered understanding of the largest bilateral flow of trade in the 
first era of globalization. With empirically correct tariff variables, it is possible that 
even the general understanding of trade during this period may be altered. Such an 
alteration would be likely to attribute greater importance to the effect of tariffs on 
trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
231  Saul, British overseas trade, p. 165. This passage was reproduced in Hatton, 
‘British exports’, p. 583.  
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III: British capital and merchandise exports, 1870-1913 
 
Introduction 
One of the main contributions of the Ford thesis was to identify a causal relationship 
between British capital and merchandise exports during the late nineteenth century, 
whereby British ex ante lending to a given country preceded an increase in British 
merchandise exports to that country by a period of one or two years. 232  Ford 
specified two channels of causation. First, since the majority of British overseas 
lending was allocated to social overhead projects, these projects required capital 
goods, such as machinery and steel, which Britain exported in abundance.233 Second, 
lending tended to increase the income of the borrowing country and thus raise its 
demand for manufactured consumption goods, which Britain also exported.  
According to Ford, the causal relationship between British capital and 
merchandise exports functioned as an important equilibrating mechanism in the gold 
standard regime of the late nineteenth century.234 Increased demand for merchandise 
exports diminished the extent to which overseas lending was settled in Britain’s 
multilateral balance of payments through a transfer of specie, ceteris paribus. As the 
historical record indicates, the outflow of specie from Britain, even during peak 
periods such as the late 1870s, remained only a small component of the balance of 
payments. 235  Equilibrating mechanisms operated to prevent the acute outflow of 
specie from Britain, but was Ford’s proposed relationship between British capital and 
merchandise exports one of these mechanisms? Subsequent scholars have expressed 
their doubts. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it will prove convenient to conceptualize 
Ford’s argument as a lending-export loop, albeit an imperfect loop, since borrowed 
British capital was oftentimes diverted toward the purchase of imports from countries 
other than Britain. On this point, Brown argued that borrowing countries had, on 
average, low marginal propensities to import either capital or consumption goods 
                                                     
232 Ford, ‘British foreign lending’, p. 305. Ex ante lending occurred when a creditor 
country committed to exporting capital, with the commitment usually taking the form of a 
primary security issue. The lending became ex post when the creditor country actually 
exported merchandise, services, or specie. 
233 Simon, ‘Portfolio foreign investment’, p. 25. Between 1865 and 1914, nearly 70% 
of British portfolio foreign lending was directed toward social overhead capital. 
234 Ford, ‘Gold standard’, p. 59. 
235 Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 72-4. 
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from Britain.236 In other words, the diversion of capital from the lending-export loop 
was significant. In support of this assertion, he invoked Tinbergen’s finding that the 
marginal effect of British capital exports on British capital goods exports was just 
one-quarter during the period from 1880-1908. 237  Nevertheless, Brown 
acknowledged that there was likely considerable variation among the bilateral 
marginal propensities to import from Britain. 
Brown identified New Zealand as a colony with a ‘high’ marginal propensity to 
import from Britain.238 Because New Zealand relied on Britain for more than three-
fifths of its imports during the late nineteenth century, the likelihood is that the 
marginal propensity of New Zealand to import from Britain was quite high, certainly 
higher than the cross-country average of one-quarter.239 Even within the context of 
the British Empire, New Zealand stands out for its atypically strong bilateral trade 
with Britain.240 In 1890, New Zealand obtained 67 per cent of its imports from 
Britain, compared to other high-income colonies of the British Empire: Canada (38 
per cent), New South Wales (38 per cent), and Victoria (42 per cent). 241  The 
discrepancy between New Zealand and Canada was largely due to the latter 
importing manufactured goods from the neighbouring United States. As for the 
Australian colonies, inter-colonial trade amongst each other reduced the share of 
Britain within the country-compositions of imports, since the trade statistics of these 
colonies treat inter-colonial trade as external. Adjusting for this convention by 
treating all Australasian inter-colonial trade as internal, New Zealand still had the 
highest share of Britain in imports (82 per cent), followed by New South Wales (74 
per cent) and Victoria (66 per cent).242 
                                                     
236 Brown, ‘World economy’, p. 52. 
237 See Tinbergen, Business cycles, p. 41.  
238 Brown, ‘World economy’, p. 52. 
239 Between 1870 and 1914, the total nominal value of New Zealand’s imports was 
£428.4 million, of which £263.4 million came from Britain; calculated from Official 
statistics of the colony (dominion) of New Zealand. 
240  On this point, Platt, ‘Recent settlement’, p. 112, was even more emphatic: 
‘Britain’s competitive position in New Zealand was almost absurdly strong’. 
241  Calculated from Statistical year-book of Canada for 1890; New South Wales 
statistical register for 1890; Statistical register of the colony of Victoria for the year 1890. 
242 Treating the trade between New Zealand and the six Australian colonies as internal 
is quite appropriate for the period prior to the Australian Federation (1901), which New 
Zealand considered joining. The seven Australasian colonies were New South Wales, New 
Zealand, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia. 
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Several factors contributed to the exceedingly high share of Britain within the 
country-composition of New Zealand’s imports. The comparatively small domestic 
market of New Zealand offered limited economies of scale for a manufacturing 
sector and, in this way, helped to ensure that the colony continued to import 
manufactured goods from the ‘workshop of the world’.243 Another explanation for 
the high share of Britain in imports is the high share of Britain in exports, and vice 
versa. Ships carrying manufactured goods to New Zealand returned to Britain with 
cargoes of primary goods, in a mutually reinforcing system that maintained the high 
share of Britain in New Zealand’s total trade. As for New Zealand’s leading export, 
wool enjoyed a growing demand from the textile mills of Yorkshire.244 In the 1880s, 
when the advent of refrigerated shipping made possible the export of meat and dairy, 
high-income Britain once again proved an eager customer. Further strengthening 
bilateral commerce was regular steamship service between London and New 
Zealand, which began in the 1870s.245 Moreover, as Hawke observed, merchant firms 
dealt in both imports and exports and, therefore, served as important ‘institutional 
links’ between Britain and New Zealand.246     
Indeed, New Zealand presents an ideal case for ascertaining the presence of a 
causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports, since the 
lending-export loop would have been little attenuated by demand for merchandise 
imports from countries other than Britain. In this respect, New Zealand surpasses 
even Argentina, which figures most prominently in Ford’s empirical test of his 
theory. However, the validity of the Ford thesis should not rest upon the case of New 
Zealand (or Argentina) alone. Accordingly, this chapter follows a twofold approach 
for assessing the empirical validity of the Ford thesis. The first part involves 
estimating a regression for a panel of countries (colonies). In this endeavour, the 
analysis benefits from Stone’s numerous series on bilateral British overseas lending 
that had been unavailable to those scholars critical of Ford’s argument. The second 
                                                     
243 See, for example, Schedvin, ‘Staples and regions’, p. 544, which attributed the 
absence of a wool textile industry in New Zealand to the limited domestic market there, 
compared to in Britain. Partly for this reason, Schedvin considered New Zealand as having 
become caught in a staple trap in the late nineteenth century. See also Watkins, ‘Staple 
theory’. 
244 Between 1870 and 1913, British imports of wool increased by 204%, while imports 
of cotton increased by only 82%; calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the 
United Kingdom. 
245 Simkin, Dependent economy, p. 154. 
246 Hawke, The making, p. 60. 
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part involves a bilateral case study of New Zealand, which should allow for a more 
granular understanding of whether and how the lending-export loop operated. 
Neither the first nor second parts of the approach should be regarded as superior to 
the other. A more representative sample inevitably entails the inclusion of countries 
with lower shares of Britain in the country-compositions of their imports. Finally, 
while this chapter primarily aims to determine whether there existed a causal 
relationship between British capital and merchandise exports in the late nineteenth 
century, it also looks to gauge the magnitude of such a relationship, provided one 
existed.       
The findings of this chapter should appeal to monetary and trade historians 
alike. For monetary historians, the absence of a Fordian lending-export loop would 
imply that other equilibrating mechanisms accommodated Britain’s overseas 
investment in the balance of payments.247 For trade historians, the absence of this 
loop would imply that British ex ante lending was not a proximate determinant of 
British merchandise exports. For instance, the post-Baring falloff in British overseas 
lending in 1891 would not have resulted in any discernible decrease in British 
merchandise exports in 1892, assuming a one-year correspondence, or in 1893, 
assuming a two-year correspondence.248  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the Ford thesis in 
greater detail, as well as its subsequent treatment in the literature. This section also 
relates Ford’s argument to some more recent research on the effect of empire on 
capital and commodity flows. The chapter then proceeds to an empirical test of the 
Ford thesis, taking advantage of Stone’s data on bilateral British overseas lending. 
The next section offers a case study of British capital and merchandise exports to 
New Zealand. The final section offers some concluding remarks.  
  
Literature 
Ford presented his argument for a causal relationship between late nineteenth-
century British capital and merchandise exports in several articles published during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. The initial articulation of his argument in 1958 states 
                                                     
247 One such equilibrating mechanism was the ‘rules of the game’; see Whale, ‘Pre-
war gold standard’. 
248 Between 1890 and 1891, British overseas lending contracted by just over half; 
calculated from Simon, ‘Portfolio foreign investment’, p. 38. 
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that British ex ante lending, usually taking the form of a primary security issue in 
London, preceded an increase in British merchandise exports to the borrowing 
country.249  Social overhead projects in the borrowing country raised demand for 
British capital goods exports, whilst higher income arising from the social overhead 
projects raised demand for British consumption goods exports. The demand for 
capital goods exports can be regarded as the direct channel of the lending-export 
loop, whilst the demand for consumption goods exports can be regarded as the 
indirect channel.250  Although Ford focused on Argentina, he maintained that the 
relationship between lending and exports was ‘typical of a large part of British 
investment overseas’.251 
In a subsequent article, Ford considered whether the relationship between 
British capital and merchandise exports held in aggregate, and not just in the case of 
Argentina. Visually inspecting the deviations of aggregate ex ante lending and 
aggregate merchandise exports from their respective nine-year moving averages, 
Ford established that the inter-temporal relationship between lending and exports 
was either one or two years.252 Backed by only this crude evidence, Ford’s argument 
nevertheless persisted within the discipline of economic history for several 
decades.253 
Hatton found only the weakest possible empirical support for Ford’s argument. 
He estimated a demand function for total, i.e. not bilateral, British exports during the 
period from 1870-1913 that included an explanatory variable for British ex ante 
lending. In the initial specification of the regression, which included explanatory 
variables for the main potential determinants of the demand for British exports, 
lending was the only explanatory variable without a statistically significant 
coefficient. 254  When Hatton omitted the explanatory variable for the growth of 
industrial production in advanced economies, only then did lending acquire a 
statistically significant, though very small coefficient.255 Although this finding casts 
                                                     
249 Ford, ‘British foreign lending’, p. 305. 
250 It should be noted that Ford did not use this exact terminology. 
251 Ford, ‘British foreign lending’, p. 305. 
252 Ford, ‘British economic fluctuations’, pp. 335-6. 
253  See, for example, Kennedy, ‘Foreign investment’, p. 436; Lewis, Growth and 
fluctuations, p. 119. 
254  Hatton, ‘British exports’, pp. 584-5. Hatton also tried leading British overseas 
lending by one and two years, but doing so did not alter his results.   
255 Ibid. 
86 
 
doubt upon the existence of a causal relationship between British capital and 
merchandise exports at the aggregate level, there remains the possibility that such a 
relationship existed at the disaggregated (bilateral) level, especially for countries 
with strong financial and trade links to Britain, such as New Zealand.  
Like Hatton, Eichengreen too assessed whether a Fordian lending-export loop 
operated, though with the broader objective of identifying equilibrating mechanisms 
during the classical gold standard, rather than identifying a determinant of British 
merchandise exports per se. Toward this end, Eichengreen estimated a battery of 
regressions, each with a different dependent variable. When the dependent variable 
was British merchandise exports, the joint significance of the three variables for 
British overseas lending, led by one, two, and three years relative to the dependent 
variable, failed to indicate a causal relationship between lending and exports.256 Later 
in his analysis, Eichengreen found that a positive shock to lending did not induce any 
substantial short-term increase in exports, but did raise exports above the steady-state 
level in the longer term.257 Differentiating between short-term and long-term causal 
relationships between British capital and merchandise exports is important. 
Certainly, British overseas investment in social overhead projects, such as railways, 
could have facilitated a long-term structural increase in British merchandise exports. 
However, it should be emphasized that the scope of Ford’s own argument did not 
extend beyond the short term.   
Situating Ford’s argument within economic theory is a difficult task, partly 
because it pertains specifically to late nineteenth-century Britain, which was far-and-
away the foremost supplier to the international markets for both credit and 
manufactured goods. The Fordian lending-export loop therefore attempts to 
characterize an economically exceptional country during the period when its 
exceptionality was most pronounced. Given Mundell’s finding that, in a 2x2x2 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the movement of factors and the movement of goods are 
usually substitutes for each other, Ford’s argument describes an unusual economic 
case.258 Yet, the nature of British overseas lending in the late nineteenth century 
helps to explain why British capital and merchandise exports were complements, 
                                                     
256 Eichengreen, ‘Alec Ford’, p. 66. 
257 Ibid., p. 68. 
258  Mundell, ‘International trade’. He found that factor immobility increases trade 
flows, due to commodity price equalization, and that trade restriction increases factor 
mobility, due to factor price equalization.  
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rather than substitutes. The majority of British overseas lending took the form of 
social overhead capital: railways, tramways, bridges, ports, etc. In this respect, the 
movement of a factor (capital) did not directly induce the development of 
manufacturing in borrowing countries, but instead facilitated greater economic 
integration. British overseas investment funded the creation of a transport 
infrastructure and, consequently, the geographic expansion of the market for British 
exports.  
To a great extent, Ford’s argument is one about the British Empire, which 
absorbed nearly two-fifths of British capital exports during the half-century before 
the First World War.259 To be sure, the vast sums that London channeled to the 
Empire were the response of a well-functioning capital market to the infrastructural 
needs of (more often than not) settler colonies. However, recent research suggests 
that the large share of lending to the Empire was partly attributable to the penchant 
that British investors exhibited for the Empire. Ferguson and Schularick estimated 
that membership in the British Empire conferred, on average, an approximately 100 
basis-point reduction in the cost of capital borrowed in London, even after 
controlling for factors such as gold standard membership.260 This preference for the 
Empire was hardly irrational, however. The common British investor, facing 
information asymmetries, readily identified the Empire with British legal institutions 
and commercial policies, that is to say, the underpinnings of secure and profitable 
investment.261     
As with capital exports, British merchandise exports also exhibited a distinct 
empire effect during this period. Mitchener and Weidenmier quantified this effect 
using a gravity model. They found that membership in the British Empire alone more 
than doubled intra-Empire bilateral trade.262 This finding was reinforced by Jacks et 
al., who estimated the determinants of bilateral trade costs, a standardized measure of 
the difference between actual and frictionless bilateral trade. When both trading 
                                                     
259 Simon, ‘Portfolio foreign investment’, p. 24. This figure excludes Argentina, which 
is often treated as part of the informal Empire. 
260 Ferguson and Schularick, ‘Empire effect’, p. 297. 
261 Ibid., p. 284. For a discussion of the information asymmetries that British investors 
confronted, see Magee and Thompson, Empire and globalisation, pp. 180-98. 
262 Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Trade and empire’, pp. 1813-4. 
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partners were members of the British Empire, bilateral trade costs were halved, 
ceteris paribus.263 
Long before it was quantified, the powerful effect of empire on trade had 
caused some scholars to regard Britain’s imperial markets as soft, which generally 
meant that British exporters did not have to compete against foreign exporters either 
to secure or maintain these markets. Thompson and Magee challenged the so-called 
‘soft market’ thesis.264 According to them, three criteria must be satisfied in order for 
a market to be considered soft.265 First, per-capita spending on British exports must 
increase over time. Second, the share of per-capita income spent on British exports 
must increase over time. And third, the growth rate of per-capita spending on British 
exports must meet or exceed the growth rate of per-capita spending on the exports of 
other countries. Thompson and Magee, who focused their analysis on the Dominions, 
found that neither Australasia nor Canada satisfy all three criteria, although 
Australasia had debatable soft-market tendencies in the 1870s.266 The implication of 
this finding for the Ford thesis is that the marginal effect of British capital exports on 
British merchandise exports varied, not only across countries and colonies, but also 
across time, and it depended upon how successfully British firms competed in each 
particular imperial market.   
 
Empirical analysis 
The method for testing the empirical validity of the Ford thesis is a country (colony) 
panel regression for the period from 1870-1913. The main specification of the 
regression equation can be written as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
) = 𝐶 + 𝛼0 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−1
) + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−1
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−2
) +
𝛼2 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−2
𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡−3
) + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
) + 𝛾 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑡−1
) + 𝜖   (3.1) 
The dependent variable is real bilateral British merchandise exports. The explanatory 
variables of interest are real bilateral British ex ante lending led by one and two years 
relative to the dependent variable. This involves, for example, pairing merchandise 
                                                     
263 Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’, p. 135. 
264 Thompson and Magee, ‘Soft touch’. They acknowledged that previous scholars 
have not agreed upon a formal definition of a ‘soft market’, which remains a somewhat 
vague term, although tends to imply some lack of competition. 
265 Ibid., p. 701. 
266 Ibid., pp. 703-5. 
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exports in 1902 with lending in the years 1901 (one-year lead) and 1900 (two-year 
lead). Other explanatory variables are current-year lending, real GDP, and the terms 
of trade. The sources of data, including the deflators used, are noted in Appendix 3.1. 
The panel includes five countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay, 
and the United States, which are selected largely on account of their non-negligible 
borrowings from Britain and their adherence to the gold standard for uninterrupted 
intervals of sufficient length.267 Because a currency revaluation would have affected 
the volume of bilateral British exports, the panel excludes those countries that either 
abandoned the gold standard or joined too late to exhibit enough inter-temporal 
variation, as did many of the Latin American countries.268 Since Uruguay and the 
United States joined the gold standard in 1876 and 1879, respectively, the panel is 
slightly unbalanced by the exclusion of annual observations for these countries prior 
to their joining the gold standard. Even though the panel includes only five countries, 
together these countries represent 43 per cent of British overseas lending during the 
period from 1880-1913.269 British lending and merchandise exports to these five 
countries, collectively, are plotted in Figure 3.1. Because Stone does not report any 
lending for New Zealand in 1870 and for Uruguay in 1877, 1879, 1892-4, 1898, and 
1903-4, £0.1 million is added to every observation in the sample, so as to permit a 
log-difference expression of the variable. All variables are expressed in log 
differences in order to make the series stationary.270 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix 3.2. 
Before proceeding to the results of the panel regression, some attention must be 
given to Stone’s annual series of bilateral British ex ante lending. Stone constructed 
these series using the data on London capital calls that Jenks and Simon assembled  
 
 
                                                     
267 It should be noted that these phenomena are related, as the creditworthiness of the 
borrowing country was enhanced by adherence to the gold standard; see Bordo and Rockoff, 
‘Seal of approval’.  
268 Notably, the panel excludes Argentina, which had a chequered participation in the 
classical gold standard. 
269 Calculated from Stone, Global export. The shares of the countries are as follows: 
Australia (9%), Canada (10%), New Zealand (2%), Uruguay (1%), and the United States 
(21%).  
270  The log-difference expression of the variables prevents the inclusion of (time-
invariant) distance. In other words, the empirical strategy cannot take the form of a gravity 
model. Most gravity models in economic history use time fixed effects, which is not a 
feasible approach here, given the small number of countries in the panel. 
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from more than forty sources, the Investor’s Monthly Manual chief among them.271 
However, whereas Simon’s (published) series are disaggregated by continent, 
Stone’s series are disaggregated by country. Simply put, Stone’s series represent a 
reclassification of the original Jenks-Simon data. In a temporal sense, capital calls 
are consistent with Ford’s notion of ex ante lending, since both evidence a 
commitment to transfer capital, which precedes an ex post transfer of capital in the 
balance of payments, either through the export of merchandise, services, or specie.272 
For the purposes of the analysis here, capital calls and ex ante lending are 
interchangeable terms. However, Stone’s series encompass just British portfolio 
foreign lending, whilst excluding foreign direct investment and other forms of 
lending conducted through the international banking system.273 Moreover, there is  
 
 
                                                     
271 Simon, ‘Portfolio foreign investment’, p. 18. These sources are listed in Stone, 
Global export, pp. 419-20.  
272 For a discussion of what constitutes a capital call, see Stone, Global export, p. 4. 
273 Stone, Global export, p. 423. 
Figure 3.1.   British lending and exports to five countries, 1880-1913 
 
 
Sources: See appendix 3.1. 
Notes: The five countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay, and the United States. Both 
series have been deflated, as noted in appendix 3.1, and are expressed here in 1880 values. 
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the problem of double counting British overseas lending.274 Take the case of the 
Wellington and Manawatu Railway Co., incorporated in 1881 and capitalized—the 
former premier of New Zealand traveled to Britain to arrange the financing—at 
£850,000.275 In 1908, New Zealand nationalized the railway at a cost of £900,000 
and borrowed the funds necessary for doing so.276  Whereas the first instance of 
lending would be expected to raise the demand for British merchandise exports, the 
second instance would not. Without denying that Stone’s series present certain 
shortcomings with respect to the present exercise, these series are nevertheless used 
in the foregoing analysis, as they remain the only series of bilateral British ex ante 
lending.    
The results of the panel regression are presented in Table 3.1. The first two 
specifications are identical, except for the use of country fixed effects in column 1 
and random effects in column 2. Because the Hausman test indicates that there are no 
systematic differences in the coefficients, column 2 represents the preferred 
                                                     
274 Stone mitigated this problem by excluding from his series those capital calls arising 
from debt consolidations; see ibid., p. 426. 
275 Le Rossignol and Stewart, ‘Railways in New Zealand’, p. 663. 
276 Ibid., pp. 664-5.  
Table 3.1.   Bilateral British merchandise exports, 1871-1913 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lending 
0.81 
(1.43) 
0.78 
(1.42) 
0.88 
(1.42) 
0.76 
(1.42) 
1.58 
(1.44) 
Lending, one-year lead 
0.16 
(1.46) 
0.12 
(1.44) 
 
0.27 
(1.44) 
1.00 
(1.44) 
Lending, two-year lead  
2.73* 
(1.40) 
2.69* 
(1.38) 
 
2.91** 
(1.38) 
3.29** 
(1.41) 
Cumulative lending   
1.48 
(1.14) 
  
GDP 
57.74*** 
(18.30) 
58.07*** 
(18.13) 
58.34*** 
(18.19) 
55.08*** 
(18.03) 
 
Terms of trade 
21.75 
(16.96) 
22.21 
(16.76) 
23.10 
(16.80) 
 
16.80 
(17.01) 
Constant 
0.81 
(1.33) 
0.80 
(1.32) 
0.73 
(1.32) 
1.09 
(1.30) 
2.93** 
(1.15) 
Country fixed effects YES NO NO NO NO 
Overall R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 
Observations 200 200 200 200 202 
Sources: See appendix 3.1. 
Notes: All variables are expressed in log differences. All coefficients and standard errors have been 
rescaled by a factor of 100. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance 
at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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specification, and all further specifications employ random effects. The notable 
finding in column 2 is that lending (two-year lead) takes on a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. It is also reassuring that GDP is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In column 3, the variables for lending (one-year lead) and 
lending (two-year lead) are ‘cumulated’ in such a manner that the resulting variable 
is the log difference of lending between periods t – 3 and t – 1. If a Fordian lending-
export loop operated with a one-year lead on some occasions and with a two-year 
lead on other occasions, then the division of British ex ante lending between two 
separate explanatory variables could obfuscate the relationship between British 
capital and merchandise exports. However, such is not the case, as indicated by the 
statistically insignificant coefficient of the variable for cumulative lending. Columns 
4 and 5 exclude GDP and the terms of trade, respectively. Excluding these 
explanatory variables increases the magnitude and statistical significance of lending 
(two-year lead). 
In many respects, the model presented here is reminiscent of the model put 
forward by Hatton. Both are export demand functions for Britain during the period 
from 1870-1913. What then explains the stronger showing of British ex ante lending 
(two-year lead) in this model than in Hatton’s model? One potential explanation lies 
in what Edelstein describes as ‘short bursts’ in bilateral British lending.277 For New 
Zealand, this burst came in the 1870s. For Uruguay, it came in the late 1880s. Other 
countries realized their short bursts at different times. Such country-specific episodes 
of British overseas lending are dampened in Hatton’s model, but are exploited in the 
panel regression here. To provide a sense of how much variation is lost through the 
aggregation of bilateral lending, Table 3.2 presents the correlation coefficients of 
bilateral British lending to all of the countries (colonies) included in the panel. None 
of the coefficients is statistically significant at any conventional level, reaffirming the 
desynchronized nature of bilateral lending. 
The meaningful interpretation of the coefficient of lending (two-year lead) is 
made challenging by the log-difference expression of the variables. Because log 
differences can be treated as approximations of growth rates, the regression equation 
can be interpreted as a weighted average of growth rates, with the coefficients 
functioning as the weights. As such, column 2 implies that a one per cent increase in  
                                                     
277 Edelstein, ‘Accumulation and empire’, pp. 195-6. 
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GDP would have been 22 times more of a determinant of bilateral British 
merchandise exports than would have been a one per cent increase in lending (two-
year lead).  
Eschewing this more abstract interpretation in favour of a historically founded 
one, consider the Baring Crisis, which resulted in the decline of foreign capital calls 
from £116.6 million in 1890 to £57.6 million in 1891.278 This 50.6 per cent decline in 
British ex ante lending would have caused British merchandise exports to decline by 
1.4 per cent, or £3.1 million, between 1892 and 1893. To place this figure in context, 
the total value of Britain’s steam engine exports (to all countries) was £3.2 million in 
1892. Though the marginal effect of British capital exports on British merchandise 
exports was small, it was hardly trivial.  
 
The bilateral case of New Zealand 
British lending to New Zealand 
New Zealand imported capital on a grand scale in the 1870s. Under the premiership 
of Julius Vogel, the colonial government undertook an ambitious programme of 
infrastructure building, the centrepiece of which was the construction of a colonial 
railway system.279 Other infrastructural projects included roads, telegraph lines, and 
waterworks.280 Vogel’s programme was financed through the issuance of debt, which 
was overwhelmingly purchased by British investors. Rosenberg estimated that, over 
the course of the decade, the nominal value of the external debt of the colonial 
government increased from £7.0 million to £25.4 million. 281  Yet, it should be 
                                                     
278  Stone, Global export, p. 377. In real terms, the decline in lending was nearly 
identical at 50.1%, as calculated using the deflator noted in appedix 3.1. The Baring Crisis 
was one of the few instances in which bilateral lending was more synchronized. 
279 Simkin, Dependent economy, pp. 146-50. 
280 Mackay, ‘Public finance’, p. 57. 
281 Rosenberg, ‘Capital imports’, p. 109. 
Table 3.2.   Correlation coefficients of bilateral British lending, 1880-1913 
 Australia Canada New Zealand Uruguay United States 
Australia -- -0.01 0.08 0.24 0.11 
Canada -0.01 -- 0.11 -0.19 -0.17 
New Zealand 0.08 0.11 -- 0.02 0.03 
Uruguay 0.24 -0.19 0.02 -- -0.02 
United States 0.11 -0.17 0.03 -0.02 -- 
Sources: See appendix 3.1. 
Notes: All variables are expressed in log differences. No correlation coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
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observed that the pace of borrowing was inconsistent, as there are clearly identifiable 
peaks in public capital calls for New Zealand in 1875 and 1878.282 
A considerable portion of public borrowing in the 1870s was not allocated to 
social overhead projects, but instead to purchasing Maori lands and providing 
immigrants free passage to the colony. Collectively, the Immigration and Public 
Works Loan Acts of 1870, 1873, and 1874 authorized the borrowing of £0.7 million 
for land acquisition and £1.5 million for assisted immigration. Whether borrowing 
for these purposes resulted in a short-term increase in British merchandise exports is 
a question this chapter addresses shortly. In the case of assisted immigration, British 
lending would more likely have raised demand for British shipping services than for 
merchandise exports.       
The profusion of British capital that New Zealand borrowed during the 1870s 
was achieved through the centralization of public finance at the colonial level. 
Through the 1860s, the provincial governments made recourse to the London capital 
market. 283  However, as Attard described, the provinces encountered increasing 
difficulty in attracting external capital, as both British investors and the London 
Stock Exchange doubted the creditworthiness of the provinces.284 The centralization 
of public finance at the colonial level effectively occurred in 1867, when the colonial 
government guaranteed and consolidated the provincial debts. 285  In 1876, the 
provinces were abolished altogether. Attard argued that the strengthening of the 
colonial government of New Zealand can be explained by its ability to raise capital 
for economic development, whereas the provincial governments ultimately proved 
deficient in this endeavour.286 
Indeed, the central government of New Zealand was successful in attracting 
external capital during the 1870s. While public borrowing abated somewhat in the 
early 1880s, it resumed again in 1883 to finance another, fainter round of 
                                                     
282 Stone, Global export, pp. 123-5. Stone further disaggregated each series of bilateral 
capital calls into public and private capital calls.  
283  Provincial borrowing in the 1860s was not altogether minor, with Simkin, 
Dependent economy, p. 142, having noted that provincial debt increased by over £2 million 
between 1860 and 1868. 
284 Attard, ‘Colonial state’, p. 118. 
285 Ibid., p. 119. 
286 Ibid., p. 122.  
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infrastructure building.287 By this point, the burgeoning public debt had become an 
acute fiscal concern, especially as New Zealand was amid a depression.288 In 1887, 
the newly elected Atkinson ministry adopted a policy of ending railway construction 
(and its finance) as swiftly as practicable.289         
The central government made a distinct return to borrowing in 1895. Some of 
the borrowing was undertaken to fund the Government Advances to Settlers Act of 
1894—yet another instance of borrowing directed toward something other than a 
social overhead project. The act, intended to promote capital-intensive family 
farming, empowered the government to provide mortgages to small landowners for 
less than the market rate of interest. In 1895, the government issued £1.5 million 
worth of 3 per cent bonds in the London capital market, which investors purchased at 
an average price of £94 8s. 9d. 290  This capital was then re-lent to current and 
prospective small landowners at an interest rate of 5 per cent, undercutting the 
prevailing interest rates of 6-8 per cent for private mortgages.291 Most of the original 
mortgages granted through this scheme represented the refinancing of pre-existing 
mortgages, rather than the financing of land purchases.292 The Government Advances 
to Settlers Act was liberal in its extension of credit, as it permitted the issuance of 
mortgages to both freeholders and, interestingly, leaseholders. Many of the latter 
held ‘leases-in-perpetuity’ from the state, a system of land tenure introduced under 
the Land Act of 1892.293 Throughout the early twentieth century, the popularity of 
the Advances to Settlers scheme continued to grow, and the colony continued to 
borrow commensurately. By 1913, the nominal value of mortgages owned by the 
central government of New Zealand amounted to £7.7 million.294 
Insofar as the Government Advances to Settlers Act permitted landowners and 
leaseholders to refinance their pre-existing mortgages through the government, this 
act brought about a private-to-public debt conversion. Private mortgages were 
                                                     
287 Simkin, Dependent economy, p. 150. This second round of infrastructure building 
was largely and characteristically presided over by Vogel, who served as Colonial Treasurer 
in the ministry of Robert Stout.  
288 According to Coghlan, Statistical account, p. 702, New Zealand had the highest 
(colonial) public debt per capita of all seven Australasian colonies in 1881. 
289 Dowie, ‘New Zealand investment’, p. 264. Railway construction did continue past 
1887, but only in order to render nearly completed lines usable. 
290 Mackay, ‘Public finance’, p. 254.  
291 Ibid. 
292 Condliffe, In the making, p. 191.  
293 Stewart, ‘Land tenure’, pp. 84-5. 
294 Official statistics of the dominion of New Zealand for the year 1913. 
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provided through New Zealand’s banks, which intermediated between depositors and 
borrowers, though the depositors were oftentimes Britons seeking to take advantage 
of more attractive rates.295 However, circumstances changed following the Baring 
Crisis of 1890 and the Australian Banking Crisis of 1893, which caused British 
depositors to become fearful about the stability of overseas banks and to withdraw 
their deposits.296 Hawke argued that the objective of the Government Advances to 
Settlers Act was to prevent the flight of British capital, transmitted through the 
international banking system, from hampering the availability of mortgages and, by 
extension, the economic development of the colony.297  
New Zealand also imported private capital in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and the corresponding private capital calls are included in 
Stone’s series. Some examples of private capital calls included the financing of the 
Wellington and Manawatu Railway Co. and the New Zealand Midland Railway Co. 
Still, the majority (64 per cent) of capital calls for New Zealand were public.298 The 
large share of public capital calls for New Zealand is easily explained by the 
interventionist role that the central government played in building infrastructure.299 
 
Testing for the lending-export loop  
Given the diversity of purposes for which New Zealand borrowed capital from 
Britain, this chapter now proceeds to test the applicability of the Ford thesis to the 
bilateral case of New Zealand. The regression equation from the previous section is 
estimated as a time-series for just New Zealand. All of the sources of data remain the 
same. The results are presented in Table 3.3. In column 1, the surprising finding is 
that the coefficients of the lending variables are all statistically insignificant. This 
finding challenges the applicability of the Ford thesis to the case of New Zealand, 
which was expected to provide the most patent evidence for the operation of a 
lending-export loop. The outcome of the time-series regression for New Zealand  
 
                                                     
295 Hawke, The making, p. 64.  
296 Simkin, Dependent economy, p. 167. 
297 Hawke, The making, p. 107. 
298 Calculated from Stone, Global export, p. 131. This high public share in total capital 
calls for New Zealand contrasts with the low public share in total capital calls for all 
countries, which was 36%.   
299 See Le Rossignol and Stewart, State socialism.     
97 
 
 
further contrasts with the outcome of the panel regression in that the coefficient of 
the terms of trade is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficient of the terms of 
trade are not entirely surprising. The lack of diversity in New Zealand’s exports—
wool comprised 49 per cent in 1883—left the economy predisposed to fluctuations in 
the prices of a narrow range of commodities, specifically wool and, later on, meat 
and dairy.300 In general, New Zealand’s terms of trade improved until 1883 and then 
remained mostly stationary for the next three decades.301 Still, there were occasional 
sharp movements in the terms of trade, and these movements often corresponded 
with movements in real British merchandise exports to the colony. The single largest 
percentage change in both the terms of trade (27 per cent) and real British 
merchandise exports (52 per cent) came in 1872. Following the Franco-Prussian 
War, industrial dislocation on the European Continent left Yorkshire in the position 
of satisfying a greater demand than usual, with British exports of woollens increasing 
from 293 million to 413 million linear yards per annum between 1870 and 1872.302 
                                                     
300 Calculated from Condliffe, In the making, p. 131.  
301 Easton and Wilson, ‘N. Z.’s terms’, pp. 36-7. 
302 Jenkins and Ponting, Wool textile industry, pp. 222-3. 
Table 3.3.   British merchandise exports to New Zealand, 1871-1913 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lending 
-0.63 
(2.37) 
0.73 
(3.57) 
 
Lending, one-year lead 
-1.82 
(2.49) 
-0.37 
(3.47) 
 
Lending, two-year lead  
-0.21 
(2.33) 
-2.37 
(3.52) 
 
Railway capital formation   
17.48** 
(7.86) 
GDP 
80.34* 
(45.51) 
160.45** 
(69.29) 
134.13** 
(53.71) 
Terms of trade 
75.30*** 
(26.25) 
89.92** 
(32.51) 
83.71*** 
(28.26) 
Constant 
0.86 
(2.70) 
-3.15 
(3.95) 
-3.08 
(3.37) 
Interval 1871-1913 1872-1900 1872-1900 
DW statistic 1.77 1.71 2.08 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.25 0.41 
Sources: See appendix 3.1. 
Notes: All variables are expressed in log differences. All coefficients and standard errors have been 
rescaled by a factor of 100. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance 
at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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The elevated demand for woollens exerted backward pressure along the supply 
chain, with the consequence that the price of wool increased from 9¼d. to 15d. per 
pound.303 Yet, the strength of the relationship between New Zealand’s terms of trade 
and its merchandise imports from Britain cannot account for the absence of an 
observable lending-export loop, since the terms of trade and British ex ante lending 
are not mutually exclusive determinants.  
Was the absence of an observable lending-export loop in the bilateral case of 
New Zealand due to the fact that not all borrowing was allocated to social overhead 
projects? Recall the difference between the direct and indirect channels of the 
Fordian lending-export loop. The direct channel involved an increase in demand for 
British capital goods exports, whereas the indirect channel involved an increase in 
the demand for British consumption goods exports. Lending for a social overhead 
project would have stimulated demand for capital goods exports via the direct 
channel and, by raising the income of the borrowing country, would have also 
stimulated demand for consumption goods exports via the indirect channel. 
However, lending for some purpose other than a social overhead project, such as land 
reform, would have confined the operation of the lending-export loop to the indirect 
channel, presumably. Given the possibility that higher incomes were subject to 
consumption smoothing, a short-term causal relationship between British capital and 
merchandise exports via the indirect channel seems not especially likely.      
The objective now is to determine whether the bilateral case of New Zealand 
exhibited a causal relationship between British capital and merchandise exports 
through the direct channel, that is to say, when lending was allocated to social 
overhead projects. Unfortunately, Stone’s series on capital calls for New Zealand do 
not differentiate between social overhead lending and other lending. This study 
therefore employs Dowie’s annual estimates of real gross railway capital formation 
in New Zealand as a proxy for social overhead lending.304 The Dowie series for gross 
railway capital formation is preferable to the more recently produced Mulcare series, 
since the latter excludes private railway capital formation. 305  This difference is 
                                                     
303 McIlraith, Course of real prices, p. 52. 
304 Dowie, ‘New Zealand investment’, pp. 39-40. I thank Jack Dowie for generously 
making available a copy of his long-since-completed PhD dissertation. 
305 Mulcare, ‘Capital formation’, p. 78. A related concern is that the Mulcare series 
treats the nationalization of a private railway as public railway capital formation, whereas the 
Dowie series does not; see Dowie, ‘New Zealand Investment’, p. 48. Thus, the spike in the 
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particularly important in the 1880s and early 1890s, when most of the private railway 
capital formation occurred.  
There remains the question of the extent to which railway capital formation 
was actually financed through external borrowing in London, as opposed to through 
domestic borrowing. Private railway capital formation was effectively limited to the 
Wellington and Manawatu Railway Co. and the New Zealand Midland Railway Co., 
and these companies were financed by British investors.306 It is assumed that nearly 
all public railway capital formation was financed externally before 1900. The New 
Zealand Official Year-book, 1900 is the first volume in this annual series to 
decompose the public debt into the amounts raised in London and domestically. Of 
the £47.9 million of central government debt outstanding in 1900, £43.3 million (90 
per cent) had been raised in London.307 However, after 1900, there was a marked 
decline in the dependence of the New Zealand central government upon the London 
capital market. 308  On this point, Simkin makes reference to the strained credit 
conditions that prevailed in the London capital market during the British economic 
downturn of 1900-4.309 Of the additional debt incurred by the central government 
from 1900-13, only 61 per cent was issued in London.310 The public finances of 
Edwardian New Zealand were becoming an increasingly domestic affair, and New 
Zealand broadly resembled Australia in this respect. Attard found that the 
domestically owned share of the long-term debt of the six Australian colonies 
increased more than threefold from 1900-13.311 Though, it should be observed that 
this increase was not due to a locational change in the placement of new debt, but 
instead to a net repatriation of outstanding debt. Of course, New Zealand may have 
realized a net repatriation of its outstanding debt, as well.      
                                                                                                                                                      
Mulcare series of public railway capital formation in 1895 is likely attributable to the 
nationalization of the New Zealand Midland Railway Co. in this year.  
306 Le Rossignol and Stewart, ‘Railways in New Zealand’, pp. 663 and 665. 
307 New Zealand official year-book, 1900, p. 401. The high share of the public debt 
raised externally was likely constant prior to 1900. In reconstructing New Zealand’s balance 
of payments, Rosenberg, ‘Capital imports’, p. 109, assumed this share was 90% in every 
year from 1862-1900.  
308 Mackay, ‘Public finance’, p. 139.  
309 Simkin, Dependent economy, p. 182. 
310 Calculated from New Zealand official year-book. Not all of the remainder was 
raised domestically, as a substantial portion was raised in Australia during the early 
twentieth century. Until the twentieth century, however, a mere £0.2 million of New 
Zealand’s public debt had been raised there.   
311 Attard, ‘Australian public borrowing’, pp. 166-7. 
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The growing reliance of the New Zealand central government on domestic 
sources of credit is perhaps best explained by the economic circumstances within 
New Zealand itself. The New Zealand Official Year-book, 1913 offers some insights: 
‘This remarkable change in the relative positions of the State creditors may be partly 
ascribed to the ability of the mass wage-earning population in the Dominion to save, 
and to the general appreciation of the manner in which their savings are invested’.312 
Public capital formation through domestic savings was greatly facilitated by growth 
in real per-capita income, which recommenced in the 1890s following two decades 
of stagnation.313 According to Greasley and Oxley, 70 per cent of the growth in real 
per-capita income during New Zealand’s pastoral boom (1890-1914) was due to the 
rising rental value of cultivated land.314 To some extent, therefore, the refrigeration-
driven pastoral boom was responsible for the increasing domestic share of public 
capital formation, which was most noticeable after 1900. 
In recognition of the apparent turn-of-the-century break in the externally 
financed share of New Zealand’s public capital formation, the proxy variable of 
gross railway capital formation is not extended beyond the nineteenth century. 
Hence, the interval is truncated to 1872-1900 for the remaining specifications of the 
regression in Table 3.3.  
One further matter related to the proxy variable requires discussion, and that is 
the a priori inter-temporal relationship between railway capital formation and British 
merchandise exports, which would differ from Ford’s proposed inter-temporal 
relationship between British ex ante lending and British merchandise exports. The 
sequence of these three events (lending, exporting, and capital formation) would 
proceed generally as follows. British investors would lend ex ante to the New 
Zealand central government via a primary security issue, with the funds deposited 
into a bank account. Sometime thereafter, the government would draw upon this 
account to purchase British capital goods exports. Dowie estimates capital formation 
using the ‘flow of funds’ method, whereby capital formation coincides with capital 
expenditure. 315  Thus, the a priori inter-temporal relationship between British 
merchandise exports and railway capital formation is a contemporaneous one.  
                                                     
312 New Zealand official year-book, 1913, p. 792. 
313 For the latest reconstructions of New Zealand’s real GDP per capita, see Greasley 
and Oxley, ‘Cointegration-based approach’, pp. 365-6. 
314 Greasley and Oxley, ‘Pastoral boom’, p. 335. 
315 Dowie, ‘New Zealand investment’, p. 21. 
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Merchandise exports to and railway capital formation in New Zealand are depicted in 
Figure 3.2.        
Column 2 of Table 3.3 replicates the initial specification, but for the truncated 
interval of 1872-1900. Once again, the coefficients of the lending variables are all 
statistically insignificant. Column 3 replaces the lending variables with current-year 
railway capital formation, the proxy for social overhead lending. The coefficient of 
railway capital formation is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
the case of British lending for social overhead projects, a Fordian lending-export 
loop emerges. Moreover, the coefficient of railway capital formation in Table 3.3 is 
many times greater than the coefficient of lending (two-year lead) in Table 3.1.  
A comparison of columns 2 and 3 suggests that the lending-export loop 
operated when British overseas lending was allocated to social overhead projects, but 
not otherwise. Social overhead lending likely stimulated demand for British 
merchandise exports via the direct channel. But is there empirical evidence for an  
Figure 3.2.   British exports to and railway capital formation in New Zealand, 1871-
1900 
 
 
Sources: Merchandise exports: see appendix 3.1. Railway capital formation: Dowie, ‘New Zealand 
investment’, pp. 39-40. 
Notes: Both series have been deflated and are expressed here in 1886-8 values. The deflator for 
merchandise exports to New Zealand is noted in appendix 3.1. Railway capital formation has already 
been deflated by Dowie.  
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indirect channel of the lending-export loop, whereby social overhead lending raised 
demand for British consumption goods exports in the short term? To answer this 
question, the direct and indirect channels are isolated by changing the dependent 
variable to capital goods exports and consumption goods exports, respectively. Iron 
is considered a representative capital good. Cotton textiles are considered a 
representative consumption good. Iron and cotton textiles are well suited to this 
exercise because the Annual Statements of the Trade of the United Kingdom report 
the quantities of these commodities exported to New Zealand, thus obviating the 
need for deflators. 
The results of these time-series regressions are presented in Table 3.4. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 replicate columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.3, but with a 
dependent variable of iron exports. The coefficient of railway capital formation is 
now statistically significant at the 1% level. This outcome suggests, even more 
clearly than before, that the direct channel was the modus operandi of the Fordian 
lending-export loop. In columns 3 and 4, with a dependent variable of cotton textile 
exports, the coefficient of railway capital formation is statistically insignificant. 
Table 3.4.   British capital and consumption goods exports to New Zealand, 1872-
1900 
 Iron exports (tonnes) Cotton textile exports (yards) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lending 
2.98 
(7.31) 
 
-0.32 
(4.47) 
 
Lending, one-year lead 
2.49 
(7.09) 
 
-7.16 
(4.34) 
 
Lending, two-year lead  
-6.10 
(7.21) 
 
-6.12 
(4.41) 
 
Railway capital 
formation 
 
50.73*** 
(14.79) 
 
-10.18 
(11.27) 
GDP 
325.36** 
(141.83) 
260.32** 
(101.10) 
235.42** 
(86.71) 
169.87** 
(77.02) 
Terms of trade 
139.51** 
(66.55) 
126.13** 
(53.19) 
66.51 
(40.69) 
60.51 
(40.52) 
Constant 
-9.80 
(8.09) 
-9.80 
(6.35) 
-2.73 
(4.95) 
-0.28 
(4.84) 
Interval 1872-1900 1872-1900 1872-1900 1872-1900 
DW statistic 1.70 2.08 2.06 2.19 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.46 0.18 0.15 
Sources: See appendix 3.1. 
Notes: All variables are expressed in log differences. All coefficients and standard errors have been 
rescaled by a factor of 100. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance 
at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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British ex ante lending to New Zealand, whether for all purposes or for just social 
overhead projects, did not cause any short-term increase in British consumption 
goods exports to the colony.     
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has revisited one of the main arguments of the Ford thesis: a causal 
relationship between British capital and merchandise exports during the late 
nineteenth century. The availability of annual data on bilateral British ex ante lending 
permitted the estimation of a country panel regression, which proved more 
conclusive than the econometric tests employed by Hatton and Eichengreen. The 
coefficient of British ex ante lending (two-year lead) was statistically significant at 
either the 10% or 5% level, depending upon the specification of the regression. The 
magnitude of this coefficient was small, but far from negligible. Indeed, it was 
estimated that the Baring Crisis, which precipitated a sharp decline in British 
overseas lending, curtailed British merchandise exports by several million pounds.  
For monetary historians, the magnitude of the coefficient implies that the 
lending-export loop only minimally offset overseas lending in Britain’s multilateral 
balance of payments. In this sense, Ford’s argument does little to advance an 
understanding of how the classical gold standard worked, at least in the short term. 
As Eichengreen argued, there was likely a long-term causal relationship between 
British capital and merchandise exports. Certainly, the role that British capital 
exports played in the geographic expansion of the market for British exports is a 
subject ripe for future consideration. The specific focus of this chapter, though, has 
been on Ford’s argument, which was concerned with just the short term.  
The high share of Britain in the country-composition of New Zealand’s imports 
rendered this bilateral case especially appropriate for better understanding the 
operation of the lending-export loop. Surprisingly, there was no initial evidence for 
the operation of a lending-export loop in New Zealand. However, when only British 
ex ante lending for social overhead projects was considered, there emerged an 
obvious lending-export loop. Furthermore, by distinguishing between capital goods 
exports and consumption goods exports, it became clear that the operation of the 
Fordian lending-export loop was due to the direct channel. In this sense, the Ford 
thesis has been qualified.  
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At the risk of concluding on a speculative note, perhaps the most significant 
implications of this chapter are for imperial history. The existence of a causal 
relationship between British capital and merchandise exports may well alter the 
debate over the so-called balance sheet of empire. 316  Yes, the British Empire 
introduced a capital-market distortion—a liability—in favour of imperial borrowers. 
But any detrimental effect of this distortion, such as reducing otherwise profitable 
domestic investment (to say nothing of non-imperial overseas investment), was 
partly offset by a short-term increase in demand for British exports, provided the 
lending was directed toward social overhead capital. At the non-imperial cost of 
capital, would New Zealand have borrowed so liberally to finance railway 
construction in the 1870s? The same question can just as well be asked of Canada for 
the first decade of the twentieth century.317 Britain lent more to its Empire and, 
consequently, exported more to its Empire, as well. In such a way, the lending-export 
loop supplements the more direct effects of empire on commodity trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
316  For one of the later contributions to this lengthy debate, see Offer, ‘Waste of 
money’.  
317 The Edwardian boom in British lending to Canada is covered extensively in Dilley, 
‘London finance’, pp. 1008-16. 
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IV: The manufacturing trade of late-Victorian Britain: how much can 
Heckscher-Ohlin explain? 
 
Introduction 
Economic historians have generally settled for the casual understanding that, 
according to Harley, ‘the industries of the Industrial Revolution retained their 
comparative advantage until the First World War’.318 Indeed, the staple industries of 
textiles and iron continued to dominate the composition of British exports through 
the late-Victorian era. 319  However, it remains uncertain whether Britain realized 
comparative advantages in the many other industries that characterized its 
manufacturing sector and, increasingly, the manufacturing sectors (and exports) of 
other industrial countries. Accordingly, this chapter contributes to the existing 
literature by calculating indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and 
revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) for 17 British manufacturing 
industries for the years 1880, 1890, and, 1900.  
These indicators are then extended into the debate over the factor determinants 
of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages. Here, the novel finding is that 
the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain did not rest in 
the relatively labour-intensive industries. This finding is inconsistent with that of 
Crafts and Thomas, who estimated the factor determinants of just (non-normalized) 
British exports for the year 1880.320  Even after controlling for human capital, it 
remains that the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain 
were not relatively labour-intensive. 
Broadberry attributed the comparative labour productivity levels of late 
nineteenth-century British manufacturing industries partly to relative factor 
endowments. One of the several patterns that emerged was that Britain tended to 
realize its highest comparative labour productivity levels (vis-à-vis the United States 
and Germany) in those manufacturing industries that used intensively Britain’s 
relatively abundant supply of human capital.321 Drawing upon a spectacular range of 
secondary sources, Broadberry explained the relative performance of various 
                                                     
318 Harley, ‘Early start’, p. 6. 
319  The staple industries of textiles and iron accounted for fully 66% of British 
manufactured exports in 1902-4; see Schlote, Overseas trade, p. 74. 
320 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 637. 
321 Broadberry, Productivity race, p. 158. 
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manufacturing industries during the period from 1850-1914. However, no systematic 
quantification of comparative labour productivity, disaggregated by industry, was 
possible for the period before 1907, due to a deficiency of output data.322 Here, there 
emerges an opportunity for this dissertation. The trade statistics of industrial 
countries contain data sufficient for calculating RCA indicators of British 
manufacturing industries for the period before 1907. Of course, comparative 
advantage is not the same as comparative labour productivity; as Broadberry has 
observed, ‘Clearly, there is no one-to-one mapping between variations in 
comparative labour productivity and comparative advantage, since labour is not the 
only factor of production’.323 This dissertation avoids any conflation of the concepts. 
Still, measurements of comparative advantage can provide some numerical 
indication of the relative performance of British manufacturing industries during the 
late-Victorian era. 
The factor proportions, or Heckscher Ohlin (H-O), model has been favoured by 
economic historians seeking to explain the pattern of nineteenth-century trade.324 
However, the H-O model does not account for the phenomenon of intra-industry 
trade, which occurs when a country imports and exports commodities within the 
same industry. A collection of models known as new trade theory (NTT) offers 
several explanations of intra-industry trade. There are hardly any applications of 
NTT to the nineteenth century, Brown being a rare example that evaluated British 
and German intra-industry trade in cotton textiles. With respect to NTT, this chapter 
finds that intra-industry trade accounted for an increasing share of Britain’s total 
manufacturing trade throughout the late-Victorian era. Nevertheless, the majority of 
the manufacturing trade of late-Victorian Britain remained Heckscher-Ohlinian, i.e. 
factor-determined, into the 1890s. As might be expected, there was considerable 
variation among Britain’s manufacturing industries, both with respect to the levels 
and trends in intra-industry trade, and this variation is discussed. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section presents a review of the 
literature. In the next section, RCA and RSCA indicators are calculated for Britain’s 
                                                     
322  For the details of the construction of his industry-disaggregated estimates, see 
Broadberry and Fremdling, ‘British and German industry’; Broadberry, ‘British and 
American manufacturing’. 
323 Broadberry, Productivity race, p. 26. 
324  For a noteworthy example, see O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘Factor-price 
convergence’. 
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manufacturing industries. The next section identifies the factor determinants of 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages, initially using a three-factor H-O 
model, and subsequently using a four-factor H-O model that controls for human 
capital. The next section examines the levels and trends in the intra-industry trade of 
Britain’s manufacturing industries. This analysis is further illuminated by means of a 
vignette of the British linen yarn industry. The last section concludes.    
 
Literature review 
Heckscher-Ohlin model 
Under the H-O model of trade, a country exports those commodities which use 
intensively its relatively abundant factors of production. 325  Thus, relative factor 
endowments determine the comparative advantages of a country.326 This model was 
used by Crafts and Thomas, who estimated the factor determinants of Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages in selected years from 1910-35, by which 
time there were regular censuses of production from which factor intensities could be 
calculated. The authors employed a three-factor H-O model, with the factors being 
(unskilled) labour, human capital, and capital. Throughout the period from 1910-35, 
the manufacturing industries in which Britain realized a comparative advantage were 
relatively intensive in labour, but not in human capital; comparative advantage was 
unaffected by the capital intensity of the industry.327 The authors then applied the 
model to late-Victorian Britain, albeit using cruder data from the Factory 
Inspectorate Returns of 1870, and found similar results, except that capital was a 
statistically significant and positive determinant of Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages during this earlier period.328 
Crafts and Thomas used the term ‘comparative advantage’ loosely. For the 
period from 1910-35, they estimated the factor determinants of British gross and net 
exports. For the late-Victorian era, they estimated the factor determinants of just 
British gross exports in the year 1880, using factor proportions inferred from 1870 
data. The problem here is that the value of gross exports alone does not indicate the 
                                                     
325 Ohlin, International trade. 
326  The H-O model departs from the earlier Ricardian model, which identifies 
technological differences between countries as the determinant of comparative advantage. 
Nevertheless, both models offer explanations for the occurrence of comparative advantages.  
327 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 636. 
328 Ibid., p. 637. 
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presence of a comparative advantage. Consider the industries of silk manufactures 
and cement. In 1900, the value of British silk exports was more than double the value 
of British cement exports, yet Britain realized a comparative disadvantage in the 
former industry and a comparative advantage in the latter industry.329 This chapter 
improves upon the work of Crafts and Thomas by normalizing British exports for the 
composition of world exports, that is to say, by calculating indicators of comparative 
advantage. 
Crafts did, in fact, calculate RCA indicators for British manufacturing 
industries, along with the manufacturing industries of ten other mostly industrial 
countries, for the years 1899, 1913, 1929, 1937, and 1950. In doing so, he employed 
the method advanced by Balassa, which is discussed fully in the next section of this 
chapter. For the year 1899, Crafts observed that Britain’s comparative advantages 
were greatest in the more mature industries of shipbuilding, iron, and textiles, rather 
than in the industries of the Second Industrial Revolution, which exhibited greater 
scope for new technology by the closing decades of the nineteenth century. 330 
However, no factor-based explanation for the pattern of Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages was offered. 
Crafts and Thomas’s portrait of manufacturing in late-Victorian Britain as 
intensive in labour, but not in human capital, was the opposite of what Harley argued 
was true of manufacturing in (slightly later) Edwardian Britain. He argued that 
Britain was relatively abundant in skilled labour and that the United States, given its 
influx of migrants from southern and eastern Europe, was relatively abundant in 
unskilled labour.331 The work of Harley is not, however, entirely comparable to the 
work of Crafts and Thomas. Whereas Crafts and Thomas were concerned with the 
pattern of specialization among industries, Harley was concerned with intra-industry 
differences between British and American manufacturing, specifically within the 
industries of shipbuilding, textiles, engineering, and iron and steel.  
 
New trade theory 
The phenomenon of intra-industry trade is explained by NTT, which comprises 
several models. Here, the discussion of NTT is limited to the essential elements of 
                                                     
329 The RCA indicators for these industries are reported in table 4.1. 
330 Crafts, ‘Revealed comparative advantage’, p. 130. 
331 Harley, ‘Edwardian industry’, pp. 394-5. 
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two NTT models: the Chamberlinian-Heckscher-Ohlin (C-H-O) model, put forward 
by Helpman and Krugman, and the neo-H-O model, put forward by Falvey. Before 
proceeding to a discussion of these models, it is first necessary to differentiate 
between two sorts of intra-industry trade: horizontal (HIIT) and vertical (VIIT). HIIT 
involves commodities differentiated according to attribute, such as colour. VIIT 
involves commodities differentiated according to quality, such as durability. 
The C-H-O model is consistent with the H-O model; inter-industry (net) trade 
still occurs between countries of differing relative factor endowments. 332 
Additionally, however, intra-industry trade of horizontally differentiated 
commodities occurs between countries of similar relative factor endowments. 
According to the model, a firm realizing increasing returns to scale and operating 
under monopolistic conditions satisfies world demand for one variety of a 
horizontally differentiated commodity. 333  HIIT ensues, since firms producing the 
different attribute-varieties of the commodity are located in different, but similarly 
endowed, countries. 
Like the C-H-O model, the neo-H-O model is also consistent with the H-O 
model, with inter-industry trade occurring as the result of differing relative factor 
endowments between countries. Even still, two countries with broadly similar factor 
endowments may exhibit moderate differences with respect to their relative 
endowments of a particular immobile factor, such as capital. If the quality of a 
commodity varies according to the capital intensity of its production, then VIIT 
occurs between countries.334 Hence, large differences in relative factor endowments 
lead to increased inter-industry trade, while small differences in the relative 
endowments of the quality-determining factor lead to increased VIIT. Cabral et al. 
lent empirical support to these relationships using data on the trade of European 
Union (EU) member states with foreign countries. They found that the between-
country difference in capital per worker was a statistically significant and positive 
determinant of VIIT between EU member states and other high-income countries, 
but that the difference was a statistically significant and negative determinant of 
VIIT between EU member states and middle-income and developing countries.335 
                                                     
332 Helpman and Krugman, Market structure, p. 142. 
333 Ibid., pp. 131-58. 
334 Falvey, ‘Commercial policy’, pp. 497-503. 
335 Cabral, Falvey, and Milner, ‘Endowment differences’, pp. 409-11. 
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Brown undertook one of the only applications of NTT to the nineteenth 
century. He found that the share of intra-industry trade in the total cotton textile 
trades of Britain and Germany nearly tripled between 1883 and 1913. 336  In 
explaining this growth in intra-industry trade, Brown described, for example, how 
Britain imported from Germany cotton textiles in colours that were unavailable 
domestically.337 Still, it remains uncertain whether the rising intra-industry trade in 
cotton textiles conformed more to the C-H-O or neo-H-O model.   
 
Measuring comparative advantage 
Balassa was interested in identifying the comparative advantages of industrial 
countries, not during the late nineteenth century, but rather during the period of trade 
liberalization that followed the Second World War. For Balassa to have determined 
comparative advantages directly would have required an enormous amount of 
systematically collected data on production costs for every industry-country pair. 
Instead, Balassa endeavoured to determine comparative advantages indirectly, based 
upon the pattern of world trade. Assuming that countries actually traded according to 
their comparative advantages, Balassa then argued that the pattern of world trade 
‘revealed’ the comparative advantages of countries.338  
Balassa’s method for calculating an indicator of RCA is expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐,𝑖 =  
𝑋𝑐,𝑖
𝑋𝑛,𝑖
𝑋𝑐
𝑋𝑛
⁄         (4.1) 
Here, X refers to the current value of exports, i to the manufactured commodity, c to 
the industrial country, and n to the whole basket of industrial countries. The RCA 
indicator is therefore the country-share of world exports of the manufactured 
commodity normalized for the country-share of world exports of total manufactured 
commodities. An indicator greater than 1 implies a comparative advantage, an 
indicator less than 1 a comparative disadvantage. Theoretically, specialization 
according to comparative advantage would cause a country’s RCA indicators to 
cluster around Xn/Xc (‘complete’ comparative advantage) and 0 (‘complete’ 
                                                     
336 Brown, ‘Cotton textiles’, pp. 509-10. The share of intra-industry trade in the total 
cotton textile trades of Britain and Germany with other current OECD countries more than 
tripled.  
337 Ibid., p. 503.   
338 Balassa, ‘Trade liberalisation’, p. 103. 
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comparative disadvantage). 339  However, empirically, indicators fall anywhere 
between these two values, oftentimes quite close to the threshold value. One reason 
is that the manufactured commodity, as defined, encompasses enough heterogeneity 
such that a country may realize a comparative advantage in one variety of the 
commodity, but a comparative disadvantage in another variety of the commodity. 
This situation is especially likely when the RCA indicators are calculated at higher 
levels of aggregation, such as the industry level, as was done by Crafts, and as is 
done here. Another reason is that transport costs and preferential tariffs, which distort 
the pattern of trade, are internalized in the RCA indicator. 
This last reason was addressed by Costinot et al., who sought to correct for 
such distortions in identifying comparative advantage. The main specification of 
their model took the form of a country-pair panel regression, in which the log of 
pairwise relative productivity in an industry predicts the log of bilateral exports in 
that industry.340 An exporter-importer fixed effect accounts for trade costs, such as 
transport costs and preferential tariffs, among others.341 The approach undertaken by 
Costinot et al. could be employed to identify Britain’s comparative advantages, vis-à-
vis each of its trading partners, for the late nineteenth century, provided bilateral 
trade data disaggregated by industry actually existed for the years 1880, 1890, and 
1900, which is not the case. Furthermore, employing the approach of Costinot et al. 
would involve the precarious assumption that the elasticity of bilateral exports to 
pairwise relative productivity was the same in the late nineteenth century as in the 
late twentieth century.  
This study therefore settles on Balassa’s method for identifying comparative 
advantages. RCA indicators are calculated for 17 British manufacturing industries for 
the years 1880, 1890, and 1900. The industries—Balassa’s method involved 
individual manufactured commodities—are beer; cement; chemicals; clocks and 
watches; copper manufactures; cotton manufactures; earthenware and chinaware; 
flax, hemp, and jute manufactures; glass; iron, steel, and manufactures thereof; 
leather and manufactures thereof; machinery; paper and manufactures thereof; rubber 
manufactures; silk manufactures; spirits; and woollen and worsted manufactures. 
                                                     
339 In the case of complete comparative advantage, the RCA indicator may be less than 
Xn/Xc, if country c completely satisfies world demand. 
340 Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer, ‘Ricardo’s ideas’, p. 595. 
341 Ibid., p. 602. 
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These 17 industries differ noticeably from the 16 industries for which Crafts 
calculated RCA indicators. Crafts’s industries were largely predetermined in the 
sense that he relied solely on a statistical compilation by Tyszynski, rather than on 
the underlying government trade statistics, for data on manufactured exports. Crafts’s 
industries are suitable for the period he considered, which was the early twentieth 
century. However, several of these industries are obviously unsuitable for the late 
nineteenth century, such as the electrical industry and the cars and aircraft industry. 
The textile industry also presents a problem. In 1899, textiles comprised 34 per cent 
of world manufactured exports and 46 per cent of British manufactured exports.342 
Earlier in the nineteenth century, the share of textiles in British manufactured exports 
was even higher, at 61 per cent in 1882-4. 343  Concentrating half of British 
manufactured exports and a third of world manufactured exports into a single 
industry obscures the actual comparative advantages held by countries, which 
differed based upon the particular class of textile. Therefore, for the purpose of 
calculating RCA indicators for the late nineteenth century, textiles are divided into 
four classes: cotton manufactures; flax, hemp, and jute manufactures; silk 
manufactures; and woollen and worsted manufactures. In general, the 17 industries 
included in this study mirror the industry classifications in the Annual Statements of 
the Trade of the United Kingdom, which is the source for data on the value of British 
manufactured exports.  
It might be argued that these 17 industries do not sufficiently account for the 
newer manufactured commodities and, indeed, industries of the Second Industrial 
Revolution. Of course, such an argument would be more applicable to the year 1900 
than the year 1880. Yet, it should be observed that many of the industries associated 
with the Second Industrial Revolution were still quite nascent by the close of the 
nineteenth century. In 1899, electrical goods and automobiles (combined) amounted 
to slightly more than 1 per cent of the manufactured exports of Britain and slightly 
more than 1 per cent of the manufactured exports of Germany, a leader in the Second 
Industrial Revolution.344 On the whole, the 17 industries offer generally adequate 
                                                     
342 Calculated from Tyszynski, ‘Manufactured commodities’, p. 277. 
343 Schlote, Overseas trade, p. 74. 
344 Calculated from Tyszynski, ‘Manufactured commodities’, p. 277. By 1913, the 
shares of these industries in the manufactured exports of Britain and Germany had increased 
to 4% and 7%, respectively. 
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coverage of world manufactured exports in 1900, even despite the emergence of 
some commodities that were inexistent in earlier decades.  
Having obtained data on British manufactured exports per industry, the next 
step in calculating the indicators is to gather data on world manufactured exports per 
industry. This latter value is initially approximated by the manufactured exports, per 
industry, of Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States combined, as 
recorded in their respective trade statistics.345 This step is immensely challenging due 
to the varying classifications of industries in the trade statistics of the different 
countries. Using British and American trade statistics, Crafts and Thomas matched 
British and American industries, in order to compare the factor determinants of 
British and American exports for a single benchmark year. They referred to this 
process as a ‘problematic and protracted exercise’.346 When the trade statistics of five 
countries are involved, the process of matching industries is considerably more 
problematic and protracted. For example, the British trade statistics keep leather and 
manufactures thereof separate from saddlery and harnesses, whereas the trade 
statistics of other countries do not. Such inconsistencies are, however, generally 
reconcilable, since the finest levels of disaggregation in the trade statistics usually 
permit the ‘reconstruction’ of industries. Where inconsistencies are ultimately 
irreconcilable, such inconsistencies are minor and do not materially alter the 
resulting RCA indicators. In order to add together the values of the manufactured 
exports, per industry, of the five industrial countries, these values are converted to 
sterling using the exchange rates reported in Mitchell.347    
The manufactured exports of Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
United States accounted for most, though not all, manufactured exports in the late 
nineteenth century. In 1899, the manufactured exports of these five countries 
accounted for 87 per cent of the manufactured exports of the 11 countries considered 
                                                     
345 Britain: Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom; Belgium: Annuaire 
statistique de la Belgique; France: Tableau générale du commerce de la France; Germany: 
Statistisches jahrbuch für das Deutsche reich; United States: Foreign commerce and 
navigation of the United States. The American data are for the years 1879/80, 1889/90, and 
1899/1900, its statistical year having spanned from 1 July to 30 June.   
346 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 632. 
347 Mitchell, British historical statistics, p. 702. Because the Belgian franc traded at 
par with the French franc during the classical gold standard, Belgian francs are converted to 
sterling using the (French) franc-sterling exchange rate. 
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by Tyszynski.348 A coverage rate of 87 per cent would suggest a rescaling factor (γ) 
of 1.15 for the value of manufactured exports, per industry, of the five industrial 
countries (Xn,i). Balassa’s original method, represented in equation 4.1, is therefore 
modified to include a rescaling factor: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑈𝐾,𝑖 =  
𝑋𝑈𝐾,𝑖
𝛾𝑋𝑛,𝑖
𝑋𝑈𝐾
𝑋𝑛
⁄       (4.2) 
However, a constant rescaling factor for all industries wrongly implies that the 
industry-composition of manufactured exports was identical between the basket of 
five industrial countries and the basket of excluded countries. The excluded countries 
were in an earlier stage of industrialization, which was often characterized by light 
manufacturing, particularly textiles. 349  Consequently, the five industrial countries 
likely accounted for more than 87 per cent of the exports of heavy manufacturing 
industries and less than 87 per cent of the exports of light manufacturing industries. 
A slightly reduced rescaling factor of 1.1 is applied to the heavy manufacturing 
industries of cement; chemicals; copper manufactures; iron, steel, and manufactures 
thereof; and paper and manufactures thereof. A slightly more generous rescaling 
factor of 1.2 is applied to the remaining industries. Although the rescaling factors of 
1.1 and 1.2 are based upon data from 1899, these rescaling factors are applied to the 
calculations for 1880, 1890, and 1900, since annual data on world manufactured 
exports pre-1899 is not available. 
The next step is to normalize the British share of world manufactured exports 
per industry (XUK,i/γXn,i) by, according to Balassa’s method, the British share of 
world manufactured exports in total (XUK/Xn). Normalizing by the country-share of 
only secondary-sector world exports provoked criticism from Vollrath, who argued 
for the inclusion of the primary sector in determining comparative advantage.350 
Because the British share of secondary-sector world exports exceeded the British 
share of total world exports, the exclusion of the primary sector from the 
normalization factor reduces the levels of the RCA indicators for British 
manufacturing industries. 351  Balassa’s procedure for normalization, which was 
                                                     
348 The 11 countries include the five abovementioned industrial countries, as well as 
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, India, and Japan. 
349 See Hoffman, Industrial economies; Maizels, Industrial growth, pp. 339-40. 
350 Vollrath, ‘Theoretical evaluation’, p. 269. 
351 In contrast, the American share of secondary-sector world exports (11%) was less 
than the American share of total world exports (14%) in 1899/1900. Thus, excluding the 
primary sector from the normalization factor increases the levels of the RCA indicators for 
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employed by Crafts, risks misidentifying a comparative advantage as a comparative 
disadvantage. Because the objective of this study is not to identify Britain’s intra-
sector industrial comparative advantages, but rather Britain’s industrial comparative 
advantages in a multi-sector context, the normalization factor includes both the 
primary and secondary sectors. Of course, the choice of normalization factor only 
alters the levels of the indicators, not their rank order. Data on the value of total 
British exports for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900 come from the Annual Statements 
of the Trade of the United Kingdom. Data on total world exports for these years come 
from Lewis.352 
Table 4.1 presents the resulting RCA indicators for British manufacturing 
industries, with their ranks indicated in parentheses. Given the data assembled, 
calculating indicators of RCA for the manufacturing industries of the other four 
industrial countries is simple. Since these indicators might be of interest to future 
economic historians, corresponding tables for Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
United States are supplied in Appendices 4.1-4.4. 
As evident from the table, the RCA indicators for textiles differ greatly 
depending upon the particular class. By 1890, the industry of cotton manufactures 
held pride of place, not just among textiles, but among all British manufacturing 
industries. The industry of silk manufactures, on the other hand, was the only textile 
industry for which Britain realized a consistent comparative disadvantage. Other 
industries in which the ‘workshop of the world’ had a consistent comparative 
disadvantage were clocks and watches; glass; and leather and manufactures thereof. 
Of the 17 industries, the sharpest movements were in copper manufactures 
(downward) and spirits (upward).353 Britain also advanced its comparative advantage 
in woollen and worsted manufactures considerably, even in spite of the heavy 
protection that this industry received in other industrial countries.354 
                                                                                                                                                      
American manufacturing industries. In 1899/1900, the primary sector contributed 68% of 
American exports; calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States 
(1900). 
352 Lewis, ‘World trade’, pp. 54-7. 
353 For some of the reasons behind these movements, consult Broadberry, Productivity 
race, pp. 174-5, 196-7. 
354 See especially Saul, British overseas trade, p. 151. While Britain’s comparative 
advantage in woollen and worsted manufactures would not have been affected by foreign 
protection per se, if such protection enabled foreign manufactures to become internationally 
competitive, as per the infant industry argument, then Britain’s comparative advantage 
would have been affected.   
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There is a well-defined scholarly debate over the international competitiveness 
of the British engineering (machinery) industry in the late 1890s, when the American 
engineering industry greatly increased its exports, especially its exports to Britain.355 
Nicholas argued that the rise in American machine exports to Britain resulted from a  
                                                     
355 Though, Clapham, Modern Britain, p. 36, noted, ‘Long before the ’nineties, exports 
of new American machinery, or of American mechanical notions, had affected the course 
and pace of industrial change in Britain’. 
Table 4.1.   RCA indicators for Britain, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
3.2 
(5) 
3.3 
(3) 
2.9 
(3) 
Cement 
2.7 
(7) 
2.4 
(8) 
1.2 
(12) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
1.6 
(11) 
1.5 
(11) 
1.2 
(11) 
Clocks and watches 
0.5 
(15) 
0.4 
(17) 
0.2 
(17) 
Copper manufactures 
4.3 
(1) 
3.9 
(2) 
1.5 
(10) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
4.3 
(2) 
4.1 
(1) 
4.1 
(1) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.4 
(8) 
2.4 
(7) 
1.8 
(9) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
3.2 
(4) 
3.2 
(5) 
3.1 
(2) 
Glass 
0.9 
(13) 
0.9 
(14) 
0.7 
(15) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
3.6 
(3) 
3.3 
(4) 
2.6 
(4) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
0.8 
(14) 
0.9 
(15) 
0.9 
(13) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
3.0 
(6) 
2.8 
(6) 
2.2 
(7) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
1.0 
(12) 
1.0 
(13) 
0.8 
(14) 
Rubber manufactures 
2.3 
(9) 
2.3 
(9) 
1.9 
(8) 
Silk manufactures 
0.5 
(16) 
0.5 
(16) 
0.5 
(16) 
Spirits 
0.5 
(17) 
1.2 
(12) 
2.3 
(6) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.9 
(10) 
2.1 
(10) 
2.5 
(5) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
117 
 
 
strong upswing in the British business cycle, which caused domestic demand to 
exceed domestic supply. 356  Irwin, however, attributed the phenomenon to the 
increasing international competitiveness of American machinery, driven by the 
declining price of American iron ore.357 Although the RCA indicator for the British 
machinery industry erodes slightly between 1890 and 1900, the indicator for 1900 
hardly suggests a loss of comparative advantage. Though, in fairness, the heightened 
level of American machine exports to Britain abated after 1899. If the indicator was 
calculated for a year between 1896 and 1899, it could be substantially lower. 
In order to gauge the relative persistence of Britain’s comparative advantages, 
Spearman correlation coefficients are calculated for various intervals, following the 
approach undertaken by Crafts. Table 4.2 presents coefficients for the intervals 
covered in this chapter, as well as for the intervals covered by Crafts. Different 
industry classifications prohibit the calculation of coefficients for intervals that span 
the turn of the twentieth century. Persistence during the late-Victorian era was 
roughly on par with persistence during the early twentieth century. The correlation 
coefficient is slightly lower for 1880-1900 than for 1899-1913, but this should be 
expected given the greater length of the former interval. What can be claimed with 
some certainty is that Britain’s comparative advantages underwent a more substantial 
reordering during the 1890s than during the 1880s, when the comparative advantages 
were remarkably persistent. By the 1890s, the protectionist backlash in Continental 
Europe had been underway for a decade, and the reshuffling of Britain’s comparative 
                                                     
356 Nicholas, ‘Export invasion’, p. 581. 
357 Irwin, ‘America’s surge’, p. 369. In turn, Irwin attributed the declining price of 
American iron ore to the opening of the Mesabi Range in 1892. 
Table 4.2.   Spearman correlation coefficients of Britain’s RCA indicators, 1880-
1950 
 1890 1899/1900 1913 1929 1937 
1880 0.95 0.66 -- -- -- 
1890 -- 0.80 -- -- -- 
1899/1900 0.80 -- 0.77 0.41 0.32 
1913 -- 0.77 -- 0.76 0.70 
1929 -- 0.41 0.76 -- 0.89 
1937 -- 0.32 0.70 0.89 -- 
1950 -- 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.75 
Sources: Coefficients for intervals spanning the years 1880, 1890, and 1900 are calculated using data 
constructed in this chapter. Coefficients for intervals spanning the years 1899, 1913, 1929, 1937, and 
1950 are calculated using data from Crafts, ‘Revealed comparative advantage’, p. 130. 
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advantages in the 1890s may have been influenced by Continental infant industries 
having attained international competitiveness.     
Before proceeding to the next section, it is necessary to recognize a certain 
fundamental feature of the RCA indicators. With Balassa’s measurement, the range 
for comparative disadvantage is between 0 and 1, while the range for comparative 
advantage is between 1 and the reciprocal of the country-share of world exports, 
which would be 6.8 for Britain in 1900. Such asymmetry is benign when the 
objective is to ascertain whether or not a country had a comparative advantage, or 
when the objective is to rank the RCA indicators. However, as Laursen observed, 
this asymmetry would tend to violate the assumption in regression analysis of 
normally distributed error terms, and it must therefore be corrected. 358  Laursen 
proposed the following transformation to symmetrize the indicators: 
𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐴 =
𝑅𝐶𝐴−1
𝑅𝐶𝐴+1
           (4.3) 
The next section relies on Laursen’s RSCA indicators, not Balassa’s RCA indicators, 
when estimating the factor determinants of Britain’s comparative advantages. 
 
Factor determinants 
Three-factor model 
This section begins with a three-factor H-O model of Britain’s comparative 
advantages, with the factors being capital, labour, and material inputs. Factor 
intensities or proxies thereof for the 17 British manufacturing industries are 
calculated from the Census of Production of 1907, which collected a limited amount 
of data on British manufacturing activity for the year 1906/7. Conveniently, the data 
is disaggregated at the industry and sub-industry levels, thereby permitting the 
‘reconstruction’ of industries so that they are consistent with the industries in the 
previous section. The process is rather straightforward, and the exact components of 
the reconstructed industries are detailed in Appendix 4.5. One important assumption 
is that the sub-industry of (textile) bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades is 
allocated among the four classes of textiles proportionally, according to gross 
output.359        
                                                     
358 Laursen, ‘International specialization’, p. 105. 
359 In 1906/7, the output of this sub-industry was £17.9 million, or about 6% of the 
entire textile industry; calculated from Final report of the first census of production of the 
United Kingdom, 1907, p. 285. 
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Capital intensity is proxied by horsepower per £1 million of gross output. 
Labour intensity is proxied by employees per £1 million of gross output. Both of 
these proxies resemble the ones employed by Crafts and Thomas when they 
Table 4.3.   Factor intensities of British industries, 1906/7  
Industry 
Capital 
intensity 
(horsepower 
per £1 million 
output) 
Labour 
intensity 
(employees per 
£1 million 
output) 
Material 
intensity  
(share of 
material inputs 
in output) 
Beer 961 1,263 0.38 
Cement 16,085 3,968 0.48 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
3,845 2,028 0.62 
Clocks and watches 897 8,648 0.38 
Copper manufactures 2,537 1,241 0.83 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 7,407 3,397 0.72 
Earthenware and chinaware 10,360 8,659 0.36 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
5,300 4,846 0.68 
Glass 4,293 6,489 0.38 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
8,688 3,863 0.63 
Leather and manufactures thereof 992 3,994 0.68 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
3,218 4,485 0.47 
Paper and manufactures thereof 11,080 3,957 0.64 
Rubber manufactures 3,080 2,699 0.67 
Silk manufactures 3,760 6,376 0.62 
Spirits 1,768 865 0.79 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
4,472 3,607 0.71 
Median 3,845 3,957 0.63 
Coefficient of variation 0.81 0.56 0.26 
Source: Calculated from Final report of the first census of production of the United Kingdom, 1907. 
See text and appendix 4.5. 
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estimated the factor determinants of British exports in 1880, although their source of 
data was the more rudimentary Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1870, as compiled 
by Musson.360 Because the Census of Production reports the value of material inputs, 
material intensity is measured directly as the share of material inputs in gross output. 
Factor intensities per industry are reported in Table 4.3. It should be observed that 
the coefficient of variation differs considerably depending upon the factor, with 
capital intensity per industry being the most disperse of the factors. 
Imposing Edwardian factor proportions on late-Victorian manufacturing 
industries is, recognizably, far from ideal. This approach is mostly necessitated by 
the availability of systematically collected data across a range of industries. Britain 
was a relative latecomer among industrial countries in collecting data on 
manufacturing output, and the Census of Production of 1907 was the first such 
exercise.361 The error of backdating the factor proportions is perhaps not so grave in 
the context of mature industrial Britain, with its generally slow growth in output and 
inputs. From 1882-1907, manufacturing output grew at an average rate of 2.0 per 
cent per annum, while the rate was 2.4 per cent per annum for the capital input and 
0.9 per cent per annum for the labour input.362 Thus, the factor proportions of the 
manufacturing sector were changing, but not radically. Of course, the factor 
proportions of individual industries may have changed to a much greater extent than 
suggested by the manufacturing sector as a whole. Nevertheless, without dismissing 
the likelihood of such changes, the foregoing analysis relies on the data from the 
Census of Production, which represents the best available source for the given 
purpose. 
The three-factor model takes the form of a semi-log OLS regression. The 
baseline specification of the regression equation can be expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐴 = 𝐶 + 𝛼 ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿) + 𝛽 ln(𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅) + 𝛾 ln(𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐿) +
𝜖          (4.4) 
The results are reported in Table 4.4. Columns 1-3 pool the data for all three 
decennial years. Column 1, which is the baseline specification of the model, clearly  
                                                     
360 See Musson, ‘Motive power’, pp. 437-9. 
361 By comparison, the United States was collecting such data nearly a century before 
Britain. 
362  These growth rates were calculated from the 1882-9, 1889-99, and 1899-1907 
intra-cycle decompositions of manufacturing input and output growth, reported in Feinstein 
et al., ‘Timing of the climacteric’, p. 178. 
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indicates that Britain’s comparative advantages were in the relatively capital-
intensive manufacturing industries and, inconsistent with Crafts and Thomas, in the 
relatively labour-economizing manufacturing industries. The coefficients imply that 
a doubling of the capital intensity in an industry would increase its RSCA indicator 
by 0.20, and that a doubling of the labour intensity of an industry would decrease its 
RSCA indicator by 0.28. Based upon these coefficients, Britain would have realized 
a comparative advantage in the glass industry in 1880, for example, if its capital 
intensity was at least 40 per cent higher or if its labour intensity was at least 29 per 
cent lower. 
That the coefficient of material intensity is not statistically significant may 
seem surprising, given Britain’s limited natural resource endowments. There are 
three potential explanations for this finding. First, Victorian Britain espoused a 
policy of free trade, which extended to raw materials and intermediate inputs. Unlike 
in other industrial countries, where a protectionist backlash had taken hold, the 
British manufacturing sector could obtain material inputs at the world price. The 
relatively material-intensive industry of woollen and worsted manufactures illustrates 
this point well. By the late nineteenth century, the majority of the raw wool used in 
the British woollen and worsted industry was imported, and this imported share 
Table 4.4.   Three-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, 1880-1900 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capital intensity 
(1906/7)  
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
Labour intensity 
(1906/7)  
-0.28*** 
(0.08) 
-0.35*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.23 
(0.16) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.30** 
(0.14) 
Material intensity 
(1906/7) 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
 
-0.21 
(0.36) 
-0.16 
(0.30) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
Textile  
0.20* 
(0.11) 
    
Capital/labour ratio 
(1870) 
  
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
   
Constant 
0.80 
(0.57) 
1.22** 
(0.60) 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.18 
(1.19) 
0.96 
(0.98) 
1.27 
(1.02) 
R2 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.26 0.42 0.40 
Observations 51 51 48 17 17 17 
Years all years all years all years 1880 1890 1900 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: All variables, except for the dependent variable and the textile dummy, are expressed in natural 
logarithms. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Col. 3 omits the cement industry, as it did not 
appear in the Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1870. 
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reached as high as four-fifths by 1895-9.363  The American woollen and worsted 
industry also relied heavily on imported wool. However, whereas Britain imported 
wool free of duty, the United States imposed a considerable duty on this imported 
material input. Following the passage of the McKinley Tariff of 1890, the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff on wool exceeded 40 per cent. 364  The divergent trade 
policies of Britain and the United States may account, at least in part, for why the 
RCA indicator for the British woollen and worsted industry steadily increased 
throughout the late nineteenth century, whilst the American woollen and worsted 
industry remained at a nearly perfect comparative disadvantage. 
In addition to wool, Britain imported a range of material inputs for its 
manufacturing sector, and many of these material inputs were sourced from the 
British Empire, which represents another potential explanation for the material 
neutrality of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages. The recent gravity 
literature yields unambiguous evidence for an empire effect on commodity trade. 
Mitchener and Weidenmier estimated that membership in the British Empire alone 
more than doubled intra-Empire bilateral trade flows. 365  Following a different 
empirical strategy, Jacks et al. estimated that membership in the British Empire 
reduced intra-Empire bilateral trade costs by half.366  Indeed, recourse to a resource-
rich empire mitigated the effects of Britain’s relatively unfavourable natural resource 
endowments on its manufacturing sector. 
A third potential explanation lies in what lay beneath Britain: coal. Insofar as 
coal was a material input in the manufacturing sector, Britain’s natural resource 
endowments were exceptionally favourable. Surely, the factor proportion of this 
material input varied greatly across industries. In the British iron and steel industry, it 
can be estimated that the factor proportion of this material input was on the order of 
11 per cent in 1887.367 While the factor proportion of coal would have been lower in 
most other industries, it was hardly negligible.368            
                                                     
363 Deane and Cole, British economic growth, p. 196. 
364 Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States (1892). 
365 Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Trade and empire’, pp. 1813-4.  
366 Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’, p. 135. 
367 The British iron and steel industry consumed an estimated 27 million tonnes of coal 
in 1887, as noted in Mitchell, Economic development, p. 12. In that year, the export price of 
coal was £0.41 per tonne, as calculated from Annual statement of the trade of the United 
Kingdom (1887). The estimated average annual gross output at current value of the British 
iron and steel industry was £103 million during the interval from 1885-9, as noted in Deane 
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Returning now to Table 4.4, column 2 includes a dummy variable for the four 
textile industries, in order to test whether factor endowments adequately explain 
Britain’s notoriously persistent comparative advantages in these industries of the 
(First) Industrial Revolution, the silk industry notwithstanding. The coefficient of 
this dummy variable is expectedly positive, and it is statistically significant at the 
10% level, suggesting some element of hysteresis in the textile industries. 
As already mentioned, the regression imposes Edwardian factor proportions on 
late-Victorian comparative advantages. Given this inter-temporal mismatch, it is 
worth performing a robustness check using the earlier data from the Factory 
Inspectorate Returns of 1870. As was done for the Census of Production, industries 
are reconstructed to match the RSCA indicators, and the components are listed in 
Appendix 4.5. The Factory Inspectorate Returns report the amounts of horsepower 
and employees in each industry and sub-industry, but not the value of output. Thus, it 
is necessary to standardize capital and labour relative to each other. Column 3 
regresses the RSCA indicators against the log of the 1870 capital-labour ratio. The 
coefficient is statistically significant and positive, as expected. However, the relative 
contributions of capital intensity and labour intensity cannot be discerned from this 
single variable. 
Did the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages 
change throughout the 1880s and 1890s? Does pooling the data for all three 
decennial years obscure an instability in the magnitudes (or possibly signs) of the 
factor coefficients? These questions are answered by estimating separate regressions 
for each of the three decennial years. The results are reported in columns 4-6. While 
the signs of the coefficients do not change, it is noteworthy that the coefficient of 
labour intensity increases (in absolute value) from 1880-90.  
The increasing (in absolute value) coefficient of labour intensity reflects an 
increasing relative scarcity of labour in Britain. This relative labour scarcity has often 
been viewed in an American mirror. With respect to the late nineteenth century, 
Habakkuk stated, ‘And if American labour was, except in the remoter parts of the 
country, no longer scarce, in England it was no longer as abundant as it had been  
                                                                                                                                                      
and Cole, British economic growth, p. 225. Accordingly, the factor proportion of coal in the 
British iron and steel industry is estimated to have been 11%.   
368 In 1887, the British iron and steel industry accounted for substantially less than half 
of the coal consumed in the manufacturing sector; see Mitchell, Economic development, p. 
12. 
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earlier in the century’. 369  By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the 
archetypes of labour-utilizing British manufacturing and labour-economizing 
American manufacturing had become compromised by an Anglo-American real and 
nominal wage convergence. For the tradable goods sector especially, the nominal 
wage represents the better indicator of comparative labour scarcity across countries. 
From 1870-1900, the nominal unskilled wage in Britain increased by 25 per cent—an 
increase all the more impressive in a period of falling prices.370  Meanwhile, the 
nominal unskilled wage in the United States actually declined by 13 per cent. Figure 
4.1 presents British and American nominal unskilled wages, indexed to their 
respective levels in 1870.   
In the 1880 regression (column 4), the coefficient of labour intensity is 
statistically insignificant at any conventional level. The apparent labour neutrality of 
                                                     
369 Habakkuk, British technology, pp. 194-5. 
370 See sources of fig. 4.1. 
Figure 4.1.   British and American nominal unskilled wages 
 
 
Sources: This figure presents the nominal wage series underlying the real wage series reported in 
Williamson, ‘Global labor markets’, p. 165. However, since Williamson relied upon unpublished 
nominal wage data, the nominal wage series have been obtained by reflating the real wage series using 
the same consumer price series that Williamson used. The source for the British consumer price series 
is Feinstein, National income, p. T140. The source for the American consumer price series is David 
and Solar, ‘Cost of living’, p. 16.  
Note: Both nominal wage series have been recalibrated to a reference year of 1870. 
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Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages in 1880 might well be interpreted as 
a vestige of the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the increased imports of grain 
that followed. The grain imports displaced agricultural labourers, who formed a 
cheap supply of labour that the British manufacturing sector could draw upon. To be 
sure, this process was not an immediate one, and the share of labour employed in 
agriculture declined continuously for the remainder of the nineteenth century.371 
However, as Habakkuk noted, ‘The rise of real wages of English agricultural labour 
in the 1880s and ’90’s certainly suggests that the surplus of agricultural labour had 
been absorbed in English industry or by emigration’.372  
Emigration contributed to the increasing relative scarcity of labour in late-
Victorian Britain, most acutely during the 1880s. Hatton and Williamson estimated 
that net emigration from Britain, almost entirely to the higher-wage Dominions and 
the United States, averaged 3.2/1,000 population per annum from 1880-9.373 For the 
broader interval from 1870-99, net emigration from Britain averaged 1.9/1,000 
population per annum, while the figures were 1.8/1,000 for Germany, 0.1/1,000 for 
France, and -1.3/1,000 for Belgium.374 Within industrial Continental Europe, only 
Germany’s net emigration rate approached that of Britain.        
By the close of the late-Victorian era, a labour-economizing regime had clearly 
emerged in the British manufacturing sector. Figures 4.2 presents scatter-plots of the 
RSCA indicators and the logged labour-intensity proxies of British industries for the 
years 1880 and 1900. The labour-economizing regime of late-Victorian British 
manufacturing should be appreciated in a global context that includes the United 
States and, even more importantly, Continental Europe. Continental Europe supplied 
more than half of world manufactured exports in 1899. 375  There, labour was 
comparatively more abundant than in Britain. Given the Anglo-American nominal 
wage convergence of the late nineteenth century, it might be suggested that, in 1900, 
the starker contrast was not between the factor determinants of manufacturing  
                                                     
371 Interestingly, O’Rourke and Williamson suggested that the contraction of British 
agriculture only began, in earnest, in the 1870s; see Globalization and history, p. 87. 
Although, the relative decline of the agricultural sector had been a longstanding trend by the 
1880s. The share of labour in agriculture declined from 28% (1851) to 22% (1871) to 16% 
(1891); see Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labour productivity’, p. 262. 
372 Habakkuk, British technology, p. 195. 
373 Hatton and Williamson, Mass migration, p. 33. 
374 Calculated from ibid. 
375 Calculated from Tyszynski, ‘Manufactured commodities’, p. 277. 
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Figure 4.2.   Labour-intensity and RSCA indicators, 1880 and 1900 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: See text. 
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comparative advantages in Britain and in the United States, but rather between the 
factor determinants of manufacturing comparative advantages in the Anglosphere 
and on the Continent.     
 
Four-factor model 
Harley argued that, for Edwardian Britain, labour as a single factor cannot 
sufficiently explain the pattern of comparative advantages. Rather, skilled labour 
ought to be differentiated from unskilled labour because Edwardian Britain was 
relatively abundant in the former and relatively scarce in the latter.376 In this vein, the 
present study considers whether human capital was a determinant of Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages using a four-factor H-O model of trade. 
Human capital intensity per industry is proxied by the industry wage 
standardized for the wage of unskilled labour. The source for data on industry wages 
is the Returns of Wages, published in 1887. This publication presents the weekly 
wage data that the British Board of Trade solicited from local chambers of commerce 
on an intermittent basis since 1830, the three most recent wage censuses having 
occurred in the years 1877, 1880, and 1883. Here, the analysis makes use of just the 
wage data from 1883. The wage observations are disaggregated by occupation, 
locality, and industry. For example, a ‘mill man’ in the Macclesfield silk 
manufacturing industry earned a (quite low) wage of 18s. per week. Occasionally, 
the Returns of Wages reports a range, rather than a single amount, for an occupation-
locality-industry wage observation. In these instances, the midpoint is used. 
Additionally, only the wages of adult men are used in calculating the proxy. In total, 
there are 737 occupation-locality-industry wage observations across 13 industries. 
Some industries enjoy more observations than do others, and the numbers of wage 
observations per industry are reported in Appendix 4.6. There are no observations for 
the industries of cement; clocks and watches; copper manufactures; and rubber 
manufactures; and so these industries are unavoidably excluded from the four-factor 
H-O model.       
                                                     
376 As Harley noted, the distinction between skilled and unskilled labour offered a 
potential resolution to the famous Leontief paradox in post-war American trade. He 
speculated that there might have been a Leontief paradox in Edwardian British trade, 
whereby labour-scarce Britain exported labour-intensive manufactured commodities. While 
he did not quite advance such an assertion, he did claim that the two-factor (capital and 
labour) H-O model was inadequate. Harley, ‘Edwardian industry’, pp. 411-13.           
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Within each industry, which specific wage observation best captures the human 
capital attainment of its labour? Here, it is worth mentioning that almost all 
industries had high-paid foremen and low-paid warehousemen and general labourers. 
The variation in human capital attainment is unlikely to manifest itself at the upper 
and lower endpoints of the wage scale in each industry. Instead, the ideal proxy for 
human capital falls somewhere between these endpoints. Without any pre-existing 
knowledge of where along the wage scale human capital attainment is best captured, 
this study constructs three separate proxies for human capital intensity for each 
industry, corresponding to the first, second, and third-quartile wage observations. 
These three wage observations per industry are then each standardized by the 
unskilled wage, taken to be the lowest of the 737 wage observations. The lowest 
observation is 13s. per week, the wage of a general labourer in the Belfast linen 
textile industry. Appendix 4.6 presents all three proxies, as well as the occupation-
localities to which the proxies correspond.   
Table 4.5 presents the results of the four-factor H-O model. The first column of 
Table 4.5 simply reproduces the first column of Table 4.4, but for the reduced sample 
of 13 industries. The loss of four industries does not alter the signs of the 
coefficients, but does reduce their statistical significance from the 1% to 5% level. 
Table 4.5.   Four-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, 1880-1900 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Capital intensity 
(1906/7) 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
Labour intensity 
(1906/7) 
-0.22** 
(0.10) 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.24** 
(0.10) 
-0.22** 
(0.10) 
Material intensity 
(1906/7) 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
-0.35 
(0.21) 
-0.25 
(0.20) 
-0.30 
(0.19) 
Human capital intensity, 
first quartile (1883) 
 
-0.71 
(0.70) 
  
Human capital intensity, 
second quartile (1883) 
  
0.42 
(0.46) 
 
Human capital intensity, 
third quartile (1883) 
   
0.83** 
(0.41) 
Constant 
0.43 
(0.66) 
0.82 
(0.75) 
0.27 
(0.68) 
0.14 
(0.64) 
R2 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.25 
Observations 39 39 39 39 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: All variables, except for the dependent variable, are expressed in natural logarithms. Standard 
errors are noted in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and *** at the 1% level. 
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Columns 2-4 introduce the proxies for human capital intensity. Only the coefficient 
of the third-quartile proxy for human capital intensity is statistically significant, and 
at the 5% level. This finding suggests that Britain’s manufacturing comparative 
advantages were in those industries that required a high degree of human capital 
attainment to be possessed by a small share of labourers. To be sure, such an 
interpretation begs for qualitative substantiation, which would far exceed the scope 
of this dissertation. Nevertheless, this finding does call into doubt the assertion by 
Crafts and Thomas that Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages did not 
utilize human capital intensively. Rather, this finding more closely accords with 
Broadberry’s generalization that Britain’s comparative labour productivity tended to 
be higher in the relatively human capital-intensive manufacturing industries.377  
What is perhaps more remarkable is how, even after controlling for human 
capital, Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages remain in the relatively 
labour-economizing manufacturing industries. The claim by Crafts and Thomas that 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages were labour-intensive finds no 
confirmation here. In using a dependent variable normalized for the composition of 
world exports, this study finds the opposite.  
 
The rise of intra-industry trade 
Grubel and Lloyd advanced what has become the conventional measure of intra-
industry trade, the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index.378 It is calculated as follows: 
𝐺𝐿𝑖 = 1 −
|𝑋𝑖−𝑀𝑖|
𝑋𝑖+𝑀𝑖
       (4.5) 
with X referring to exports, M to imports, and i to the industry. The index offers a 
standardized measure of intra-industry trade that is comparable across industries and 
time. Complete intra-industry trade, whereby per-industry exports equals per-
industry imports, would yield an index of 1. Complete inter-industry (H-O) trade, 
involving an absence of either per-industry exports or per-industry imports, would 
yield an index of 0.  
Here, annual G-L indices are calculated for 24 British manufacturing 
industries. Unlike the calculation of Balassa’s RCA indicator, the calculation of the 
G-L index requires data from just a single country. Free from the need to reconcile 
                                                     
377 Broadberry, Productivity race, p. 158. 
378 Grubel and Lloyd, ‘Intra-industry trade’, pp. 495-9. 
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the British trade statistics with the trade statistics of other countries, it is possible to 
expand the number of manufacturing industries under consideration from 17 to 24. 
Three of the additional industries result from the extrication of textile yarns from the 
textile industries, with the residual industries (cotton, linen, and woollen and worsted 
manufactures) now consisting mainly of cloth.379 It is not possible to extricate silk 
yarn from silk manufactures. Due to inconsistencies between the export and import 
data reported in the British trade statistics, other industries are either redefined or 
excluded altogether, as evident from a comparison of Table 4.1 and Table 4.6.380 One 
change worth mentioning explicitly is that the machinery industry is now included 
within the industry of iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, as necessitated by the 
more limited disaggregation of the import data for iron, steel, and manufactures 
thereof. Owing to a substantial rearrangement of the British trade statistics in 1895, 
the foregoing analysis is confined to the interval from 1870-94, which corresponds to 
the late-Victorian era sans the economic recovery of the late 1890s. The G-L indices 
for the 24 industries are reported annually in Appendix 4.7 and at eight-yearly 
intervals in Table 4.6.  
A summary series of intra-industry trade, plotted in Figure 4.3, is calculated as 
the trade-weighted average of the per-industry G-L series. What is immediately 
observable is the increase in Britain’s intra-industry manufacturing trade, with the 
summary series rising, without any major interruption, from 0.20-0.37 between 1870 
and 1894. That intra-industry manufacturing trade increased at all in the late 
nineteenth century constitutes a novel finding. Yet, the magnitude of the increase 
was not especially great, as Britain realized a considerably greater absolute increase 
in its summary series of intra-industry manufacturing trade, from 0.51-0.75, in just 
the single decade (1962-72) prior to its entering the European Economic 
Community.381 Of course, comparing the growth of intra-industry manufacturing  
                                                     
379 The residual textile industries encompass a number of non-cloth manufactures, 
including, for example, carpets and laces. It should also be noted that the industry of linen 
manufactures excludes manufactures of hemp and jute.   
380 The industries of beer and cement are excluded because they are not disaggregated 
in the import data. These net-export industries were characterized by nearly complete inter-
industry trade. Thus, the sample of 24 industries is slightly biased against Heckscher-
Ohlinian industries. 
381  At best, it is only possible to offer an impressionistic comparison of Britain’s 
manufacturing intra-industry trade between these two periods, given the immense changes in 
the composition of world trade in manufactured goods. Any such comparison would require 
that the industry definitions are of a broadly consistent degree of disaggregation in both 
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trade between the first and second eras of globalization is an exercise fraught with 
qualifications, including the emergence of new manufacturing industries, the 
dislocation of trade caused by the Second World War, multilateral trade 
                                                                                                                                                      
periods, as one frequently criticized feature of the G-L index is that it decreases at finer 
degrees of disaggregation. 
The industry definitions employed in this section of the paper are well suited to the 
late nineteenth century. The 24 industries cover almost all of Britain’s manufacturing trade. 
Furthermore, there is not an excessive concentration of trade in a small number of industries, 
although the industry of cotton manufactures represents an unavoidable exception in this 
regard. In terms of the degree of disaggregation, the industry definitions in this section 
roughly correspond to the two-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification, 
which came into use after the Second World War. 
Trade-weighted summary G-L indices of British manufacturing intra-industry trade 
are calculated for the years 1962 and 1972, using industries defined at the two-digit level of 
the 1st Rev. SITC. There are 26 two-digit manufacturing industries, or roughly the same 
number of industries as defined for the nineteenth century. The codes for the twentieth-
century industries are as follows: 11, 51-6, 59, 61-9, 71-3, and 81-6. The export and import 
data are obtained from the United Nations Comtrade Database.      
Table 4.6.   Grubel-Lloyd indices for British manufacturing indices, 1870-94 
Industry 1870 1878 1886 1894 
1870-94 
(mean) 
Alkali 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.08 
Books 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.32 
Caoutchouc manufactures* 0.11 0.27 0.53 0.56 0.33 
Chemical products and preparations, n.e.s. 0.65 0.96 0.95 0.79 0.86 
Copper manufactures* 0.85 0.94 0.85 [0.85] 0.86 
Cordage and twine* [0.93] [0.81] [0.87] [0.82] 0.86 
Cotton manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 
Cotton yarn+ 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 
Drugs and medicinal preparations 0.67 0.77 0.90 0.90 0.86 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.17 0.39 0.54 0.49 0.38 
Glass [0.94] [0.54] [0.77] [0.46] 0.73 
Hats 0.82 0.28 0.24 0.29 0.27 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof* 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.22 
Jute yarn 0.49 0.27 0.63 0.25 0.45 
Lead manufactures* [0.96] [0.52] [0.60] [0.51] 0.61 
Leather manufactures 0.88 [0.93] 0.95 [0.91] 0.92 
Linen manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.10 
Linen yarn+ 0.05 0.49 0.70 0.81 0.49 
Painters’ colours and materials 0.65 0.78 0.76 0.80 0.76 
Paper and manufactures thereof [0.95] [0.92] [0.99] [0.69] 0.93 
Silk manufactures+ [0.17] [0.26] [0.35] [0.17] 0.30 
Spirits [0.11] [0.29] [0.58] [0.76] 0.46 
Woollens and worsteds, excluding yarn+ 0.27 0.52 0.58 0.82 0.51 
Woollen and worsted yarn+ 0.49 0.58 0.72 0.54 0.59 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
Note: * indicates a capital goods industry. + indicates a textile industry. G-L indices for net-import 
industries are noted in brackets. 
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liberalization under GATT, and, due to the boundedness of the G-L index, the more 
limited potential for absolute increases at higher levels.     
Evaluating the contours of late-Victorian Britain’s growth in intra-industry 
manufacturing trade does not require an implicit standard for comparison, and can 
therefore be done with greater certainty. To what extent is the variation in the trends 
and levels of the per-industry G-L series explicable in terms of NTT? According to 
NTT, intra-industry trade occurs in products differentiated according to attribute 
(HIIT) or according to quality (VIIT). In general, it would be expected that 
consumption goods industries would present greater scope for product differentiation 
than would capital goods industries, as intra-industry trade in the latter category of 
industries would be mostly confined to VIIT. It would follow that the G-L indices for 
capital goods industries would be lower. However, the late-Victorian capital goods 
industries were not subject to systematically lower levels of intra-industry trade, and 
this finding is consistent with what Culem and Lundberg observed for the intra-
industry trade of developed countries in 1980.382 For the interval from 1870-94, the 
mean G-L indices for copper manufactures (0.86); cordage and twine (0.86); and 
lead manufactures (0.61) were among the upper half of industries, while the mean G-
L indices for caoutchouc manufactures (0.33) and iron, steel, and manufactures 
thereof (0.22) were among the lower half.383  
An even stronger expectation is that the textile industries would exhibit high 
levels of intra-industry trade, given the tremendous potential for product 
differentiation. Colour and pattern offer scope for HIIT. Thread-count and weave 
offer potential for VIIT. In explaining the nearly threefold increase in Britain’s intra-
industry trade in finished cotton cloth, from 0.05 in 1883 to 0.14 in 1913, Brown 
identified elements of both HIIT and VIIT, though he did not invoke these concepts 
explicitly. Compared to the other manufacturing industries in Table 4.6, however, the 
level of Britain’s intra-industry trade in cotton manufactures was especially low. 
Thus, the large percentage increase in the G-L series for this industry did not amount 
to a large absolute increase. 
 
                                                     
382 Culem and Lundberg, ‘Product pattern’, p. 118. 
383 While other industries contain capital goods, such as windows (glass) and machine 
belting (leather manufactures), these five industries are characteristically capital goods 
industries.   
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Given the immense weight attached to cotton manufactures, the contribution of 
this industry to the trade-weighted summary series was to reduce its level and 
dampen its growth. If the industry of cotton manufactures was excluded, the 
summary series would have increased from 0.27-0.51, rather than from 0.20-0.37. If 
both the industries of cotton manufactures and cotton yarn were excluded, the 
summary series would have increased from 0.30-0.55. An alternative summary 
series, excluding cotton manufactures and cotton yarn, is plotted in Figure 4.3. In 
late-Victorian Britain, cotton manufactures and cotton yarn were overwhelmingly 
Heckscher-Ohlinian industries, despite the small increases in intra-industry trade 
documented, though not contextualized, by Brown. 
Still, other textile industries presented similar potential for product 
differentiation. With respect to levels and growth, were the industries of cotton 
manufactures and cotton yarn representative of all textile industries? Is it possible to 
advance some generalizations about the textile industries, the mainstay of nineteenth-
century British manufacturing? An industry-panel regression, with a dependent 
variable of GLi,t and with year fixed effects, is estimated for the entire sample of 24 
industries. The results are presented in Table 4.7. In column 1, the first explanatory  
Figure 4.3.   Summary series of British intra-industry manufacturing trade, 1870-94 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
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variable is a textile dummy, assigned to the industries of cotton manufactures (non-
yarn); cotton yarn; linen manufactures (non-yarn); linen yarn; woollen and worsted 
manufactures (non-yarn); woollen and worsted yarn; and silk manufactures 
(including yarn). The statistically significant and negative coefficient of the dummy 
variable indicates that the textile industries were, in fact, subject to systematically 
lower levels of intra-industry trade. The G-L index for the ‘average textile industry’ 
was less than one-third that of the ‘average non-textile industry’.  
The second explanatory variable interacts the textile dummy with time. The 
statistically significant and positive coefficient of the interaction variable indicates 
that intra-industry trade in the average textile industry grew faster than in the average 
non-textile industry. To determine how much faster, column 2 replaces the year fixed 
effects with a trend variable. In the average non-textile industry, the G-L series 
increased by 0.0024 per annum. Meanwhile, in the average textile industry, the G-L 
series increased by 0.0112 (0.0024+0.0088) per annum, or nearly five times as fast. 
With lower levels and faster growth, it is possible to discuss a late-Victorian ‘textile 
convergence’ in intra-industry trade. Such a phenomenon must be substantially 
qualified, however. Cotton manufactures, cotton yarn, and silk manufactures all 
contributed to the lower levels, but not to the faster growth.384  
                                                     
384 The trend rates of growth for the per-industry G-L series are 0.0018 for cotton 
manufactures (non-yarn), 0.0031 for cotton yarn, and -0.0001 for silk manufactures. All 
trends are statistically significant at the 1% level, except the trend for silk manufactures, 
which is not statistically significant at any conventional level.  
Table 4.7.   Textile convergence in Grubel-Lloyd indices, 1870-94 
 (1) (2) 
Textile industry 
-39.25*** 
(12.27) 
-39.25*** 
(12.27) 
Textile industry x time 
0.87*** 
(0.14) 
0.88*** 
(0.14) 
Time  
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
Constant 
56.53*** 
(6.95) 
55.12*** 
(6.63) 
Year fixed effects YES NO 
Overall R2 0.19 0.19 
Observations 600 600 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in levels. All coefficients and standard errors have been 
rescaled by a factor of 100. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. There are seven textile industries: cotton manufactures (non-yarn); cotton 
yarn; linen manufactures (non-yarn); linen yarn; silk manufactures (including yarn); woollen and 
worsted manufactures (non-yarn); and woollen and worsted yarn. 
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In the net-import industry of silk manufactures, there was no increase in intra-
industry trade, whatsoever. Among the greatest casualties of nineteenth-century 
British manufacturing, the silk industry could barely withstand French competition 
following the elimination of duties on silk manufactures under the Cobden-Chevalier 
Treaty of 1860. Domestic output declined throughout the 1860s as imports from 
France flooded the British market.385 That Britain exported silk manufactures at all 
was due to its competitiveness within a very narrow range of commodities. In the 
1880s, Britain was early to implement the use of machinery in the formerly labour-
intensive production of silk pile fabrics.386 Additionally, Britain specialized in the 
production of silk fabrics that incorporated other textile yarns. In 1890, 48 per cent of 
Britain’s exports of silk manufactures were composed ‘of silk and other materials’. 
In this way, the proximity of the Cheshire silk textile industry to the (internationally 
competitive) Lancashire cotton textile industry helped Britain to retain a small niche 
in the world export trade of silk manufactures. Thus, a small degree of VIIT persisted 
in the British silk industry.  
The textile convergence was due to the linen and woollen and worsted 
industries. The G-L series for the industries of linen manufactures (non-yarn); linen 
yarn; woollen and worsted manufactures (non-yarn); and woollen and worsted yarn 
all exhibit a statistically significant upward trend that exceeds the trend for the 
average non-textile industry (0.0024).387 The most impressive trend rate of growth, 
0.0375 per annum, was in the linen yarn industry, which is the subject of the next 
section of this chapter.  
The rapidly increasing intra-industry trade in linens and woollens was due to 
HIIT and VIIT, certainly, but also to the moderate factor proportions that 
characterized these textile classes, compared to cottons and silks. As evident from 
Table 4.3, the industry of cotton manufactures had the highest capital intensity and 
the lowest labour intensity of the four textile classes. Conversely, the industry of silk 
manufactures had the lowest capital intensity and the highest labour intensity. Linen 
manufactures (including yarn) and the woollen and worsted manufactures (including 
                                                     
385 For rough estimates of the declining output of the British silk industry in the wake 
of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, see Deane and Cole, British economic growth, p. 210.     
386 Rawlley, Silk industry, pp. 282-3.  
387 The trend rates of growth for the per-industry G-L series are 0.0051 for linen 
manufactures (non-yarn); 0.0375 for linen yarn; 0.0209 for woollen and worsted 
manufactured (non-yarn); and 0.0098 for woollen and worsted yarn. All trends are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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yarn) were of intermediate factor intensity, both with respect to capital and labour.388 
The intermediate factor intensities of these industries made them amenable to 
increasing VIIT. Britain exported the more capital-intensive commodities within 
these industries and imported the less capital-intensive commodities within these 
industries, as per Falvey’s neo-H-O model. Yet, in the cotton and silk industries, 
more extreme factor requirements militated against growth in intra-industry trade, 
and Britain’s distinctly net-export position in cotton manufactures and net-import 
position in silk manufactures continued unaltered. 
Given that late-Victorian Britain was a net exporter in the majority of 
manufacturing industries, it might be expected that the summary series of Britain’s 
manufacturing intra-industry trade would follow a pro-cyclical course. As Bordo and 
Helbling have found, business cycles were highly desynchronized in the late 
nineteenth century, compared to in the late twentieth century. 389  Because late-
Victorian Britain exported to numerous markets undergoing asynchronous business 
cycles, imports represent the channel through which the business cycle would have 
exerted its greatest affect upon intra-industry trade. Increased (decreased) imports 
during upswings (downswings) in the British business cycle would raise (lower) 
intra-industry trade. To determine whether such a pro-cyclical relationship existed, 
the cyclical components of the summary series and of real net national income per 
capita, as obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, are correlated.390 The correlation 
coefficient of the cyclical components is -0.40, and this coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
The counter-cyclicality of the summary series is partly attributable to the 
phenomenon of the Long Depression of 1873-9, when the industrial economies of the 
world were in a generally protracted decline, but a decline that was less acute in 
                                                     
388 Obviously, the factor intensities of yarn and cloth production, within the same 
textile industry, would differ. However, reliable proxies for the factor intensities of these 
different stages of textile production are unavailable. It is therefore unavoidable that 
comparisons of the factor intensities of the textile industries must aggregate the yarn-
spinning and cloth-weaving stages of production.  
389 Bordo and Helbling, ‘International business cycle’, p. 212. From 1880-1913, the 
average bilateral output coefficient between countries was 0.03. From 1986-2008, this 
coefficient was 0.35, indicating a substantially higher degree of business cycle 
synchronization.  
390 The data for real net national income per capita are obtained from Mitchell and 
Deane, British historical statistics, p. 367. 
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Britain than elsewhere, at least until 1877.391 During the years from 1873-7, Britain’s 
export markets contracted severely, with exports to the United States declining by 
more than half, from £33.6 million to £16.4 million. Meanwhile Britain’s imports of 
manufactured commodities actually increased, as capital otherwise invested overseas 
was instead invested domestically, financing a spate of residential construction.392 
Indeed, the fastest growth in Britain’s manufacturing intra-industry trade occurred 
during the relatively mild, early depression years of 1873-7, when the summary 
series increased from 0.22-0.29. That the high level of manufacturing intra-industry 
trade continued to increase thereafter, however, was due to more fundamental causes, 
such as overseas industrialization and increasing demand for differentiated products. 
 
The British linen yarn industry 
The British linen yarn industry, as a component of the overall linen industry, had 
fallen into absolute decline during the late-Victorian era, with the peak of nineteenth-
century production having occurred in 1871.393 By 1900, Britain’s output of linen 
yarn had fallen by nearly half.394 There are two principal explanations for the decline. 
First, consumption of linen textiles was falling, as domestic and foreign consumers 
substituted toward cheaper cotton textiles. 395  Second, the British linen textile 
industry increasingly relied upon imported linen yarn, mainly from Belgium. 
The decline in the British linen yarn, or flax-spinning, industry was most 
prominent in England, where the number of flax spindles fell from 270,000 to 
118,000 between 1871 and 1885.396 The demise of the English (and Scottish) flax-
spinning industries was indicative of an emerging scarcity of labour in late-Victorian 
Britain, though not necessarily Ireland. The English flax-spinning industry, centred 
in Lancashire and Yorkshire, competed with the higher-productivity cotton and 
                                                     
391 Rostow, British economy, pp. 179-80. 
392 Habakkuk, ‘Fluctuations in house-building’, p. 204. Consistent with the mid-1870s 
boom in residential construction, the G-L series for the industry of iron, steel, and 
manufactures thereof increased very rapidly, from 0.11 to 0.23 between 1873 and 1877. 
393 Hoffman, British industry, foldout appendix table. 
394 Ibid. 
395  Patterson, ‘Linen industry’, p. 135. Moreover, linen textiles were a victim of 
changes in fashion during the late nineteenth century. 
396 Second report of the Royal Commission on the depression of trade and industry, p. 
261. 
138 
 
woollen industries for labour.397 In Scotland, the flax-spinning industry of Dundee 
was largely displaced by the jute-spinning and jute-weaving industries, which catered 
to the large demand for burlaps in the United States.398   
The British flax-spinning industry became consolidated in Ireland, where 
output remained generally stable. By 1890, 73 per cent of Britain’s flax spindles 
were located in Ireland.399 The consolidation of the British flax-spinning industry in 
Ireland, already well underway by the mid-nineteenth century, can be attributed to 
the relatively more abundant labour supply there. Whereas flax-spinning firms in 
England competed against other manufacturing industries for labour, flax-spinning 
firms in Ireland could draw upon a large supply of low-productivity agricultural 
labour. Though, as Boyer at al. have contended, Irish emigration from the middle of 
the nineteenth century onwards was a trend that rendered the factor price of Irish 
labour increasingly dear.400 The Irish flax-spinning industry also enjoyed one slight 
advantage that the English flax-spinning industry did not, and that was the local 
production of flax. Flax was a labour-intensive crop, and its cultivation was therefore 
unprofitable in England. However, the lack of English flax was only a minor, if any, 
disadvantage to the English flax-spinning industry, which simply imported cheap 
flax from the Baltic region.401 By the end of the nineteenth century, even Ireland had 
become a substantial net importer of flax.402 Altogether, the British flax-spinning 
industry aligns with the material-neutral pattern of Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages, identified earlier in this chapter.     
There is no indication that the Irish flax-spinning industry was unduly deprived 
of capital. Arguably, flax spinning in Ireland was more capital-intensive than in 
England. Whereas firms in England and Scotland remained small, firms in Ireland 
                                                     
397 Ibid., p. 268. Mr. R. H. Reade, a managing director at a Belfast flax-spinning firm, 
stated in his testimony before the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and 
Industry, ‘The linen manufacture was confined to the counties of Yorkshire and Lancashire, 
in both which you had got those other great textile industries of cotton and wool, which were 
very much larger, which expanded at a very much greater rate, and could afford to pay 
higher wages’. 
398 In 1885, 107 million of the 215 million yards of ‘jute piece goods’ exported by 
Britain were destined for the United States. Ironically, much of these exports to the United 
States returned to Britain in the form of burlap sacks containing raw cotton. In this way, the 
Scottish jute industry was bolstered by the success of the English cotton industry.  
399 Calculated from Return of number of factories and workshops, 1890. 
400 Boyer, Hatton, and O’Rourke, ‘Real wages’, p. 236. 
401 Rimmer, Marshalls of Leeds, p. 246. 
402 Patterson, ‘Linen industry’, p. 130. 
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were large, and their operation more closely resembled mass production. In 1890, the 
average flax-spinning firm in Ireland contained 14,070 spindles, compared to 7,857 
in England and 3,158 in Scotland.403 Undoubtedly, Irish firms realized economies of 
scale to a far greater degree than English and Scottish firms, of which the numbers 
were steadily declining. 
The capital intensity of Irish flax spinning was manifest in the volume and type 
of machinery it employed. The flax-spinning firms of Belfast invested heavily in 
additional machinery during the Cotton Famine of the early 1860s, when substitution 
toward linen cloth engendered an extreme demand for linen yarn. 404  During the 
1870s and 1880s, when leaner demand conditions prevailed, the Irish firms pulled 
technologically ahead of their English counterparts, which failed to adopt machine 
methods for heckling flax.405 Altogether, the Irish flax-spinning industry was subject 
to a comparatively high degree of capital deepening and technological progress; 
incidentally, these were the main determinants of rising per-capita income in Ireland, 
according to Geary and Stark.406  
Regardless of how well adjusted the Irish flax-spinning industry might have 
been, British weavers of linen cloth became increasingly reliant upon imported linen 
yarn throughout the late-Victorian era. The G-L series for linen yarn rose from a 
predominantly inter-industry level of 0.05 in 1870 to a predominantly intra-industry 
level of 0.81 in 1894. In 1894, 85 per cent of Britain’s linen yarn imports came from 
Belgium. How did the Belgian linen yarn compare to the British linen yarn?   
The textual evidence suggests that Britain’s growing intra-industry trade in 
linen yarn was a growing VIIT, or trade in linen yarn differentiated by quality. 
Testimony before the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry 
describes the pattern of Britain’s intra-industry trade in linen yarn with Belgium: 
‘The exports to Belgium in 1885 had increased 25 per cent. over the preceding five 
years, and our imports from Belgium are also increasing…we spin a finer yarn than 
they do, and they spin the coarse yarns cheaper than we can’.407 
 
                                                     
403 Calculated from Return of number of factories and workshops, 1890. 
404 Ollerenshaw, ‘Industry, 1820-1914’, pp. 77-8. 
405 Rimmer, Marshalls of Leeds, p. 252. 
406 Geary and Stark, ‘Post-famine economic growth’. 
407 Second report of the Royal Commission on the depression of trade and industry, p. 
268. 
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One way to ascertain, quantitatively, whether Britain’s intra-industry trade in 
linen yarn constituted VIIT is to impose a unit-value dispersion criterion, as was 
done by Greenaway et al. Assuming that price varies according to quality, then 
vertical intra-industry trade should exhibit different unit values of exports and 
imports. In their empirical analysis of British intra-industry trade in 1988, 
Greenaway et al. treated intra-industry trade as vertical when the unit value of 
exports deviated from the unit value of imports by +/-15%.408 Since the British trade 
statistics report both quantities and values for both exports and imports of linen yarn, 
it is possible to calculate the unit-value dispersion for this industry. The unit-value 
dispersion is presented at quinquennial intervals in Table 4.8. Britain’s intra-industry 
trade in linen yarn was, from the 1880s onward, a distinctly vertical one, in which 
Britain exported high-quality yarn and imported low-quality yarn.  
The reason why the small amount of intra-industry trade prior to the 1880s was 
not vertical, i.e. the unit-value dispersion was less than +/-15%, was because Britain 
continued to export low-quality yarn to several traditional markets, including the 
United States and the Empire. In 1875, when the unit-value dispersion was less than 
15 per cent, the average value of Britain’s linen yarn exports was £0.067/lb 
(£0.059/lb for imports). However, the average values of bilateral linen yarn exports 
varied greatly: £0.076/lb for exports to Belgium, £0.092/lb for exports to Germany, 
but only £0.022/lb for exports to the United States. The British export of low-quality 
yarns to non-Continental markets caused the unit-value dispersion to fall under 15 
per cent prior to the 1880s. 
Surely by the 1890s, a pattern of linen yarn production (and trade) had 
established itself in Europe, with Britain producing and exporting fine yarn and the  
                                                     
408 Greenaway, Hine, and Milner, ‘Vertical and horizontal’, p. 1508. 
Table 4.8.   Unit-value dispersion of British linen yarn exports and imports, 1870-
1900 
Year Unit-value dispersion VIIT 
1870 +1.10 Yes 
1875 +0.11 No 
1880 +0.27 Yes 
1885 +0.41 Yes 
1890 +0.36 Yes 
1895 +0.36 Yes 
1900 +0.46 Yes 
Note: A positive unit-value dispersion indicates that the price of British exports exceeds the price of 
imports. 
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Continent producing and exporting coarse yarn.409 This pattern conforms exactly to 
Falvey’s neo-H-O model of trade. Recall that, in this model, VIIT results from 
quality differentials, which are determined by differing (though not extremely 
differing) relative endowments of a particular immobile factor of production. 410 
Britain, with its greater relative endowment of capital, exported relatively capital-
intensive, high-quality yarn. In contrast, Belgium, with its greater relative 
endowment of labour, exported relatively labour-intensive, low-quality yarn. 
One crude proxy for comparing the factor proportions of the Belgian and 
British flax-spinning industries is spindles per worker, as presented in Table 4.9. The 
earliest reliable data for the Belgian flax-spinning industry is from the Recensement 
Générale des Industries of 1896, as earlier Belgian industrial censuses did not 
distinguish between spinning and weaving labourers. The latest reliable data for the 
British flax-spinning industry is the Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1890.411  In 
1896, the number of spindles per worker in Belgium was on par with the number of 
spindles per worker in Britain nearly two decades earlier in 1878. A rough 
comparison for the year 1896 can be made by extrapolating forward the growth in 
spindles per worker in Britain between the Factory Inspectorate Returns of 1878 and 
                                                     
409  Outside of Belgium, Continental flax spinning was likely even more labour-
intensive. In Germany, thousands of labourers continued to spin flax by hand, in a manner 
little changed since medieval times, into the 1870s. Clapham, France and Germany, p. 290.  
410 In Falvey, ‘Commercial policy’, the immobile factor of production was capital, but 
another factor (e.g. labour) could instead determine quality; see Greenaway and Milner, 
Intra-industry trade, pp. 10-11. 
411 The Census of Production of 1907 does not sufficiently distinguish between the 
spinning and weaving of flax. 
Table 4.9.   British and Belgian flax spindles per worker, 1878-96 
 
Spindles Workers 
Spindles per worker 
 Absolute 
Relative to 
Britain (1896) 
Britain     
1878 922,693 46,983 19.6 0.92 
1890 993,192 47,667 20.8 0.97 
1896 (extrapolated) -- -- 21.4 1.00 
Belgium     
1896 292,000 14,935 19.6 0.91 
Sources: Britain: Return of the number of factories and workshops, 1878 and Return of the number of 
factories and workshops, 1890 for the numbers of spindles and workers. Belgium: Milward and Saul, 
Continental Europe, p. 161, for the number of spindles; (Belgian) Recensement générale des 
industries et des métières en Belgique, 1896 for the number of workers. 
Notes: For Britain, the numbers of spindles and workers consist only of those spindles and workers in 
mills engaged solely in flax spinning. The data excludes spindles and workers in the so-called 
integrated mills, though these mills were very few in number. 
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1890. This extrapolation results in 21.4 spindles per worker in Britain, compared to 
19.6 spindles per worker in Belgium. While these numbers should not be 
overemphasized, it is nevertheless unsurprising that they reveal modestly lower 
capital intensity in Belgian flax spinning. 
Obviously, the findings of this chapter with respect to the linen yarn industry 
cannot possibly be generalized for Britain’s manufacturing sector as a whole. Still, it 
can be claimed that late-Victorian Britain’s manufacturing intra-industry trade was 
not wholly confined to HIIT. The linen yarn industry conformed to the neo-H-O 
model of intra-industry trade in products differentiated by quality, rather than the C-
H-O model of products differentiated by attribute. Indeed, further exploration of 
VIIT in the late nineteenth century is certainly warranted, but very much complicated 
by the inadequate reporting of export and import quantities in the trade statistics of 
most countries.  
 
Conclusion 
In the 1890s, the manufacturing trade of late-Victorian Britain was mostly 
Heckscher-Ohlinian, even despite a persistent growth in intra-industry trade during 
the prior quarter-century. If the industries of cotton manufactures (non-yarn) and 
cotton yarn are excluded, then the composition of Britain’s manufacturing trade 
would have been roughly balanced between inter-industry and intra-industry by the 
closing decade of the nineteenth century. The levels of intra-industry trade in the 
linen and woollen and worsted industries were initially low, but grew very rapidly 
throughout the late-Victorian era, resulting in a ‘textile convergence’ in intra-
industry trade. Still, the cotton and silk industries did not contribute to this 
convergence, due to their more extreme factor requirements. 
Indeed, the cotton and silk industries are emblematic of the pattern of Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages in the late-Victorian era. In the relatively 
capital-intensive, labour non-intensive industry of cotton manufactures, Britain 
realized one of its greatest comparative advantages. In the relatively labour-intensive, 
capital non-intensive industry of silk manufactures, Britain was at a pronounced 
comparative disadvantage. The finding that Britain’s manufacturing comparative 
advantages were labour non-intensive opposes the prevailing view advanced by 
Crafts and Thomas. Furthermore, this finding was unaffected after controlling for 
human capital. Another surprising finding was the material neutrality of Britain’s 
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manufacturing comparative advantages, for which there are several possible 
explanations, including coal, free trade, and the Empire. 
The effect of the Empire on the composition of Britain’s manufacturing trade 
has gone largely unexamined in this chapter, and it represents a fascinating area for 
future research. Given the well-documented empire effect on trade, and given that 
Britain’s trade with the Empire was largely an exchange of manufactured goods for 
primary goods, the Empire was tantamount to a H-O bias in Britain’s manufacturing 
trade. Britain’s largest bilateral trade, with the United States, conformed to the same 
pattern, although increasing American manufactured exports to Britain was a 
distinguishing feature of the Edwardian years. 
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V: Conclusion 
 
Summary of findings 
In this dissertation, I have revisited and revised the economic historian’s 
understanding of late-Victorian British exports, in several essential respects. Prior to 
this dissertation, the prevailing scholarly understanding was that foreign tariffs and 
(recent) British overseas lending were not, in general, determinants of the annual 
volume of British exports. And with respect to the composition of exports, it was 
thought that Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages rested in relatively 
labour-intensive industries. Collectively, these notions amount to a significant 
misunderstanding of the course and character of late-Victorian British exports. 
To be sure, the foremost determinant of bilateral British exports was the GDP 
of the respective foreign market, as was evident in chapter III. Additionally, gravity 
models of world trade in the nineteenth century have consistently revealed the 
significance of GDP for the volume of bilateral trade, and there is no reason to think 
that British trade, in particular, differed in this regard. 412  However, as this 
dissertation has argued, the course of late-Victorian British exports was rather more 
complicated, having also been determined by foreign tariffs and recent British 
overseas lending. Recall that Hatton’s export demand function excluded foreign 
tariffs altogether, and the estimated coefficient for British ex ante overseas lending 
was statistically insignificant. Thus, this dissertation has both improved upon and 
revised the work of Hatton. 
Tariffs were the sole inter-temporal determinant of Anglo-American bilateral 
trade costs. This finding represents a major caveat to the finding by Jacks et al. that 
tariffs were not a statistically significant (inter-temporal and cross-sectional) 
determinant of Britain’s trade costs. Simply on account of the large share of the 
United States in total British exports, it can be reasoned that tariffs did indeed hinder 
the development of British trade, taken as a whole. Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that the United States was just one of Britain’s many export markets, 
and there remains ample scope for making an even more convincing case that foreign 
tariffs were a determinant of the total volume of British exports. Such an attempt 
                                                     
412 Estevadeordal et al., ‘Rise and fall’; López-Córdova and Meissner, ‘Exchange-rate 
regime’. However, in Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’, GDP is internalized in the trade cost 
measurement. 
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might involve an examination of bilateral exports to Germany, including the 
reconstruction of the bilateral German tariff toward Britain. Taking the United States 
and Germany together would capture, in 1870, one-quarter of Britain’s export 
markets and the bulk of Britain’s industrial export markets. A replication of chapter 
II for the case of Germany, along with chapter II itself, would enable economic 
historians to approach an even clearer understanding of the effect of foreign 
protection on the first industrial nation. 
The findings from chapters II and III are most meaningful when they are used 
in concert to explain the course of exports. In light of these findings, the McKinley 
Tariff of 1890 and the decline in British capital exports after 1889 conspired to 
produce a miniature crisis in British exports during the early 1890s. It is hardly 
surprising that the weakest intra-cycle export volume growth rate (0.8 per cent per 
annum from 1890-6) of either the mid or late-Victorian eras occurred just at the time 
when foreign protection was heightened and overseas lending fell sharply. 413  Of 
course, the poor condition of British exports in the early 1890s does not necessarily 
imply that the British economy was performing poorly at the time. Capital otherwise 
exported was instead invested domestically. 414  Yet, domestic demand for 
commodities like tinplate was only so elastic, and the rise of foreign protection 
spelled real consequences for both the British export sector and the economy at large. 
Chapter IV fully revised Crafts and Thomas’s argument that the manufacturing 
comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain rested in relatively labour-intensive 
industries. By the 1890s, a labour-economizing regime had emerged in British 
manufacturing. Indeed, Britain was at a measurable comparative disadvantage in 
such relatively labour-intensive industries as clocks and watches; glass; and silk 
manufactures. One implication of this finding is to render the British manufacturing 
sector closer to the labour-economizing archetype of the United States than had 
previously been thought. Additionally, this dissertation has also shown that the 
manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain were neutral with 
respect to material intensity, and it has pointed to Britain’s free trade policy and the 
Empire as likely explanations. Ostensibly, the comparative advantages were also 
neutral with respect to human capital intensity, although much additional research is 
warranted in this area.  
                                                     
413 Calculated from Imlah, Pax Britannica, p. 97. 
414 Cairncross, Home and foreign investment, ch. 7. 
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Overall, the Heckscher-Ohlin model does offer an explanation for the within-
sector pattern of British manufacturing trade. Nevertheless, throughout the late-
Victorian era, inter-industry manufacturing trade was declining in favour of intra-
industry manufacturing trade. But still, Britain’s manufacturing trade remained 
mostly Heckscher-Ohlinian through the 1890s, with the colossal cotton textile 
industry exhibiting the most extreme degree of inter-industry trade. 
 
Areas for further research 
The application of new trade theory (NTT) to economic history represents one of the 
most promising areas for further research. The finding that intra-industry trade was 
increasing throughout the late-Victorian era beckons the question: when did the take-
off of intra-industry trade occur? Perhaps it began to rise in the mid-Victorian era, or 
maybe even earlier. Of equal interest is the progression of Britain’s manufacturing 
intra-industry trade in the Edwardian and interwar eras. Did the abandonment of free 
trade with the Import Duties Act of 1932 recast British manufacturing trade along 
more Heckscher-Ohlinian lines? Altogether, backward and forward extensions of the 
summary series of Britain’s manufacturing intra-industry trade would be insightful. 
Decomposing Britain’s manufacturing intra-industry trade into horizontal intra-
industry trade (HIIT) and vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT) would also be 
important, as these different sorts of intra-industry trade are explained by different 
models within NTT. Isolating the HIIT component of Britain’s manufacturing intra-
industry trade would be essential for understanding when, and to what extent, the 
pattern of trade was scale-determined, per the Chamberlinian-Heckscher-Ohlin 
model. However, the relatively poor reporting of quantities in the British trade 
statistics likely rules out the use of a unit-value dispersion criterion in any sector-
wide study. A more productive approach toward understanding the origins, 
development, and nature of Britain’s manufacturing intra-industry trade would 
involve additional industry-specific studies, and the groundwork for this approach 
has already been laid. Brown examined the intra-industry trade in cotton cloth. This 
dissertation has provided a vignette of Britain’s intra-industry trade in linen yarn. An 
assemblage of industry-specific studies, drawing upon both statistical and textual 
evidence, is in order. 
Another worthy area for future research is British exports to the Empire, both 
during the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras. The literature on British trade with the 
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Empire during this period is highly bifurcated. On the one hand, the gravity models 
simply relegate the imperial connection to a dummy variable, and the coefficient is 
(unsurprisingly) always statistically significant, even after controlling for factors 
commonly associated with the imperial connection, such as a common language.415 
On the other hand, the more narrative accounts of British trade with the Empire 
provide a cornucopia of illustrative examples of common consumption patterns. With 
respect to Dominion imports of railway equipment, Platt observed, ‘Naturally as 
managers and engineers of the great railway systems of the world, British-trained 
personnel preferred, if at all possible, to work with the materials and equipment with 
which they were already familiar’. 416  Other examples abound throughout the 
literature. By now, the literature has well established that the imperial connection 
raised the volume of bilateral trade and that common consumption patterns were 
partly the cause. 
Currently, a more meaningful direction for this debate is to consider the causal 
mechanisms, other than common consumption patterns, between membership in the 
British Empire and the elevated levels of bilateral British exports to these markets. 
The question should be asked: how much of the empire effect did not operate 
through the mechanism of common consumption patterns? Mitchener and 
Weidenmier have already made a considerable amount of progress in this direction, 
having identified imperial currency unions and preferential trade policies as some of 
the channels through which the empire effect operated, although it should be 
observed that their analysis did not focus exclusively upon the British Empire.417 
Still, their work can be improved upon. One way to improve upon their work would 
be to consider other causal mechanisms, such as the extent of distribution networks 
and the presence of a common legal framework.  
One serious shortcoming of the work of Mitchener and Weidenmier is that 
their gravity model did not exploit the inter-temporal variation in preferential trade 
policies. The trade policies of the Dominions were classified as preferential, even 
though the Dominions did not actually adopt policies of imperial preference until the 
final years of the first era of globalization, Australia not until 1907. Related to this 
                                                     
415 Estevadeordal et al., ‘Rise and fall’; López-Córdova and Meissner, ‘Exchange-rate 
regime’; Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Trade and empire’; Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’. 
416 Platt, ‘Recent settlement’, p. 101. 
417 Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Trade and empire’, pp. 1825-7. 
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point, there is uncertainty about the effect of Edwardian imperial preference on the 
volume of British exports to the Dominions. Did Edwardian imperial preference raise 
the volume of British exports to the Dominions? Was, in fact, the course of British 
exports altered between the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras as a consequence of 
trade policy? Very recent research by de Bromhead et al. has identified a policy-
induced reorientation of British imports towards the Empire, following the Ottawa 
agreements of 1932.418 Upon further research, it might be concluded that Britain’s 
reorientation toward the Empire, with respect to exports, began around the turn of the 
twentieth century, perhaps with Canada’s implementation of a preferential trade 
policy in 1897. 
The effect of empire on the ‘character’ of British exports also presents 
questions. Did the Empire, whether through common consumption patterns or 
through preferential trade policies, help to sustain Britain’s comparatively 
disadvantaged manufacturing industries? It should be observed from chapter IV that 
the revealed comparative advantage indicators for even Britain’s most comparatively 
disadvantaged industries were nowhere close to nil, and it is likely that the exports of 
these industries were disproportionately destined for Empire markets. In 1900, more 
than three-fifths of the exports of the comparatively disadvantaged British glass 
industry were sold to the Empire. Indeed, it might be asked: did the Empire thus 
function to mitigate the degree of within-sector specialization?  
 
The usefulness of bilateral case studies 
One prominent feature of this dissertation has been the use of bilateral case studies to 
inform debates within economic history. Any case study will invariably raise 
concerns about the generalizability of its findings. These concerns should not be 
dismissed lightly. Nonetheless, carefully devised and contextualized case studies can 
yield unique and meaningful insights. In this dissertation, the case studies have 
focused upon Britain’s bilateral trade with the United States and New Zealand in 
chapters II and III, respectively. 
In the late nineteenth century, Anglo-American bilateral trade was of intrinsic 
importance to the world economy. The large share of the United States in British 
exports made this particular bilateral case generalizable, to some degree. And the 
                                                     
418 de Bromhead, Fernihough, Lampe, and O’Rourke, ‘Shift towards empire’. 
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variation in American tariff policy also made this case worth considering. The 
advantage gained from focusing on one bilateral case was the ability to employ the 
empirically correct tariff measure in the econometric analysis. Ultimately, the use of 
the empirically correct tariff measure resulted in an altered interpretation of the inter-
temporal determinants of Anglo-American trade costs. Moving beyond a bilateral 
case study would have entailed the use of inferior data in an analysis that would have 
largely amounted to a replication of the pre-existing gravity models for the period. 
In contrast with the United States, New Zealand was not analyzed on account 
of the relative importance of this market for British exports, but rather on account of 
the extraordinarily high share of Britain in the country-composition of its imports. 
This fact made the bilateral case of New Zealand uniquely amenable to identifying 
the channel of causality in the Fordian lending-export loop, whereby British capital 
exports raised demand for British merchandise exports in the short term. 
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Appendix 1.1.   Values, volumes, and prices of British exports, 1870-1900 
Year 
Current value 
(£ million) 
Volume index Price index 
1870 199.6 75.5 118.5 
1871 223.1 84.7 118.0 
1872 256.3 87.9 130.6 
1873 255.2 84.6 135.2 
1874 239.6 84.1 127.7 
1875 223.5 83.5 120.0 
1876 200.6 81.4 110.5 
1877 198.9 84.0 106.2 
1878 192.8 84.4 102.3 
1879 191.5 89.0 96.4 
1880 223.1 100.0 100.0 
1881 234.0 109.5 95.8 
1882 241.5 110.8 97.7 
1883 239.8 113.9 94.4 
1884 233.0 114.8 90.9 
1885 213.1 109.2 87.4 
1886 212.7 114.0 83.6 
1887 221.9 119.2 83.4 
1888 234.5 126.8 82.9 
1889 248.9 131.9 84.6 
1890 263.5 133.8 88.3 
1891 247.2 126.6 87.5 
1892 227.1 121.8 83.6 
1893 218.1 117.2 83.4 
1894 215.8 122.2 79.2 
1895 225.9 132.9 76.2 
1896 240.2 140.1 76.9 
1897 234.2 138.1 76.0 
1898 233.4 137.2 76.2 
1899 264.5 146.1 79.8 
1900 291.2 140.0 91.7 
Source: Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-7. 
Notes: The volume index is expressed in 1880 prices. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 
Industry 1870/1 1871/2 1872/3 1873/4 1874/5 
Alkali 
2.0 
(35.1) 
2.4 
(30.2) 
3.4 
(15.1) 
4.2 
(17.0) 
4.7 
(19.9) 
Books 
0.7 
(25.0) 
0.7 
(25.0) 
0.8 
(22.9) 
1.1 
(22.5) 
1.2 
(24.5) 
Cement -- -- -- -- -- 
Clocks and watches 
1.8 
(23.3) 
1.0 
(26.1) 
0.3 
(25.3) 
0.3 
(24.8) 
0.3 
(25.3) 
Coal 
0.2 
(47.5) 
0.3 
(47.2) 
0.3 
(23.9) 
0.4 
(19.0) 
0.5 
(18.3) 
Cotton manufactures 
14.4 
(40.5) 
14.5 
(41.0) 
14.2 
(36.3) 
14.8 
(36.3) 
16.1 
(37.4) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.2 
(41.3) 
2.2 
(41.6) 
2.5 
(41.6) 
2.9 
(43.7) 
2.9 
(41.7) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
10.4 
(33.7) 
11.2 
(33.1) 
10.8 
(33.2) 
12.9 
(33.1) 
14.5 
(33.9) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
0.8 
(19.8) 
0.8 
(20.6) 
0.8 
(20.8) 
0.8 
(21.0) 
1.2 
(20.8) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
22.0 
(43.1) 
24.9 
(41.4) 
25.7 
(31.8) 
20.3 
(31.5) 
12.9 
(33.3) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
3.5 
(36.4) 
3.4 
(37.1) 
2.5 
(31.6) 
1.7 
(31.9) 
1.7 
(33.0) 
Salt 
0.5 
(101.6) 
0.5 
(98.4) 
0.7 
(41.7) 
1.3 
(36.7) 
1.1 
(40.2) 
Silk manufactures 
12.0 
(57.8) 
9.3 
(57.7) 
6.2 
(57.3) 
4.8 
(56.1) 
4.3 
(57.3) 
Tinplate 
6.2 
(22.7) 
7.3 
(22.8) 
8.1 
(15.3) 
9.9 
(15.1) 
11.6 
(16.1) 
Wool 
1.9 
(45.6) 
0.7 
(46.1) 
3.0 
(38.3) 
1.4 
(38.5) 
2.5 
(35.5) 
Wool manufactures 
21.4 
(67.7) 
20.9 
(65.7) 
20.7 
(58.5) 
23.4 
(58.4) 
24.4 
(59.8) 
Industry-composite tariff 46.8 45.2 38.1 37.9 38.9 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1875/6 1876/7 1877/8 1878/9 1879/80 
Alkali 
4.7 
(21.9) 
6.1 
(23.2) 
6.0 
(24.7) 
5.9 
(29.7) 
3.6 
(25.2) 
Books 
1.5 
(25.0) 
1.3 
(25.0) 
1.4 
(25.0) 
1.7 
(24.7) 
1.0 
(24.8) 
Cement -- -- -- -- -- 
Clocks and watches 
0.1 
(26.4) 
0.1 
(27.3) 
0.1 
(27.0) 
0.1 
(27.2) 
0.1 
(26.5) 
Coal 
0.5 
(18.9) 
0.7 
(20.9) 
0.7 
(22.3) 
0.6 
(21.3) 
0.2 
(22.3) 
Cotton manufactures 
15.6 
(40.2) 
14.5 
(39.8) 
14.0 
(39.5) 
13.9 
(38.8) 
10.9 
(38.8) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
3.4 
(42.1) 
3.8 
(42.1) 
4.2 
(41.9) 
4.1 
(42.3) 
2.7 
(42.4) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
15.9 
(33.7) 
18.4 
(33.7) 
18.5 
(33.2) 
19.3 
(33.7) 
13.7 
(33.7) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
1.7 
(20.6) 
1.5 
(20.6) 
1.3 
(20.5) 
1.9 
(20.6) 
1.2 
(20.8) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
11.1 
(36.2) 
9.8 
(36.8) 
9.1 
(38.5) 
9.3 
(38.0) 
26.8 
(42.2) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
2.1 
(34.7) 
2.1 
(33.0) 
2.0 
(34.5) 
2.2 
(34.8) 
2.7 
(29.0) 
Salt 
1.5 
(37.2) 
1.6 
(49.4) 
1.6 
(48.8) 
1.8 
(47.4) 
0.8 
(48.3) 
Silk manufactures 
4.1 
(58.5) 
4.4 
(58.9) 
3.8 
(59.1) 
4.9 
(59.3) 
4.3 
(59.0) 
Tinplate 
11.3 
(21.3) 
13.1 
(25.0) 
13.0 
(27.0) 
14.2 
(29.9) 
11.1 
(24.7) 
Wool 
3.9 
(35.3) 
3.8 
(37.9) 
5.1 
(38.8) 
3.0 
(35.7) 
8.2 
(41.2) 
Wool manufactures 
22.6 
(65.5) 
18.8 
(66.5) 
19.1 
(66.8) 
17.1 
(67.2) 
12.7 
(68.7) 
Industry-composite tariff 41.2 40.7 41.2 41.2 41.2 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1880/1 1881/2 1882/3 1883/4 1884/5 
Alkali 
4.1 
(27.9) 
3.5 
(32.8) 
4.2 
(31.1) 
5.1 
(28.5) 
5.3 
(29.7) 
Books 
1.3 
(24.8) 
1.3 
(24.8) 
1.4 
(24.8) 
1.4 
(25.0) 
1.4 
(25.0) 
Cement -- -- -- 
0.5 
(20.0) 
0.5 
(20.0) 
Clocks and watches 
0.1 
(26.5) 
0.1 
(36.8) 
0.1 
(26.5) 
0.1 
(25.8) 
0.1 
(26.3) 
Coal 
0.6 
(24.6) 
0.7 
(27.9) 
0.5 
(24.0) 
0.8 
(22.5) 
0.9 
(22.6) 
Cotton manufactures 
13.6 
(38.5) 
13.9 
(39.1) 
14.5 
(37.8) 
12.4 
(40.1) 
12.7 
(40.1) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
3.8 
(42.7) 
3.4 
(43.2) 
4.4 
(43.1) 
2.8 
(55.7) 
3.4 
(56.4) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
12.0 
(33.2) 
11.9 
(33.3) 
12.6 
(32.8) 
13.7 
(34.1) 
15.1 
(34.1) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
1.8 
(21.3) 
2.0 
(21.8) 
1.6 
(22.0) 
2.4 
(20.8) 
1.8 
(20.5) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
26.1 
(41.7) 
26.5 
(44.8) 
20.7 
(40.6) 
12.4 
(39.7) 
9.7 
(40.0) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
2.0 
(31.7) 
2.0 
(31.0) 
2.2 
(29.8) 
1.4 
(27.8) 
1.5 
(28.0) 
Salt 
1.2 
(48.2) 
0.9 
(45.8) 
0.9 
(47.8) 
1.2 
(49.9) 
1.3 
(53.0) 
Silk manufactures 
4.8 
(58.8) 
5.1 
(59.1) 
4.4 
(59.0) 
5.2 
(49.9) 
4.9 
(49.8) 
Tinplate 
11.3 
(28.5) 
11.8 
(29.6) 
13.5 
(30.2) 
17.0 
(27.9) 
18.6 
(30.4) 
Wool 
3.6 
(40.3) 
3.0 
(37.3) 
3.6 
(37.4) 
5.5 
(33.3) 
4.1 
(33.4) 
Wool manufactures 
13.6 
(67.7) 
14.0 
(68.1) 
15.3 
(68.5) 
18.1 
(66.2) 
18.5 
(67.2) 
Industry-composite tariff 41.7 43.0 41.7 40.9 41.8 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1885/6 1886/7 1887/8 1888/9 1889/90 
Alkali 
4.8 
(31.2) 
4.0 
(33.7) 
3.7 
(36.8) 
3.5 
(36.9) 
3.9 
(32.9) 
Books 
1.3 
(25.0) 
1.2 
(25.0) 
1.4 
(25.0) 
1.3 
(25.0) 
1.2 
(25.0) 
Cement 
0.4 
(20.0) 
0.6 
(20.0) 
1.0 
(20.0) 
0.7 
(20.0) 
0.9 
(20.0) 
Clocks and watches 
0.1 
(26.2) 
0.1 
(26.0) 
0.1 
(25.9) 
0.1 
(26.0) 
0.1 
(26.0) 
Coal 
0.7 
(23.3) 
0.6 
(24.3) 
0.4 
(22.3) 
0.3 
(21.7) 
0.1 
(22.2) 
Cotton manufactures 
11.0 
(40.2) 
9.8 
(40.2) 
9.1 
(40.0) 
8.5 
(40.0) 
9.5 
(39.9) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
3.1 
(56.7) 
3.1 
(57.0) 
3.3 
(57.0) 
3.2 
(57.1) 
3.2 
(57.1) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
13.5 
(34.3) 
13.3 
(34.2) 
13.1 
(34.2) 
14.2 
(34.0) 
14.7 
(33.9) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
1.7 
(20.4) 
1.5 
(20.4) 
1.9 
(20.2) 
2.1 
(20.2) 
2.0 
(20.2) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
10.3 
(42.5) 
17.3 
(43.8) 
15.5 
(46.7) 
8.7 
(42.8) 
9.9 
(38.0) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
2.0 
(28.5) 
1.7 
(30.1) 
2.2 
(29.8) 
2.1 
(30.5) 
1.9 
(31.7) 
Salt 
1.1 
(47.3) 
0.9 
(46.5) 
0.7 
(49.0) 
0.6 
(49.2) 
0.6 
(41.3) 
Silk manufactures 
4.4 
(49.7) 
4.6 
(49.7) 
5.2 
(49.6) 
5.5 
(49.6) 
5.4 
(49.5) 
Tinplate 
17.0 
(32.4) 
14.6 
(33.8) 
15.9 
(33.2) 
17.8 
(34.7) 
16.7 
(32.5) 
Wool 
7.7 
(37.2) 
7.4 
(36.1) 
6.5 
(33.6) 
7.4 
(34.3) 
6.7 
(33.8) 
Wool manufactures 
21.0 
(67.3) 
19.3 
(67.2) 
20.1 
(68.3) 
23.8 
(67.1) 
23.2 
(69.1) 
Industry-composite tariff 43.4 43.9 44.4 44.5 43.8 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1890/1 1891/2 1892/3 1893/4 1894/5 
Alkali 
4.7 
(26.7) 
6.0 
(24.5) 
5.5 
(25.0) 
5.3 
(30.5) 
4.1 
(30.9) 
Books 
1.3 
(25.0) 
1.6 
(25.0) 
1.3 
(25.0) 
1.8 
(25.0) 
1.3 
(25.0) 
Cement 
1.5 
(20.8) 
1.7 
(21.9) 
1.3 
(24.0) 
2.0 
(24.9) 
1.1 
(24.8) 
Clocks and watches 
0.1 
(26.5) 
0.1 
(27.0) 
0.1 
(27.3) 
0.0 
(26.6) 
0.1 
(25.0) 
Coal 
0.3 
(21.7) 
0.7 
(22.6) 
0.4 
(22.7) 
0.5 
(23.1) 
0.4 
(24.4) 
Cotton manufactures 
9.4 
(51.0) 
12.1 
(57.3) 
12.8 
(57.1) 
13.5 
(56.3) 
15.2 
(46.8) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
3.5 
(57.2) 
4.5 
(57.6) 
4.1 
(57.6) 
5.0 
(57.7) 
5.3 
(34.9) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
13.9 
(37.9) 
19.5 
(39.1) 
18.1 
(39.1) 
21.2 
(39.1) 
17.5 
(36.2) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
2.1 
(20.8) 
2.4 
(21.5) 
1.8 
(21.4) 
2.7 
(21.4) 
3.0 
(20.6) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
7.8 
(39.3) 
9.3 
(42.8) 
9.2 
(48.6) 
6.6 
(50.0) 
7.5 
(38.7) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
1.8 
(33.2) 
2.2 
(33.7) 
2.1 
(34.2) 
2.8 
(33.3) 
3.1 
(26.3) 
Salt 
0.5 
(44.1) 
0.5 
(46.0) 
0.4 
(42.8) 
0.7 
(39.9) 
0.1 
(47.4) 
Silk manufactures 
4.2 
(51.9) 
3.3 
(54.0) 
3.3 
(53.6) 
3.5 
(53.1) 
3.2 
(47.5) 
Tinplate 
27.1 
(29.1) 
12.2 
(74.6) 
15.2 
(78.4) 
18.5 
(82.4) 
13.9 
(56.7) 
Wool 
7.0 
(38.4) 
7.7 
(44.1) 
8.4 
(44.3) 
2.6 
(41.1) 
0.5 
(39.0) 
Wool manufactures 
14.8 
(80.6) 
16.3 
(95.8) 
15.9 
(98.6) 
13.1 
(97.3) 
23.8 
(56.8) 
Industry-composite tariff 43.1 55.0 57.8 57.6 44.7 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1895/6 1896/7 1897/8 1898/9 1899/00 
Alkali 
3.3 
(31.0) 
3.1 
(30.8) 
2.0 
(49.6) 
1.0 
(52.3) 
1.1 
(45.8) 
Books 
1.1 
(25.0) 
1.2 
(25.0) 
1.7 
(25.0) 
1.7 
(25.0) 
1.4 
(25.0) 
Cement 
1.1 
(24.7) 
0.8 
(25.1) 
0.7 
(24.6) 
0.7 
(24.0) 
0.5 
(23.1) 
Clocks and watches 
0.1 
(25.0) 
0.1 
(25.0) 
0.2 
(38.2) 
0.2 
(35.8) 
0.2 
(36.1) 
Coal 
0.2 
(13.8) 
0.2 
(14.2) 
0.6 
(23.8) 
0.5 
(22.0) 
0.4 
(21.3) 
Cotton manufactures 
14.4 
(45.9) 
18.4 
(46.0) 
19.5 
(54.8) 
22.1 
(56.0) 
21.6 
(55.3) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
5.2 
(33.8) 
5.2 
(34.0) 
4.9 
(55.4) 
5.1 
(58.8) 
4.1 
(58.8) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
15.5 
(35.6) 
21.0 
(34.8) 
23.8 
(41.1) 
28.3 
(42.0) 
24.8 
(41.3) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
2.3 
(20.7) 
1.4 
(20.9) 
2.4 
(21.1) 
2.4 
(20.9) 
2.1 
(21.3) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
10.4 
(32.0) 
6.7 
(34.1) 
7.8 
(36.7) 
8.1 
(38.1) 
10.9 
(34.9) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
2.5 
(25.5) 
3.2 
(24.6) 
4.3 
(32.3) 
4.3 
(35.7) 
3.4 
(35.3) 
Salt 
0.0 
(15.5) 
0.0 
(34.6) 
0.7 
(47.3) 
0.7 
(46.7) 
0.6 
(46.7) 
Silk manufactures 
2.7 
(47.0) 
2.4 
(46.8) 
3.5 
(54.3) 
4.0 
(54.0) 
3.5 
(52.0) 
Tinplate 
9.6 
(51.7) 
6.8 
(51.6) 
6.9 
(66.4) 
4.5 
(62.4) 
6.0 
(46.5) 
Wool 
0.0 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
8.3 
(47.0) 
5.6 
(47.3) 
9.7 
(48.9) 
Wool manufactures 
31.6 
(47.8) 
29.5 
(46.4) 
12.8 
(80.4) 
10.9 
(94.9) 
9.6 
(91.4) 
Industry-composite tariff 41.3 40.8 50.7 52.0 49.6 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1900/1 1901/2 1902/3 1903/4 1904/5 
Alkali 
0.7 
(40.8) 
0.5 
(37.4) 
0.3 
(37.5) 
0.3 
(36.6) 
0.3 
(37.6) 
Books 
1.6 
(24.9) 
1.6 
(25.0) 
1.3 
(25.0) 
1.6 
(25.0) 
1.5 
(24.9) 
Cement 
0.4 
(23.1) 
0.1 
(22.9) 
0.2 
(24.7) 
0.2 
(24.2) 
0.1 
(23.8) 
Clocks and watches 
0.3 
(35.9) 
0.3 
(34.1) 
0.2 
(35.8) 
0.2 
(36.3) 
0.2 
(37.7) 
Coal 
0.3 
(20.1) 
0.5 
(19.9) 
5.0 
(8.2) 
0.5 
(6.6) 
0.2 
(21.6) 
Cotton manufactures 
21.5 
(54.9) 
21.1 
(54.9) 
18.8 
(53.7) 
21.1 
(53.8) 
17.8 
(54.3) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
4.8 
(58.8) 
3.8 
(59.1) 
3.0 
(58.9) 
4.0 
(58.9) 
3.3 
(59.0) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
28.0 
(39.3) 
27.1 
(39.0) 
21.6 
(40.2) 
27.2 
(40.1) 
24.8 
(39.6) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
2.0 
(21.3) 
2.4 
(21.2) 
1.7 
(21.2) 
1.9 
(21.1) 
1.6 
(20.8) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
10.7 
(35.9) 
10.9 
(33.7) 
21.9 
(30.9) 
10.7 
(34.0) 
9.3 
(34.4) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
3.7 
(35.1) 
3.2 
(36.1) 
2.9 
(35.4) 
3.3 
(36.5) 
3.8 
(34.0) 
Salt 
0.7 
(45.0) 
0.6 
(38.9) 
0.4 
(41.1) 
0.4 
(41.2) 
0.3 
(40.1) 
Silk manufactures 
2.9 
(53.1) 
2.7 
(53.6) 
2.0 
(53.5) 
2.2 
(52.8) 
1.8 
(53.5) 
Tinplate 
5.6 
(46.6) 
7.7 
(49.2) 
3.2 
(50.9) 
4.3 
(54.6) 
5.3 
(53.0) 
Wool 
8.0 
(50.8) 
8.0 
(59.0) 
8.7 
(54.7) 
11.7 
(48.9) 
19.6 
(46.6) 
Wool manufactures 
8.8 
(91.3) 
9.6 
(91.6) 
8.7 
(91.0) 
10.3 
(92.6) 
10.3 
(91.8) 
Industry-composite tariff 48.7 49.5 45.3 49.5 49.3 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1905/6 1906/7 1907/8 1908/9 1909/10 
Alkali 
0.2 
(35.2) 
-- -- -- -- 
Books 
1.5 
(25.0) 
1.5 
(25.0) 
1.9 
(25.0) 
1.8 
(25.0) 
2.7 
(29.0) 
Cement 
0.1 
(24.8) 
0.8 
(25.1) 
0.8 
(24.1) 
0.1 
(20.6) 
0.1 
(22.1) 
Clocks and watches 
0.1 
(39.6) 
0.1 
(39.0) 
0.1 
(35.8) 
0.1 
(37.5) 
0.1 
(35.6) 
Coal 
0.3 
(21.6) 
0.2 
(20.8) 
0.1 
(22.5) 
0.1 
(20.6) 
0.0 
(16.1) 
Cotton manufactures 
20.2 
(54.0) 
20.3 
(53.4) 
24.9 
(52.3) 
22.1 
(53.4) 
18.0 
(56.0) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.9 
(58.9) 
2.8 
(58.6) 
3.5 
(58.8) 
2.6 
(58.7) 
2.5 
(58.5) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
27.4 
(38.0) 
27.3 
(35.0) 
27.4 
(35.1) 
24.8 
(38.3) 
24.4 
(38.7) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
1.6 
(21.2) 
1.1 
(21.4) 
0.6 
(22.2) 
1.5 
(21.7) 
1.3 
(25.3) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
13.0 
(29.4) 
18.7 
(26.8) 
13.7 
(30.1) 
10.0 
(32.4) 
14.9 
(27.1) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
3.9 
(34.1) 
3.5 
(30.9) 
3.1 
(32.0) 
3.1 
(36.3) 
3.7 
(32.0) 
Salt 
0.3 
(41.9) 
0.3 
(43.7) 
0.3 
(45.1) 
0.3 
(41.3) 
0.2 
(39.6) 
Silk manufactures 
1.7 
(53.2) 
1.9 
(52.7) 
2.0 
(51.9) 
2.0 
(53.1) 
2.7 
(53.4) 
Tinplate 
3.5 
(52.9) 
4.1 
(45.6) 
4.8 
(49.0) 
3.5 
(54.6) 
3.8 
(43.2) 
Wool 
13.0 
(43.5) 
10.6 
(40.9) 
8.5 
(42.7) 
20.8 
(49.1) 
17.2 
(44.3) 
Wool manufactures 
10.1 
(90.3) 
6.9 
(89.4) 
8.3 
(91.2) 
7.2 
(90.2) 
8.5 
(90.1) 
Industry-composite tariff 46.8 42.5 45.4 47.9 45.8 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.1.   Industry weights, industry tariffs, and industry-composite tariff, 
1870/1-1912/3 (continued) 
Industry 1910/1 1911/2 1912/3 
Alkali -- -- -- 
Books 
3.2 
(29.1) 
3.5 
(29.9) 
3.0 
(29.7) 
Cement 
0.1 
(23.2) 
0.1 
(22.0) 
0.0 
(21.9) 
Clocks and watches 
0.2 
(37.1) 
0.1 
(36.0) 
0.1 
(35.8) 
Coal 
0.0 
(14.8) 
0.0 
(13.7) 
0.0 
(14.8) 
Cotton manufactures 
21.0 
(55.7) 
21.8 
(55.6) 
20.5 
(55.0) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.8 
(58.3) 
2.4 
(58.4) 
2.5 
(58.2) 
Flax and manufactures thereof 
26.9 
(38.9) 
28.4 
(36.7) 
29.7 
(33.2) 
Fur and manufactures thereof 
1.2 
(26.2) 
1.0 
(25.9) 
1.0 
(26.2) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof 
15.5 
(26.0) 
11.2 
(28.6) 
12.9 
(26.1) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
3.9 
(32.3) 
4.8 
(29.8) 
5.4 
(27.9) 
Salt 
0.3 
(36.2) 
0.3 
(41.1) 
0.3 
(40.7) 
Silk manufactures 
4.1 
(52.5) 
3.4 
(52.0) 
3.0 
(51.4) 
Tinplate 
3.2 
(36.2) 
0.3 
(25.2) 
1.0 
(29.9) 
Wool 
8.9 
(42.2) 
15.1 
(43.6) 
13.9 
(44.7) 
Wool manufactures 
8.8 
(87.7) 
7.6 
(83.0) 
6.8 
(81.8) 
Industry-composite tariff 45.3 44.8 42.4 
Source: Calculated from Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. See text. 
Notes: Weights are expressed in %. Per-industry ad valorem equivalent tariffs are expressed in % and 
indicated in parentheses. Several industries contain discontinuities, as discussed in the text. 
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Appendix 2.2.   Specie, dutiable, and free American imports from Britain, 1870/1-
1912/3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Year 
Specie imports from 
Britain ($ million) 
Dutiable imports from 
Britain ($ million) 
Free imports from 
Britain, excluding 
specie ($ million) 
1870/1 0.1 212.1 8.6 
1871/2 0.6 236.5 12.2 
1872/3 0.5 219.7 17.6 
1873/4 13.6 159.5 20.5 
1874/5 1.7 137.0 18.3 
1875/6 1.5 108.7 14.6 
1876/7 21.4 95.7 18.0 
1877/8 12.6 90.9 16.4 
1878/9 3.4 89.9 18.6 
1879/80 -- 179.8 30.8 
1880/1 -- 150.4 24.1 
1881/2 -- 169.9 25.7 
1882/3 -- 161.3 27.3 
1883/4 -- 135.0 27.6 
1884/5 -- 112.2 24.5 
1885/6 -- 126.9 27.3 
1886/7 -- 138.3 26.7 
1887/8 -- 147.2 30.7 
1888/9 -- 150.1 28.2 
1889/90 -- 155.8 30.6 
1890/1 -- 158.3 36.4 
1891/2 -- 120.9 35.4 
1892/3 -- 139.7 43.2 
1893/4 -- 82.9 24.5 
1894/5 -- 108.7 50.4 
1895/6 -- 114.0 56.0 
1896/7 -- 96.5 71.5 
1897/8 -- 76.2 32.7 
1898/9 -- 82.2 36.3 
1899/00 -- 106.8 52.8 
1900/1 -- 92.5 50.9 
1901/2 -- 110.0 55.8 
1902/3 -- 131.3 58.7 
1903/4 -- 108.7 57.1 
1904/5 -- 114.1 61.7 
1905/6 -- 133.0 77.1 
1906/7 -- 155.3 90.8 
1907/8 -- 124.7 65.6 
1908/9 -- 134.5 74.1 
1909/10 -- 154.5 116.5 
1910/1 -- 138.6 122.7 
1911/2 -- 135.8 137.1 
1912/3 -- 143.0 152.5 
Source: Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. 
Notes: It should not be assumed from col. 1 that there were no specie imports from Britain after 
1878/9. Rather, it should simply be noted that, after 1878/9, the Foreign Commerce records specie and 
merchandise imports separately. 
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Appendix 3.1.   Data sources for panel regression 
 
British exports 
For all countries, these figures are obtained from Annual statements of the trade of the 
United Kingdom and deflated by the British export price index from Imlah, Pax Britannica, 
pp. 96-8. For consistency, figures for Canada include Newfoundland and Labrador. 
 
British lending 
For all countries, these figures are obtained from Stone, Global export, and deflated by the 
British export price index from Imlah, Pax Britannica, pp. 96-8. 
 
Real GDP 
Australia: Butlin, Australian domestic product, pp. 33-4. 
Canada: Urquhart, Derivation of the estimates, pp. 24-5. 
New Zealand: Calculated as the real GDP per capita reported in Greasley and Oxley, 
‘Cointegration based approach’, pp. 365-6, multiplied by the non-Maori population of 
New Zealand reported in Rankin, ‘Gross national product’, pp. 58-9. 
Uruguay: Maddison, World economy, p. 132. 
United States: Sutch and Carter, Historical statistics, table Ca9.  
 
Terms of trade 
Australia: Wilson, Capital imports, p. 89.  
Canada: Calculated from Urquhart and Buckley, Historical statistics of Canada, p. 184. This 
series pertains to fiscal years ending 31 March (until 1908) and ending 30 June 
(thereafter). Therefore, the terms of trade lag British exports by either one-quarter or 
one-half year. 
New Zealand: Calculated from Easton and Wilson, ‘N. Z.’s terms’, pp. 36-7. I thank Brian 
Easton for supplying this data. 
Uruguay: Baptista and Bértola, 1999, unpublished data. I thank Belén Baptista for supplying 
this data.  
United States: Lipsey, Price and quantity, p. 442. This series pertains to fiscal years ending 
30 June. Therefore, the terms of trade lead British exports by one-half year. 
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Appendix 3.2.   Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
 Interval I(0) I(1) 
Australia    
Exports 1871-1913 -2.50 -5.85*** 
Lending 1871-1913 -2.75* -7.30*** 
GDP 1871-1913 -1.78 -8.80*** 
Terms of trade 1871-1913 -2.55 -9.56*** 
Canada    
Exports 1871-1913 0.04 -7.49*** 
Lending 1871-1913 -2.56 -10.10*** 
GDP 1871-1913 1.60 -6.46*** 
Terms of trade 1871-1913 -2.53 -6.85*** 
New Zealand    
Exports 1871-1913 -2.65* -5.75*** 
Lending 1871-1913 -4.04*** -9.11*** 
GDP 1871-1913 -2.27 -6.10*** 
Terms of trade 1871-1913 -3.65*** -7.51*** 
Railway capital formation 1872-1900 -3.19** -3.82*** 
Iron 1872-1900 -3.41** -5.11*** 
Cotton textiles 1872-1900 -1.29 -5.77*** 
Uruguay    
Exports 1877-1913 -2.18 -8.01*** 
Lending 1877-1913 -3.65** -6.57*** 
GDP 1877-1913 -0.59 -8.12*** 
Terms of trade 1877-1913 -1.91 -6.13*** 
United States    
Exports 1880-1913 -3.47** -8.99*** 
Lending 1880-1913 -3.09** -7.57*** 
GDP 1880-1913 -0.35 -8.67*** 
Terms of trade 1880-1913 -2.55 -5.61*** 
Notes: All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. * indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** 
at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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Appendix 4.1.   RCA indicators for Belgium, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
0.1 
(15) 
0.1 
(16) 
0.0 
(16) 
Cement 
2.6 
(5) 
1.3 
(8) 
5.8 
(2) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
0.9 
(7) 
2.0 
(4) 
2.3 
(5) 
Clocks and watches 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
Copper manufactures 
0.3 
(13) 
0.4 
(11) 
0.3 
(13) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.3 
(12) 
0.3 
(12) 
0.3 
(11) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
0.8 
(8) 
1.8 
(5) 
1.5 
(8) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
4.4 
(2) 
4.9 
(2) 
5.1 
(3) 
Glass 
8.7 
(1) 
7.0 
(1) 
8.3 
(1) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.7 
(9) 
1.7 
(6) 
1.5 
(7) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
0.5 
(11) 
0.6 
(10) 
1.2 
(9) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
2.6 
(4) 
3.3 
(3) 
2.3 
(4) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
3.1 
(3) 
1.6 
(7) 
1.7 
(6) 
Rubber manufactures 
0.1 
(14) 
0.1 
(15) 
0.2 
(14) 
Silk manufactures 
0.0 
(16) 
0.1 
(14) 
0.1 
(15) 
Spirits 
0.5 
(10) 
0.1 
(13) 
0.3 
(12) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.8 
(6) 
1.3 
(9) 
0.8 
(10) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Appendix 4.2.   RCA indicators for France, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
0.1 
(17) 
0.3 
(17) 
0.5 
(16) 
Cement 
0.4 
(14) 
2.0 
(8) 
1.9 
(7) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
1.2 
(9) 
1.2 
(10) 
1.4 
(10) 
Clocks and watches 
3.6 
(3) 
3.6 
(3) 
4.8 
(2) 
Copper manufactures 
0.3 
(15) 
0.6 
(14) 
0.7 
(13) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.3 
(16) 
0.4 
(16) 
0.7 
(14) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
1.4 
(8) 
1.9 
(9) 
1.8 
(9) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.8 
(11) 
0.5 
(15) 
1.0 
(12) 
Glass 
1.6 
(7) 
2.1 
(7) 
2.1 
(6) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.5 
(13) 
0.8 
(11) 
0.6 
(15) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
4.1 
(2) 
3.6 
(4) 
3.0 
(4) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
0.5 
(12) 
0.7 
(13) 
0.5 
(17) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
2.7 
(5) 
2.3 
(6) 
1.9 
(8) 
Rubber manufactures 
1.2 
(10) 
0.8 
(12) 
1.0 
(11) 
Silk manufactures 
3.6 
(4) 
4.3 
(2) 
5.6 
(1) 
Spirits 
4.5 
(1) 
4.8 
(1) 
3.7 
(3) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
2.5 
(6) 
2.4 
(5) 
2.2 
(5) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Appendix 4.3.   RCA indicators for Germany, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
2.7 
(6) 
2.2 
(8) 
2.2 
(7) 
Cement 
3.1 
(4) 
2.8 
(5) 
2.8 
(4) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
4.4 
(1) 
4.5 
(2) 
3.8 
(2) 
Clocks and watches 
2.2 
(8) 
2.7 
(6) 
2.1 
(9) 
Copper manufactures 
1.3 
(14) 
1.4 
(13) 
1.2 
(14) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.7 
(16) 
0.9 
(16) 
1.0 
(15) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.5 
(7) 
1.9 
(11) 
2.8 
(5) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.5 
(17) 
0.5 
(17) 
0.5 
(17) 
Glass 
1.9 
(11) 
2.2 
(9) 
1.6 
(12) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
2.0 
(10) 
1.9 
(12) 
2.0 
(10) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
2.0 
(9) 
2.6 
(7) 
1.9 
(11) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
1.2 
(15) 
0.9 
(15) 
1.5 
(13) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
3.2 
(3) 
4.7 
(1) 
4.0 
(1) 
Rubber manufactures 
2.9 
(5) 
3.2 
(4) 
2.9 
(3) 
Silk manufactures 
3.7 
(2) 
3.6 
(3) 
2.5 
(6) 
Spirits 
1.9 
(12) 
1.2 
(14) 
0.9 
(16) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.8 
(13) 
2.1 
(10) 
2.1 
(8) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Appendix 4.4.   RCA indicators for the United States, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
0.1 
(12) 
0.4 
(9) 
0.9 
(7) 
Cement 
0.1 
(14) 
0.1 
(15) 
0.1 
(15) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
0.2 
(7) 
0.4 
(8) 
0.6 
(10) 
Clocks and watches 
1.2 
(1) 
1.6 
(1) 
1.4 
(5) 
Copper manufactures 
0.2 
(9) 
0.5 
(6) 
3.6 
(1) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.2 
(11) 
0.2 
(13) 
0.4 
(12) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
0.0 
(15) 
0.1 
(14) 
0.2 
(14) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.1 
(13) 
0.2 
(12) 
0.4 
(11) 
Glass 
0.2 
(10) 
0.2 
(11) 
0.4 
(13) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.3 
(5) 
0.4 
(7) 
1.4 
(4) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
0.5 
(4) 
0.8 
(2) 
1.6 
(3) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
0.5 
(3) 
0.8 
(3) 
1.6 
(2) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
0.2 
(6) 
0.2 
(10) 
0.7 
(8) 
Rubber manufactures 
0.2 
(8) 
0.6 
(4) 
1.1 
(6) 
Silk manufactures 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
Spirits 
0.7 
(2) 
0.5 
(5) 
0.6 
(9) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
0.0 
(16) 
0.0 
(16) 
0.0 
(16) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Appendix 4.5.   Industry components of factor proxies 
 
Census of Production (1907) 
Beer: Brewing and malting trades 
Cement: Cement trade 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint: Chemicals, coal tar products, drugs, and 
perfumery trade; Paint, colour, and varnish trades 
Clocks and watches: Watch and clock trades 
Copper manufactures: Copper and brass trades (smelting, rolling, and casting) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn: Cotton trade; 61% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and 
finishing trades 
Earthenware and chinaware: Bricks and fireclay trades; China and earthenware trades 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage: Jute, hemp, and linen trades; 
11% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades; Rope, twine, and net trades 
Glass: Glass, stone, roofing, felts, and miscellaneous trades 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery: Iron and steel, engineering, and 
shipbuilding trades (all sub-industries thereof); excluding Engineering trades 
(including electrical engineering); excluding Shipbuilding and marine engineering 
trades; excluding Small arms trades 
Leather and manufactures thereof: Boot and shoe trades; Glove trade; Leather trade (tanning 
and dressing); Saddlery and harness trade; Traveling bag and fancy leather goods trade 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives: Engineering trades (including 
electrical engineering) 
Paper and manufactures thereof: Paper trade; Cardboard box trade 
Rubber and manufactures thereof: Indiarubber trades 
Silk manufactures: Silk trades; 2% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades 
Spirits: Spirit distilling trade; Spirit compounding, rectifying, and methylating trades 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn: Woollen and worsted trades; 26% of 
Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades 
 
Factory Inspectorate Returns (1870)* 
Beer: Breweries  
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint: Miscellaneous chemical works 
Clocks and watches: Clocks and watches 
Copper manufactures: Copper-mills 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn: Cotton factories  
Earthenware and chinaware: Potteries; Other earthenware; Bricks and tiles 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage: Flax factories; Hemp 
factories; Jute factories; Ropemaking 
Glass: Glass-making  
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery: Blast furnaces and iron-mills; 
Foundries; Nails and rivets; Cutlery; Files, saws, and tools; Locks 
Leather and manufactures thereof: Leather manufactures (all sub-industries thereof); Boot- 
and shoe-making; Manufacture of gloves 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives: Manufacture of machinery  
Paper and manufactures thereof: Paper manufactures (all sub-industries thereof) 
Rubber and manufactures thereof: India-rubber and gutta percha  
Silk manufactures: Silk factories 
Spirits: Distilleries  
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn: Woollen factories; Worsted factories 
 
* Compiled in Musson, ‘Motive power’, pp. 437-9. 
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For each of the above 13 industries, the occupations corresponding to the first, second, and 
third-quartile wage observations are reported, along with the respective industry (as defined 
in the Returns of Wages) and locality. Several occupations are reported below if the quartile 
wage observation corresponds to multiple identically-waged occupations, or if the quartile 
wage observation falls between occupations. 
 
Beer 
Observations: 6 
1st quartile: £1.10; cellarmen, brewing trade, Edinburgh; carters, brewing trade, Edinburgh 
2nd quartile: £1.13; carters, brewing trade, Edinburgh; maltmen, brewing trade, Edinburgh 
3rd quartile: £1.25; maltmen, brewing trade, Edinburgh; brew house and tun room men, 
brewing trade, Edinburgh 
 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint 
Observations: 19 
1st quartile: £0.95; labourers (manufacture of vitriol), chemical works, Glasgow; smiths 
hammermen, chemical works, Glasgow 
Appendix 4.6.   Human capital proxies, 1883 
Industry First quartile Second quartile Third quartile 
Beer 1.69 1.74 1.92 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
1.46 1.97 2.38 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 1.62 1.92 2.77 
Earthenware and chinaware 1.63 1.85 2.17 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
1.46 1.82 2.11 
Glass 1.92 2.28 2.54 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
1.77 2.31 2.62 
Leather and manufactures thereof 1.83 2.15 2.35 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
1.72 2.34 2.60 
Paper and manufactures thereof 1.60 1.83 2.32 
Silk manufactures 1.58 1.69 1.82 
Spirits 1.66 1.82 2.06 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.49 1.78 2.31 
Source: Calculated from Returns of wages published between 1830 and 1886. 
Notes: The human capital proxies above are calculated by dividing the first, second, and third quartile 
wage observations for each industry by the lowest of the 737 observations in the sample. The lowest 
wage observation is 13s. per week, or the wage of a general labourer in the Belfast linen textile 
industry. Hence, the figures in the table can be interpreted as multiples of the unskilled wage. 
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2nd quartile: £1.28; furnacemen, chemical works, Glasgow; skilled hands, chemical works, 
Glasgow 
3rd quartile: £1.55; coopers, chemical works, Glasgow; pattern makers, chemical works, 
Glasgow; masons, chemical works, Glasgow 
 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
Observations: 85 
1st quartile: £1.05; strippers (carding), cotton manufactures, Manchester; grinders (carding), 
cotton manufactures, Manchester; stokers, cotton manufactures, Manchester; scutchers 
(carding), cotton manufactures, Oldham; stokers, cotton manufactures, Oldham; 
labourers and old hands; cotton manufactures, Oldham; colour mixers (calico 
printing), cotton printing and dyeing, Manchester; stokers, cotton printing and dyeing, 
Manchester; carters, cotton printing and dyeing, Glasgow 
2nd quartile: £1.25; under carders (carding), cotton manufactures, Manchester; warehouse 
hands, cotton manufactures, Oldham; engine tenters, cotton printing and dyeing, 
Manchester 
3rd quartile: £1.80; warpers (reeling), cotton manufactures, Oldham; dressers (reeling), cotton 
manufactures, Warrington 
 
Earthenware and chinaware 
Observations: 10 
1st quartile: £1.06; enginemen (earthenware), earthenware and porcelain manufactures, 
Glasgow; kilnmen (earthenware), earthenware and porcelain manufactures, Glasgow 
2nd quartile: £1.20; millmen (earthenware), earthenware and porcelain manufactures, 
Glasgow, panmen, earthenware and porcelain manufactures, Glasgow 
3rd quartile: £1.41; throwers (earthenware), earthenware and porcelain manufactures, 
Glasgow; turners (earthenware), earthenware and porcelain manufactures, Glasgow; 
handlers (earthenware) earthenware and porcelain manufactures, Glasgow 
 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage 
Observations: 46 
1st quartile: £0.95; labourers, linen and flax manufactures, Dundee; cloth measurers, jute 
manufactures, Dundee 
2nd quartile: £1.18; winding masters (weaving), linen and flax manufactures, Leeds; roughers 
or hacklers (spinning), linen and flax manufactures, Dundee; rope yarn spinners, rope, 
twine, and sail making, Greenock; winding masters (weaving), linen and flax 
manufactures, Belfast; cloth weighers, jute manufactures, Dundee; hemp dressers, 
rope, twine, and sail making, Dundee 
3rd quartile: £1.37; foremen (spinning), jute manufactures, Dundee; tenters (weaving), linen 
and flax manufactures, Leeds; overlookers (spinning), linen and flax manufactures, 
Dundee 
 
Glass 
Observations: 29 
1st quartile: £1.25; mixers, glass manufactures, South Shields; carters, glass manufactures, 
South Shields; potmakers, glass manufactures, Glasgow 
2nd quartile: £1.48; grinders, glass manufactures, South Shields 
3rd quartile: £1.65; warehouse hands, glass manufactures, Glasgow 
 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery 
Observations: 164 
1st quartile: £1.15; slotters, iron foundries and general engineering, Manchester; holders-up, 
iron foundries and general engineering, Cleveland; pattern maker’s assistants (iron 
foundries), iron foundries and general engineering, Sunderland; drillers (iron 
185 
 
foundries), iron foundries and general engineering, Sunderland; chain strikers (iron 
forges), iron foundries and general engineering, Sunderland 
2nd quartile: £1.50; roll turners (puddling), blast furnaces and rolling mills, Cleveland; under-
hands (Martin-Siemen’s Process), steel manufacture, Sheffield; vessel men (Bessemer 
Process), steel manufacture, Sheffield; smiths (Bessemer Process), steel manufacture, 
Sheffield; joiners (Bessemer Process), steel manufacture, Sheffield; bar rollers (18”), 
steel manufacture, Glasgow; boilermen, steel manufacture, Glasgow; joiners, steel 
manufacture, Glasgow; pattern makers, iron foundries and general engineering, 
Sheffield; pattern makers, iron foundries and general engineering, Cleveland; 
blacksmiths, iron foundries and general engineering, Cleveland; engine fitters, iron 
foundries and general engineering, Cleveland; turners, iron foundries and general 
engineering, Cleveland; joiners, iron foundries and general engineering, Cleveland; 
planers (iron foundries), iron foundries and general engineering, Sunderland 
3rd quartile: £1.70; riveters (boiler maker), iron foundries and general engineering, 
Manchester; brass moulders (iron foundries), iron foundries and general engineering, 
Sunderland; joiners (iron foundries), iron foundries and general engineering, 
Sunderland 
 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
Observations: 56 
1st quartile: £1.20; tanyard labourers, leather dressing, Bristol; pressmen (rough stuff 
department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester 
2nd quartile: £1.40; strikers, leather tanning and dressing, Warrington; yard foremen, leather 
tanning and dressing, Warrington; clickers (clicking department), boot and shoe 
manufacture, Leicester; rounders (clicking department), boot and shoe manufacture, 
Leicester; rangers (rough stuff department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; 
heelers (work out department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; putters-up (work 
out department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; foremen (packing department), 
boot and shoe manufacture, Bristol 
3rd quartile: £1.53; shed foremen, leather tanning and dressing, Warrington; dyers, leather 
tanning and dressing, Nottingham; finishers, leather tanning and dressing, 
Nottingham; sorters (clicking department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; 
foremen (machine closing department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; sole 
sewers (work out department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; finishers (work 
out department), boot and shoe manufacture, Leicester; engine drivers, boot and shoe 
manufacture, Leicester; heelers machine (work out department), boot and shoe 
manufacture, Bristol; foremen (rough stuff department), boot and shoe manufacture, 
Leicester; pattern cutters (clicking department), boot and shoe manufacture, Bristol 
 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives 
Observations: 112 
1st quartile: £1.12; drillers, manufacture of machinery, Glasgow; strikers, manufacture of 
machinery, Birmingham 
2nd quartile: £1.53; grinders and glazers, manufacture of machinery, Birmingham; pattern 
makers, manufacture of machinery, Dundee 
3rd quartile: £1.69; iron moulders, manufacture of machinery, Greenock; planers and slotters, 
manufacture of machinery, Shields; machinemen, manufacture of machinery, Shields; 
turners, manufacture of machinery, Shields; boiler makers, manufacture of machinery, 
Glasgow 
 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
Observations: 32 
1st quartile: £1.04; glazers, paper manufacture, Edinburgh; stokers, paper manufacture, 
Aberdeen; pad tenters, manufacture of paper hangings, Manchester; paper makers, 
186 
 
paper manufacture, Edinburgh; finishers, paper manufacture, Greenock; finishers, 
paper manufacture, Aberdeen 
2nd quartile: £1.19; colour mixer labourers, manufacture of paper hangings, Manchester; 
stokers, paper manufacture, Edinburgh 
3rd quartile: £1.51; mechanics, paper manufacture, Greenock; block and roller cutters, 
manufacture of paper hangings, Manchester; paper makers, paper manufacture, 
Aberdeen 
 
Silk manufactures 
Observations: 11 
1st quartile: £1.03; silk dyers, silk manufactures, Macclesfield; overlookers (silk throwing), 
silk manufactures, Macclesfield; makers up (silk throwing), silk manufactures, 
Macclesfield; weavers (silk weaving), silk manufactures, Macclesfield; weavers (silk 
weaving), silk manufactures, Derby 
2nd quartile: £1.10; overlookers (silk throwing), silk manufactures, Macclesfield; makers up 
(silk throwing), silk manufactures, Macclesfield; weavers (silk weaving), silk 
manufactures, Macclesfield; weavers (silk weaving), silk manufactures, Derby 
3rd quartile: £1.18; overlookers (silk throwing), silk manufactures, Macclesfield; makers up 
(silk throwing), silk manufactures, Macclesfield; weavers (silk weaving), silk 
manufactures, Macclesfield; weavers (silk weaving), silk manufactures, Derby; 
finishers (silk weaving), silk manufactures, Macclesfield 
 
Spirits 
Observations: 4 
1st quartile: £1.08; distilling men (distilleries), miscellaneous trades, Glasgow; carters 
(distilleries), miscellaneous trades, Glasgow 
2nd quartile: £1.18; carters (distilleries), miscellaneous trades, Glasgow; millers (distilleries), 
miscellaneous trades, Glasgow 
3rd quartile: £1.34; millers (distilleries), miscellaneous trades, Glasgow; coopers (distilleries), 
miscellaneous trades, Glasgow 
 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn 
Observations: 164 
1st quartile: £0.97; spinners, woollen manufactures, Halifax; fettlers, woollen manufactures, 
Kendal 
2nd quartile: £1.16; warpers and beamers, woollen manufactures, Halifax; press setters, 
brushers, and steamers, woollen manufactures, Dewsbury; engine tenters, woollen 
manufactures, Stroud; packers, worsted manufactures, Bradford 
3rd quartile: £1.50; spinners, woollen manufactures, Huddersfield; engine tenters, woollen 
manufactures, Huddersfield; wool sorters, woollen manufactures, Stroud; spinners 
foremen, woollen manufactures, Stroud; spinning and doubling overlookers 
(spinning), worsted manufactures, Bradford  
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Appendix 4.7.   Grubel-Lloyd indices for British manufacturing industries, 1870-94 
Industry 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Alkali 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.12 
Books 0.32 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.33 
Caoutchouc manufactures* 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.19 
Chemical products and preparations, n. e. s. 0.65 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.80 
Copper manufactures* 0.85 0.86 [0.84] 0.98 [0.98] 
Cordage and twine* [0.93] [1.00] [0.76] [0.80] [0.79] 
Cotton manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Cotton yarn+ 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Drugs and medicinal preparations 0.67 0.72 0.78 0.66 0.79 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.33 
Glass [0.94] [0.94] [0.96] [0.96] [0.85] 
Hats 0.82 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.20 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof* 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.15 
Jute yarn 0.49 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.62 
Lead manufactures* [0.96] [0.76] [0.74] [0.66] [0.74] 
Leather manufactures 0.88 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.93 
Linen manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Linen yarn+ 0.05 0.21 0.22 0.05 0.13 
Painters’ colours and materials 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.67 
Paper and manufactures thereof [0.95] 0.94 0.97 0.99 [0.96] 
Silk manufactures+ [0.17] [0.39] [0.38] [0.31] [0.30] 
Spirits [0.11] [0.13] [0.18] [0.12] [0.11] 
Woollens and worsteds, excluding yarn+ 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.30 
Woollen and worsted yarn+ 0.49 0.32 0.39 0.45 0.45 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
Notes: * indicates a capital goods industry. + indicates a textile industry. G-L indices for net-import 
industries are noted in brackets. 
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Appendix 4.7.   Grubel-Lloyd indices for British manufacturing industries, 1870-94 
(continued) 
Industry 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 
Alkali 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07 
Books 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.30 
Caoutchouc manufactures* 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.21 
Chemical products and preparations, n. e. s. 0.83 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.77 
Copper manufactures* [0.96] [0.95] [1.00] 0.94 0.98 
Cordage and twine* [0.82] [0.65] [0.73] [0.81] [0.87] 
Cotton manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Cotton yarn+ 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.07 
Drugs and medicinal preparations 0.77 0.90 0.82 0.77 0.94 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.39 
Glass [0.77] [0.66] [0.62] [0.54] [0.66] 
Hats 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.29 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof* 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.24 
Jute yarn 0.39 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.55 
Lead manufactures* [0.63] [0.63] [0.62] [0.52] [0.54] 
Leather manufactures [0.89] [0.94] [0.94] [0.93] 0.99 
Linen manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Linen yarn+ 0.19 0.23 0.36 0.49 0.51 
Painters’ colours and materials 0.74 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.84 
Paper and manufactures thereof 0.99 [0.89] [0.91] [0.92] [0.99] 
Silk manufactures+ [0.25] [0.26] [0.23] [0.26] [0.23] 
Spirits [0.17] [0.14] [0.27] [0.29] [0.26] 
Woollens and worsteds, excluding yarn+ 0.33 0.42 0.46 0.52 0.52 
Woollen and worsted yarn+ 0.45 0.56 0.65 0.58 0.55 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
Notes: * indicates a capital goods industry. + indicates a textile industry. G-L indices for net-import 
industries are noted in brackets. 
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Appendix 4.7.   Grubel-Lloyd indices for British manufacturing industries, 1870-94 
(continued) 
Industry 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 
Alkali 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Books 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 
Caoutchouc manufactures* 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.41 
Chemical products and preparations, n. e. s. 0.76 0.80 0.92 0.96 0.99 
Copper manufactures* 0.89 0.79 0.88 0.82 0.80 
Cordage and twine* [0.88] [0.91] [0.90] [0.89] [0.89] 
Cotton manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Cotton yarn+ 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Drugs and medicinal preparations 0.90 0.95 0.94 [0.90] 0.94 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.44 
Glass [0.68] [0.73] [0.79] [0.81] [0.79] 
Hats 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.23 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof* 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.28 
Jute yarn 0.83 0.47 0.27 0.31 0.42 
Lead manufactures* [0.54] [0.65] [0.63] [0.60] [0.51] 
Leather manufactures [0.93] 0.94 0.98 [0.96] 0.99 
Linen manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 
Linen yarn+ 0.43 0.32 0.35 0.42 0.32 
Painters’ colours and materials 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.76 
Paper and manufactures thereof 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.97 
Silk manufactures+ [0.26] [0.36] [0.39] [0.37] [0.33] 
Spirits [0.41] [0.61] [0.55] [0.59] [0.56] 
Woollens and worsteds, excluding yarn+ 0.61 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.51 
Woollen and worsted yarn+ 0.71 0.59 0.68 0.76 0.65 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
Notes: * indicates a capital goods industry. + indicates a textile industry. G-L indices for net-import 
industries are noted in brackets. 
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Appendix 4.7.   Grubel-Lloyd indices for British manufacturing industries, 1870-94 
(continued) 
Industry 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 
Alkali 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 
Books 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.35 
Caoutchouc manufactures* 0.61 0.53 0.46 0.41 0.44 
Chemical products and preparations, n. e. s. 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.84 
Copper manufactures* 0.80 0.85 0.68 [0.90] 0.80 
Cordage and twine* [0.92] [0.87] [0.92] [0.99] [0.87] 
Cotton manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Cotton yarn+ 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Drugs and medicinal preparations 0.97 0.90 0.85 0.98 0.91 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 
Glass [0.74] [0.77] [0.76] [0.74] [0.78] 
Hats 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof* 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.22 
Jute yarn [0.96] 0.63 0.45 0.59 0.38 
Lead manufactures* [0.56] [0.60] [0.59] [0.57] [0.58] 
Leather manufactures 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.93 
Linen manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14 
Linen yarn+ 0.38 0.70 0.74 0.89 0.95 
Painters’ colours and materials 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.80 
Paper and manufactures thereof 0.94 [0.99] [0.96] 1.00 [0.96] 
Silk manufactures+ [0.32] [0.35] [0.37] [0.41] [0.35] 
Spirits [0.58] [0.58] [0.64] [0.74] [0.74] 
Woollens and worsteds, excluding yarn+ 0.56 0.58 0.54 0.61 0.63 
Woollen and worsted yarn+ 0.63 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.72 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
Notes: * indicates a capital goods industry. + indicates a textile industry. G-L indices for net-import 
industries are noted in brackets. 
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Appendix 4.7.   Grubel-Lloyd indices for British manufacturing industries, 1870-94 
(continued) 
Industry 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 
Alkali 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.12 
Books 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 
Caoutchouc manufactures* 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.56 
Chemical products and preparations, n. e. s. 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.76 0.79 
Copper manufactures* 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.81 0.85 
Cordage and twine* [0.95] [0.87] [0.90] [0.89] [0.82] 
Cotton manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Cotton yarn+ 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Drugs and medicinal preparations 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.90 
Earthenware and chinaware 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.49 
Glass [0.68] [0.61] [0.53] [0.48] [0.46] 
Hats 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.29 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof* 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 
Jute yarn 0.40 0.44 0.31 0.29 0.25 
Lead manufactures* [0.56] [0.48] [0.53] [0.46] [0.51] 
Leather manufactures 0.92 0.96 [0.96] [0.94] [0.91] 
Linen manufactures, excluding yarn+ 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.17 
Linen yarn+ 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.85 0.81 
Painters’ colours and materials 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.82 0.80 
Paper and manufactures thereof [0.92] [0.89] [0.79] [0.77] [0.69] 
Silk manufactures+ [0.33] [0.27] [0.25] [0.23] [0.17] 
Spirits [0.70] [0.69] [0.74] [0.74] [0.76] 
Woollens and worsteds, excluding yarn+ 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.77 0.82 
Woollen and worsted yarn+ 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.55 0.54 
Source: Calculated from Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom. See text. 
Notes: * indicates a capital goods industry. + indicates a textile industry. G-L indices for net-import 
industries are noted in brackets. 
